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As a response to recent calls for further insights into the factors that trigger board 
processes, this research investigated the determinants of trust in the boardroom. Following a 
review of existing literature on boards, a model explicating the hypothesised relationships 
between trust and its determinants (cognitive conflict, communication efficacy, the 
perception of board members’ competence, affective conflict, and familiarity), and the 
moderating effects of board meeting frequency and board tenure, was developed. This 
model was tested using responses from 97 UK companies. There were two significant 
findings: the perception of board members’ competence was positively related to trust, 
whereas affective conflict was negatively related to trust. Previous research has suggested 
that trust is an important determinant of board effectiveness, and this study contributes to the 
further understanding of what conditions in the boardroom facilitate or hinder the presence of 
trust. Thus, this research presents further knowledge on board processes and how they 
relate to each other. In terms of implications for practice, the research showed why boards of 
directors should engage in activities such as training and development that increase 
directors’ perception of each others’ competencies and why emotional conflict in the 
boardroom should be managed. 
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1.1 Background to the Research Project 
Corporate scandals across the globe have triggered the interest by scholars and 
practitioners on the topic of corporate governance and especially the role of boards of 
directors. The causes of these scandals havecommonly been attributed toexcessive risk 
taking, lack of transparency in decision-making, and the inadequate oversight of corporate 
executives (Isaksson and Kirkpatrick, 2009; Hsu and Wu, 2014), and subsequently public 
trust towards executive directors of organisations has dwindled (Migliore and DeClouette, 
2011; Pistone, 2010).To prevent scandals from re-occurring, corporate governance 
legislations and guidelines were put in place to enforce tighter accountability of directors, 
and stimulate improvements in board practices. These included, amongst others are greater 
reporting and disclosures requirements, separation of roles of the Chair and CEO, the 
inclusion of outside, independent directors on boards, and changes to directors’ pay and 
compensation  (Damianides, 2005; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Raiborn and Schorg, 
2004).These soft and hard laws relating to improved governance and board practices are 
strongly influenced by mainstream academic research, often based on agency theory 
(Barnhart et al., 1994; Dahya and McConnell, 2005; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999 
Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Johnson et al., 1996, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010).Although 
there are alternative corporate governance theories such as stewardship, resource 
dependence, and stakeholder theories, their focus has also tended to be on the ‘usual 
suspects’ of board structure and composition (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003), and how 
varying such board characteristics can lead to different performance outcomes (Daily et al., 
2003; Huse, 2005; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005). 
Yet, after decades of research, the relationship between board characteristics, 
especially the ‘usual suspects’, and firm performance remains elusive (Barnhart et al., 1994; 
Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999 Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Finkelstein and Mooney, 
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2003; Johnson et al., 1996). Johnson et al. (1996) compared the search for the link between 
board characteristics and firm performance to the search for the mystical unicorn and 
concluded that “…there can be two general rationales for our failure to “discover” this 
legendary species. First, this animal simply does not exist. Second, we have not searched in 
the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment.” (p. 433).In a similar vein, other 
scholars have argued that the inconclusive results are because this stream of research has 
treated boards akin to a ‘black box’ and failed to examine what is actually happening inside 
the boardroom (Huse, 1998, 2007; Pettigrew, 1992; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). In the 
pursuit of parsimony, agency and other mainstream governance scholars have tended to 
infer board behaviours from structural and compositional proxies using archival data, and 
have failed to consider social psychological factors that influence actual board behaviour and 
processes (see Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Huse, 1998; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Westphal, Seidel and Stewart, 2001). 
Due to these limitations, more recent research in corporate governance has 
increasingly moved away from the traditional board structure/ composition and performance 
studies towards behavioural perspectives on boards (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hambrick, 
v.Werder and Zajac, 2008; Huse, 2007; Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni and Vigano, 2011). 
Broadly speaking, these behavioural studies are different to the conventional board research 
in two main areas. First, behavioural studies draw on a wider range of theoretical 
perspectives (and associated concepts)in order to capture and explain socio-psychological 
processes that occur in the boardroom (Westphal and Zajac, 2013). Second, in order to 
capture the complexity of actual board processes and interactions, behavioural board 
scholars have eschewed traditional archival research methods and instead favoured 
approaches that brought them close to the phenomenon under investigation, including 
surveys of board members (Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009, 2012; Ong and 
Wang, 2005; Huse, 2007); participant and non-participant observation studies (Huse and 
Zattoni, 2008; Machold and Farquhar, 2013; Pugliese et al., 2015), interviews (Bailey and 
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Peck, 2013; Pye, 2001), and case study research (Veronesi and Keasey, 2012; Maitlis, 
2004; Parker, 2007, 2008).This research and its contributions to academic knowledge on 
boardsare situated within this behavioural stream of research in corporate governance.  
One of the contributions of the behavioural board literature has been to develop and 
test more complex and sophisticated models that explain board effectiveness. Following the 
work of Forbes and Milliken (1999) and Huse (2005) and drawing extensively on input-
process-output (IPO) models developed in small team research (Ilgen et al., 2005), 
researchers found that board processes mediate the relationship between board 
characteristics and board and/or firm performance outcomes, and that such processes are 
generally better predictors of performance than the ‘usual suspects’ (Finkelstein and 
Mooney, 2003; Hendry, 2010; Machold et al., 2011; Minichilli et al., 2012; Zona and Zattoni, 
2007; Zattoni et al., 2015). Despite our increasing knowledge of board processes, a number 
of gaps remain. First, by and large, researchers have leant on the original Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) model. This lead to a stronger emphasis on cognitive processes and fewer 
studies on affective dimensions of board interactions (Bankewitz, 2016; Brundin and 
Nordqvist, 2008). Second, the IPO approach views board processes as mediators between 
board compositional characteristics and board/ firm outcomes, and assumes that these 
processes work ‘side by side’ (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Findings from the small team 
literature, however, show that such relationships are much more complex and that 
processes themselves are interlinked (Colquitt et al., 2007; Jehn et al., 2001, 2008; Mayer et 
al., 1999; Parayitam and Dooley, 2007, 2009). For this reason, there has been a call for 
research on the antecedents or determinants of board processes that go beyond 
consideration of board structural characteristics (e.g. Farquhar, 2011; Huse, 2005; Minichilli 
et al., 2009; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005).  
This thesis seeks to add to knowledge on behavioural perspectives on board by 
investigating the determinants of trust in the boardroom. The next section will explain in 
more detail the reasons behind the focus of the study and the contribution it makes. 
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1.2 The Rationale for Studying Determinants of Trust and the Contribution to 
Knowledge 
The behavioural literature on boards places great emphasis on the human side of 
corporate governance, and the social-psychological processes and interactions between 
directors that shape how they make decisions and perform their tasks (Westphal and Zajac, 
2013; Huse, 2007). In this context, several scholars have emphasised the importance of 
trust between board members as an underlying condition that enables directors to negotiate 
their domains of responsibility, share knowledge and work towards a common goal (Huse, 
2007; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; van Ees et al. 2009). Put differently, trust in the boardroom is 
seen to be important because of how it shapes relational norms and board dynamics. 
Defining what is meant by trust is, however, not straightforward. Originally 
developed by sociologists (cf. Blau, 1964) and later applied as a construct within the 
organisational behaviour and small team literature (Gambetta, 1988; Kee and Knox, 1970; 
Mayer et al., 1995), there has been a great proliferation of studies that have extended and 
refined the concept. A more detailed discussion of this literature and the concept will be 
presented in chapter 3, but in essence, this thesis will consider trust as a multi-dimensional 
concept including both cognitive and affective dimensions (Gillespie and Mann, 2004; 
McAllister, 1995). Further, following Hosmer (1995), trust is essentially a relational concept, 
and in this thesis, the focus will be on relations between board members, that is trust within 
the board, as opposed totrust between other internal and/or external stakeholders (Huse, 
2007). 
There are three main reasons why this research has chosen to investigate trust in 
the boardroom and focus specifically on the determinants of trust. First, in the behavioural 
approach, boards are seen to be similar to teams and work groups in that they are a social 
system that performs one or more tasks within an organisational context (Bettenhausen, 
1991; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Boards face complex, multifaceted tasks that involve 
strategic issue processing (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). In order to 
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gain a better understanding of how board task performance is achieved, board processes 
such as cognitive conflict (Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009, 2012; Wan and 
Ong, 2005), use of knowledge and skills (Bankewitz, 2016; Khanna et al., 2014; Kor and 
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Minichilli et al., 2012; McDonald et al., 2008), and effort norms 
(Gabrielsson et al., 2007; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Wan and Ong, 2005; van Ees et al., 2008)  
have been extensively researched.Yet, despite scholars having highlighted the importance 
of trust to board functioning, there are only a few empirical studies of the phenomenon in the 
boardroom (Van Ees et al., 2008; 2009a; Huse and Zattoni, 2008; Farquhar, 2011).Clearly, it 
is an underexplored topic in board research and thus warrants further investigation. 
The second reason for focusing on trust as a boardroom process is related to the 
conceptualisation of trust as having both cognitive and affective dimensions (Huse and 
Zattoni, 2008; Gillespie and Mann, 2004). To date, the majority of board behavioural studies 
have tended to emphasise cognitive processes rather than affective ones (Bankewitz, 2016; 
Brundin and Nordqvist, 2004; Walker et al., 2015), yet team interactions are complex and 
multi-sided (Butler, 1999; Huse, 2007). Thus, the exploration of a concept that combines 
both rational and emotive dimensions has the potential to bring us closer to understanding 
actual board behaviours and inter-relational dynamics between board members (Migliore 
and DeClouette, 2011). 
Third, as noted above, much of the behavioural literature has followed an IPO 
approach seeking to understand board processes as mediators between board 
characteristics and board/firm performance. We lack knowledge on the determinants of 
board processes other than board structural and compositional characteristics. As the small 
team literature indicates, far from being atomised, processed are related and may serve as 
triggers for each other (Jehn et al., 2001; Parayitam and Dooley, 2007, 2009). Hence, this 
research will focus specifically on the determinants of trust in the boardroom. Following 
Stiles and Taylor (2001), boards of directors are an especially interesting setting to 
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investigate how trust develops given the complexity, fluidity and ambiguities under which 
board members interact, shape their roles and reach decisions.   
There are also practical reasons for choosing to study trust in this research. A 
recent report by the Rock Centre for Corporate Governance at Stanford University and The 
Miles Group (TMG) highlighted continued concerns by directors over underlying boardroom 
dynamics and especially raised concerns that levels of trust are not sufficiently high for 
boards to perform effectively (Larcker et al., 2016). Stephen Miles, the CEO of  TMG noted 
that “There is clearly sub-optimization happening in boards and it has an impact on trust as 
well as overall board effectiveness.” (Larcker et al., 2016, p.1). A better understanding of 
what triggers or suppresses relational norms such as trust is, therefore, important in 
improving board effectiveness. Many of the recent reforms in corporate governance as 
reflected in corporate governance codes have focused on strengthening the control role of 
boards. For example, codes emphasise the importance of board independence and are 
recommending separate leadership structures, the appointment of independent non-
executive directors, and limits to the tenure of non-executive directors (cf. FRC, UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2016). Whilst this has undoubtedly helped strengthen the 
monitoring and control aspects, many academic and practitioner reports continue to highlight 
that it is engagement in strategic tasks that has the highest impact on boards’ ability to add 
value (Pugliese et al., 2009; Bhagat et al., 2013). A recent survey by McKinsey distinguished 
between 3 types of boards – ineffective, complacent and striving boards. Within the highest 
performing boards, striving boards, directors also reported a culture of trust and respect 
(Kehoe et al., 2016). Greater understanding of what triggers such a boardroom culture and 
atmosphereis, therefore, crucial in developing boards’ strategic task performance. In sum, an 
investigation of the determinants of trust opens possibilitiesto also develop guidelines for 
practitioners to improve boardroom culture and effectiveness. 
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Following the above, this research seeks to contribute to knowledge on behavioural 
dimensions of theboard by investigating the determinants of trust in boards. Specifically, the 
underlying research question is ‘What cognitive and affectivefactors influence the presence 
of trust in boards?’. In more detail, the objectives of this research are: 
1. To develop a conceptual model of the affective and cognitive determinants of 
trust in boards. This will involve the development of a multi-dimensional of concept of trust in 
boards, as well as the theoretical derivation of cognitive and affective determinants based on 
a review of the literature on trust within teams. 
2. To empirically test the conceptual model. This will involve operationalizing the 
concepts; designing, piloting and executing a survey of boards; and analysing and 
interpreting the results. The UK has been chosen as the empirical setting for this research 
for a number of reasons. Even though the UK has been at the forefront of developments in 
corporate governance, there continue to be concerns about board effectiveness as 
evidenced by the recent financial crisis (House of Commons, Treasury Committee, 2009). 
Second, in contrast to most continental governance systems, the UK has a unitary board 
structureand is, therefore, a particularly useful empirical setting to explore interaction that 
occurs between different types of directors (executive and non-executive). 
3. To derive implications for theory and practice. Contrary to mainstream corporate 
governance literature based on agency theory, this research explicitly focuses on socio-
psychological dimensions of board interactions. The findings of this study will, therefore, 
contribute to providing an alternative perspective to theorising on boards from a behavioural 
perspective. The implications for practice will outline how boards need to go beyond 
compliance with codes to develop high performing boardroom cultures. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
D E T E R M I N A N T S  O F  T R U S T  I N  T H E  B O A R D R O O M | 18 
 
1.3 Summary of the Thesis Content 
This thesis contains a total of seven chapters. This section provides a general 
summary of the subsequent chapters in this thesis.  
Chapter 2- presents the review of the research on corporate governance and 
boards of directors in two parts. The first part reviews the mainstream theoretical and 
empirical literature that has focused on the link between board structure and performance. 
The theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter are agency,stewardship, resource 
dependence, and stakeholder theories of corporate governance, and the implications of 
these theories for the role and function of boards will be discussed. The second part of the 
chapter reviews the literature on behavioural perspectives on boards which include a) the 
application of the behavioural theory of the firm to understanding boards and b) board 
processes and their determinants based on IPO models drawn from the small team 
literature. This chapter seeks to highlight the current state-of-art of knowledge on boards of 
directors, as well as locating the thesis within this body of work. 
Chapter 3-develops the conceptual model of the relationship between trust and its 
determinants. This involves reviewing the literature on trust in teams and defining the 
concept. Further, the existing literature on trust in teams, and the emerging literature on trust 
in boards will be used to derive the affective and cognitive determinants of trust, as well as 
potential interaction variables. Hypotheses are then formulated. 
Chapter 4-presents the methodology of this research. Having considered 
alternative methods, a quantitative survey designwas chosen and used in investigating the 
relationship between trust and its determinants. The chapter describes in detail the research 
design and implementation, including questionnaire development; the research population 
and sampling; validity and reliability checks; and sources of biases and how these were 
addressed. Ethical concerns and how these were dealt with will also be discussed. 
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Chapter 5- presents the results and findings of the data analysis testing for the 
determinants of trust in the boardroom. A regression analysis was employed in this chapter 
to test the hypotheses outlined in chapter 3.  
Chapter 6- discusses the results of the research in Chapter 5 in relation to existing 
literature and its contribution to the stream of research on the behavioural approach to 
boards.  
Chapter 7- concludes the research by highlighting the contribution to knowledge, 
the limitation of the research, and recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: TRADITIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES AND 
BEHAVIOURAL PERSPECTIVES ON BOARDS 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the term corporate governance is fairly recent in academic scholarship, 
discussions about the nature of companies, how companies are directed and controlled and 
in whose interests, and the roles and responsibilities of directors can be traced as far back 
as the history of corporations themselves (cf. Smith, 1937 [1776]; Berle and Means, 1932; 
Morck, 2007). Although there is no commonly agreed definition of corporate governance, it is 
typically seen to encompass the structures, systems and mechanismsby which companies 
are controlled, directed, and made accountable to stakeholders (Cadbury, 1992; OECD 
2004; Conyon and Peck, 1998).  
Within the various corporate governance mechanisms, the board of directors is 
typically seen as a central one and has been described as being at the ‘apex of the internal 
decision control system’ (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). It is therefore not 
surprising that there is a voluminous literature on boards spanning many decades and 
discipline areas. Finance and economics scholars, largely drawing on transaction cost and 
agency theory, have tended to view the board of directors as a key control mechanism to 
protect shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Legalscholarship has drawn on the property rights theory (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972) and more recently the team production theory of corporate law (Blair and 
Stout, 1999) to identify the rights and responsibilities of boards and directors in relation to 
other actors within firms. Sociologists have studied boards and directors as part of wider 
power structures in societies (Useem, 1984),and have also drawn attention to boards a 
mechanism that links organisations to their external environment and through which 
resources, power and legitimacy are obtained and constructed (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Galaskiewicz, 1985). Finally, management 
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scholars have drawn on multiple theoretical perspectives including managerial hegemony, 
upper echelons, stewardship and resource-based views to understand boards within a wider 
framework of organisational value creation (or destruction) (Mace, 1971; Andrews, 1981; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to review this entire body of work on boards of 
directors. Instead, the focus will be broadly on how boards contribute to organisationalvalue 
creation, and more specifically the theoretical and empirical literature that has sought to 
explain how boards impact on firm performance.Early studies, including the seminal work by 
Mace (1971), were skeptical about boards having any effect on firm performance and 
described boards as passively rubber-stamping management decisions. Corporate 
governance changes and new theoretical developments from the late 1970s and 1980s 
onwards led to a renewal of interest in boards, and especially the role of boards in controlling 
management actions and behaviours (Fama and Jensen, 1976; Kosnik, 1990; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991), but also boards’ roles as boundary spanners through corporate networks 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Burt, 1980; Pennings, 1980).This initiated a voluminous stream 
of literature that examined how board structure and composition, and especially 
characteristics associated with board independence, impact on firm performance (Certo, 
2003; Daily et al., 2003; Finkelstein et al., 2008; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). Nevertheless, despite decades of empirical research, the evidence linking 
board composition to firm performance remained equivocal(e.g. Daily et al., 2003; Dalton 
and Dalton, 2011; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). This has led to a change in the direction 
of board research and scholars have proposed an alternative way of theorizing about 
corporate boards by introducing behavioural perspectives in an attempt to better understand 
and explain what makes boards effective (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; Kroll et al., 2008; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005, 
van Ees et al., 2009b). 
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The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, thischapter will present an overview of 
the literature on corporate governance theories that underpin the conceptualisation 
of board roles and tasks, and a synthesis of the empirical findings on the relationship 
between board structure/composition and firm performance. The aim here is to 
present an overview of what constitutes the board structure/composition research 
and its criticisms leading to the second part of this chapter. Second is the review of 
theliterature on the new directions and alternative theorisingin the research on 
boards and corporate governance that emanated from the limitation of the 
mainstream research on board structure/composition.This part of the chapter will 
focus on the behavioural perspectives on boards by distinguishing betweenthe 
behavioural theory of boards derived from the application of the behavioural theory 
of the firm (van Ees et al., 2009b), and the stream of research in an input-process-
output model tradition derived from team literature and applied to corporate boards 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999).Emphasis will be on why there has been a call to study 
board behavioural processes and dynamics in and around the boardroom to better 
understand conditions for effective corporate governance. From the review of the 
behavioural stream of research examining board processes, the primary objective of this 
research will be focused on -which is to identify the potential determinants of board 
processes - specifically, those for trust in the boardroom. 
2.2 Traditional Theories on Corporate Governance and Board Characteristics 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed agency theory to explain what happens in 
agency relationships, a contractual relationship under which one or more persons (i.e. the 
principal) employ another person or a group of individuals (i.e. the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf, which usually involves the delegation of a degree of decision-making. 
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When propounding the theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed a 'theory of the firm' 
to explain the conflict of interest between the parties involved in the agency relationship and 
the consequences thereof. The main actors in this relationship are shareholders who are the 
principals and corporate managers who are the agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; WIliamson, 1984). According to agency theorists, this relationship is 
based on the human behavioural assumptions that people are boundedly rational, self-
interested, and utility maximizers (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
assumption of bounded rationality means that people make rational decisions within their 
limited capabilities. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that if both parties are 
self-interested and utility maximizers, there is a reason to believe that the agent will not 
always act in the best interest of the principal. There is also the assumption of the principals’ 
and the agents’ differing attitude towards risk. While the principal is assumed to be risk 
neutral, the agent is assumed to be risk averse (Eisenhardt, 1989). Taking into account 
these assumptions, agency theory is concerned with resolving two main problems that 
ensue in the principal-agent relationship. These problems are (1) conflicting goals of the 
principal and the agent, and their different attitudes towards risk; (2) the principal’s difficulty 
of verifying the activity of the agent which refers to the problem of ‘information asymmetry’ 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Given these problems, agency theory explains why the firm exists 
despite the inherent conflict of interests between the principal and the agent. Due to the 
conflicting interests, agency theorists recommend the use of contracts to align the principals’ 
and the agents’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). These are outcome-based contracts and 
behavioural-based contracts. According to Eisenhardt (1989), finding the optimal contract 
that will align the interests of both parties is dependent on varying levels of output 
uncertainty, risk aversion, and the available information to the principal. On the one hand, if 
the principal is completely aware of the activity of the agent (i.e. when information is 
available), the behavioural contract will be the optimal contract. On the other hand, if the 
principal has no access to information or is unaware of the activities of the agent, an 
outcome-based contract is the optimal contract (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shankman, 1999). When 
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information is unavailable, or the actions of the agent are not entirely observable, two 
agency problems are cited in the principal-agent relationship. These problems are called 
‘contracting problems’ and include moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In the principal-agent relationship, moral hazard describes a situation whereby the agent 
takes advantage of being protected from the consequences of a risky behaviour knowing 
that the principal or the investor will incur the costs of such actions. Adverse selection is 
when the principal cannot verify the skills and abilities of the agent (i.e. hidden information) 
before hiring or while the agent is acting on behalf of the principal. 
To mitigate these contracting problems, the principal is compelled to invest in 
information systems such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures, boards of directors, 
and additional layers of management (Eisenhardt, 1989; Nyberg et al., 2010). According to 
Eisenhardt (1989), investing in these systems that inform or reveal the agent’s behaviour to 
the principal are likely to curb the inherent opportunism of agents. These attempts to solve 
the problems associated with the principal-agent relationship are what results in ‘agency 
costs’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs 
are the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual losses. Due to information 
asymmetry, monitoring costs are incurred by the principal when an independent party 
(usually the board of directors) is hired to scrutinise the activity of the agent or managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shankman, 1999). Given the emphasis placed on information 
asymmetries by agency theorists, the principal could also use incentives withthe agent or 
output-based contracts to minimise the potential divergence interest (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In sum, the investment in systems through the appointment of the board of directors 
and/or the use of incentive systems to exact control over the agent are called ‘monitoring 
costs’ incurred by theprincipal (Easterbrook, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
‘Bonding costs’ are the costs the agent incurs in an attempt to show that his/her 
actions/decisions are in favour of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, 
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agents or managers could easily forgo profit voluntarily for the growth of the organisation or 
to add intrinsic value to the firm. This opportunity cost of organisational growth amongst 
other decisions the agent makes on behalf of the principal is called the bonding cost (Hewitt 
and Brown, 2000). The impact of bonding costs on the agent are usually profound when the 
principal uses an 'outcome-based contract' to align interests in their relationship (Eisenhardt, 
1989). This allows the principal to shift the consequences of misguided or poor managerial 
decisions on the agent. A common way of doing this is to use equity-linked compensation 
amongst other incentive systems (Burns and Keida, 2004). According to Daily et al. (2003), 
managerial compensation or incentives (such as stock options, ownership concentration, 
short run incentive and other incentives) are also capable of mitigating against conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders. Such managerial compensation and incentive 
systems encourage managers to adopt practices that insulate shareholders from managerial 
self-interest. The use of equity and other forms of compensation may make managers less 
risk averse and more likely to take on positive net present value, risky projects (Burns and 
Keida, 2004). In sum, bonding costs are the costs of assuring the principals that their interest 
will be prioritised, hence, relieving agency issues associated with 'adverse selection' from 
the principals’ standpoint (Hewitt and Brown, 2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hansmann, 
1980). 
‘Residual loss’ is the cost incurred when there is some divergence between the 
agent’s decisions and those decisions that will maximise the interest of the principal (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). To summarise, where the principal may incur costs to protect personal 
interests, the agent may also incur costs by bearing full responsibility for the actions taken 
on behalf of the principal. Irrespective of who bears what cost, these are all costs associated 
with the principal-agent relationship (i.e. agency costs). Therefore, monitoring costs, bonding 
costs, and residual loss are incurred in an attempt to align interests in the principal-agent 
relationship and to solve agency problems.  
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In agency theory, the role of the board is to monitor and control agents (Boyd, 
1990; Daily et al., 1996; Eisenhardt, 1989; Garrat, 1997; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1992). The monitoring role of the board of directors includes 
activities such as monitoring the CEO, monitoring strategy implementation, planning 
CEO succession and evaluating and compensating CEO/top managers of the firm 
while the control role of the board includes hiring, firing and remunerating the 
management.  
According to agency theorists, certain characteristics of the board are more likely 
to facilitate effective monitoring and control of theagents and could lead to better firm 
performance (Daily et al., 2003).  The main focus of agency theorists is on the 
concept of board independence, i.e. the ability of the board to exercise control 
without undue influence by the agents (managers) (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Daily et 
al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1996; Westphal, 1998).Agency theorists, 
therefore,suggests the presence of a higher proportion of independent outside 
directors on corporate boards (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Nicholson and Kiel, 2003)in order to achieve effective monitoring of 
the actions of self-interested managers. A director is usually seen to be independent 
if he/she has no employment, financial or familial ties with the focal firm and its 
management team and thus be free of influence from the CEO and the management 
team (Bhagat et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 1996; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Westphal, 
1998). According to Dalton and Dalton (2011), board independence as prescribed by 
agency theory may refer to the willingness and the ability of board members to 
monitor a firm and its management responsibly. Responsible monitoring is seen to 
occur when the board independently scrutinises management in a way that promotes 
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shareholders’ interests (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, and Dalton, 2008; Fogel and Geier, 
2007).  
Another element of board independence has to do with how the roles of the CEO 
and the chairperson are structured. For the purpose of independence and achieving 
an optimal leadership structure, agency theorists recommended that the posts of the 
chair and the CEO be assigned to two individuals (Boyd, 1995; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). This is because the presence of CEO-duality is argued to reduce the 
effectiveness of board monitoring and would lead to a person having a significant 
amount of power that influences decision-making and the control of the management 
(Boyd, 1995; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Mizruchi, 1983). Additionally, advocates for 
agency theory argue that without such separation, directors are unable to evaluate 
the performance, policies, and practices of a firm's executive management 
dispassionately (see Chi, 2009; Conger and Lawler, 2009; Jensen, 1993; MacAvoy 
and Millstein, 2003; Monks and Minow, 2008). As suggested by agency theorists, 
CEO duality compromisesboard independence and the ability of the board to monitor 
effectively and control managerial self-interest. 
Regarding the optimal board composition, agency theorists have also discussed 
the issue of board size. On the one hand, there is an argument that larger boards will 
better monitor the management due to a greater number of people scrutinising their 
activities. On the other hand, if the board exceeds a certain size, decision-making 
could be compromised as sub-groups form which could allow the CEO to dominate. 
Therefore, Jensen (1993) suggested an upper bound of eight directors as any 
number above this will inhibit higher board performance. 
There have been numerous studies that have sought to test the predictions from agency 
theory regarding board characteristics and performance outcomes but the evidence is 
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mixed(Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Ahmed et al., 2006; Crespi-Cladera and Pascual-
Fuster, 2014; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Harris and Raviv, 2008; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Johnson et al., 1996; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; 
Raheja, 2005).Researchers whohave used the presence of outside directors to proxy for 
board independence in various national contexts found that it has a positive impact on firms’ 
financial and operating performance, especially when accompanied with other organisational 
variables (Choi et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2015; Pearce and Zahra, 1991).Where these studies 
have shown that the representation of independent outside directors on corporate 
boards is positively associated with firm performance, other studies have evidenced 
negative consequences or a non-correlation. For example, evidence from US firms 
shows a non-correlation between board independence and performance outcomes (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Dalton et al., 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003; Hossain et al., 2001; Yermack, 1996). In addition, some studies have reported an 
inverse curvilinear relationship between board independence and firm performance 
(Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998). Meta-analytic studies that examined the impact of board 
independence in the form of outside director representation in different countries and 
contexts have also revealed no substantive evidence to support its influence on performance 
(e.g. Barnhart et al., 1994; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2008; Fogel andGrier, 2007; 
Rhoades et al., 2000). It is without surprise that Barnhart et al. (1994) concluded in their 
research that there is “no relation between director independence and performance, whether 
measured by accounting or stock return measures” (p.1814). 
Researchers have also been unable to find a consistently clear positive or negative 
impact of CEO duality on performance outcomes. For example, in Krause and Semadeni’s 
(2013) study of different forms of duality in Standard and Poor’s 1500 and Fortune’s 1000 
firms, their findings emphasises the non-systematic effect the separation of the CEO and 
chairperson has on performance. They found that the separation of the leadership roles 
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positively impacts on future performance when present firm performance is poor but 
negatively impacts on future performance when present performance is high. They also 
found that different types of CEO-chairperson separation have distinct consequences for a 
firm with little to suggest that the separation of the leadership roles will always have a 
positive impact on firm performance. Ballinger and Marcel (2010) and Quigley and Hambrick 
(2012) found that CEO duality, even in the case of CEO interim successions, has a clear 
weakening negative effect on firm performance. Similar to these findings is that of Peng et 
al. (2007) when evidence from China shows that there is little support for the agency 
theoretic proposition of a positiverelationship between board independence and firm 
performance.In Dalton and Dalton’s (2011) integrated micro and macro research of the 
impact board structure and CEO duality has on firm performance, they found that there is 
virtually no evidence relating firm financial performance to CEO duality. Considering the 
amount of multi-disciplinary primary research, narrative reviews, and meta-analysis that 
extend over many years regarding the impact of leadership structure of boards on firm 
performance, it hasn’t been easier to summarise that there is no substantive evidence to 
support the relationship between aboard’s leadership structure and the performance of a firm 
(Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2008; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Dey et al., 2009; Faleye, 
2007; Iyengar and Zampelli, 2009). 
The lack of empirical support for the agency theoretical views on board 
composition and leadership structure is associated with two main issues. The first is 
how board independence is defined and observed. There are no clear guidelines for 
identifying an independent board and no common consensus regarding the definition of 
board independence(Brennan et al., 2004; Rashid, 2015). Some researchers have 
used the proportion of outside directors who can make decisions without the 
influence of the firm’s executive management as a proxy for board independence 
(Johnson et al., 1996). Nevertheless, Weisbach (1988) and, later,Crespi-Cladera and 
Pascual-Fuster (2014), point out that outside directors are not synonymous with 
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independence since they may have personal or economic ties to the firm, and that 
we should distinguish between outside, inside and ‘Grey’ directors.Johnson et al. 
(1996) also raised this issue regarding the extent to which outside directors are truly 
independent of the executive management. They identified a variety of factors (such 
as having a personal, economic, and professional dealings with the firm or its 
management) that may diminish the level of the independence of outside directors. 
In a similar vein, Westphal (1998) investigates how interpersonal behaviours 
between CEOs and outside board members can influence observable structural 
power.Some researchers have attempted to investigate how strictly independent 
directors and Grey directors’ impact on firm performance but have found no 
substantial evidence to support the relationship (Crespi-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster, 
2014; Hsu and Wu, 2014). Hsu and Wu (2014) found that firms with grey directors 
are less likely to fail while Crespi-Cladera and Pascual-Fuste's (2014) study revealed 
a weak negative relationship between non-strictly independent directors and the 
future performance of a firm. 
The second issue has to do with how firm performance is empirically measured 
(e.g. market versus accounting-based performance measures), and how intervening factors 
arecontrolled. According to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), the measurement of firm 
performance is likely to be a function of many other factors of which board characteristics 
could be one of them, as proposed by agency theory. This constraint of measuring firm 
performance makes it difficult to isolate the impact board characteristics has on 
performance, hence the limitation of empirically testing agency theorists’recommendation on 
board composition. Dalton and Dalton (2011) and others also pointed out that research had 
operationalised firm performance in many different ways (see Daily et al., 1999; Dalton et al., 
1998; DeRue et al., 2009; Rhoades et al., 2000). Because of the problems associated with 
using firm performance as an outcome measure, more recent literature has sought to look at 
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the effects ofboard structure/composition on board decisions. For example, studies have 
explored how board composition impacts on board decisions such as mergers and 
acquisitions, the use of debt, appointment of new inside directors, lawsuits, levels of CEO 
compensation and so on (Deutsch, 2005; Gillette et al., 2003; Henry, 2004).Agency theorists 
suggest that mergers and acquisitionsare used to protect shareholders from poor managerial 
behaviour(Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The board of directors are responsible 
forrecommending and approving such decisions regarding potential acquisitions. In line with 
agency theory, existing studies suggest that shareholders believe that independent directors 
are more likely to act in their best interest when making decisions regarding acquisitions 
(Cotter et al., 1997; Cole, Fatemi and Vu, 2007; Brickley et al., 1994; McWilliams and Sen, 
1997). This is based on the argument that independent directors increase the likelihood of 
good corporate decisions regarding acquisitions via their monitoring role (Donna, 2007; 
Jensen, 1986). However, Deutsch (2005) revealed in a meta-analysis of the systematic 
relationship between board composition and six of the seven critical decisions that boards 
make (which includes those of mergers and acquisitions) that there was little evidence to 
support agency theory’s predictions. 
As per the decision to initiate lawsuits, this is used to signal a breakdown in the 
shareholder-director relationship, especially when targeted towards a board of directors 
(Crutchley et al., 2015; Kesner et al., 1990). Board members may be sued for failing to 
maintain their fiduciary duties in the oversight of the opportunistic management or 
participating in misleading shareholders. Kesner et al. (2015) showed in their research that 
this is usually the case when boards have a greater proportion of inside directors. In line with 
agency theory’s monitoring arguments, the presence of board independence is argued to 
reduce corporate wrongdoing (Jensen, 1986). This argument is consistent with Uzun et al. 
(2004) who found that as the number of independent directors increased in boards’ auditing 
and compensation committees, the possibility of fraud is decreased. 
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The decision on CEO compensation is a responsibility delegated to the board of 
directors (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). The traditional agency theory assumption of 
optimal contracting sees the board as the representative of shareholders whose main role is 
to constrain and monitor managerial power by introducing ownership interest in executive 
compensation packages (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Finkelstein, 1992; Yermack, 1996). The 
board of directors' independence is a corporate governance mechanism that makes this 
achievable (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Ben‐Amar and Zeghal, 2011). Previous studies have 
examined the relationship between top executive compensation and board independence or 
outside member representation has produced mixed results. For instance, Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1989) had reported that decisions on CEO compensation are not related to the 
proportion of outside directors on the board. Contrary to these findings, Boyd (1994) and 
Lambert et al. (1991) presented a positive relation between CEO compensation and the 
percentage of the board composed of outside directors. In a more recent research, it was 
found that CEO compensation is positively related to theproportion of the outside board 
members and CEO duality (Ben‐Amar and Zeghal, 2011; Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; 
Ya’acob, 2016). 
2.2.1.1 Agency Theory Summary 
Agency theory argues that the primary role of boards is to monitor and control the 
inherent opportunism of managers (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, the structure and composition of boards (i.e. the presence of a majority of 
independent directors and an independent chair) should influence the ability of boards to 
effectively carry out their monitoring and control roles (Boyd, 1995; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). There is growing empirical evidence 
that continues to question the efficacy and applicability of agency theory, especially 
regarding board composition and leadership structure and their impacts on firm 
performance. Hermalin and Weisbach’s (2003) in their review of the economics and finance 
literature on boards concluded that there is limited evidence that links board structure and 
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composition to board outcomes and performance. Similarly, in the review of management 
literature, Daily et al. (2003) did not find empirical support for the monitoring and control 
approach to corporate governance using shareholder value as a measure of performance. 
Dalton and Dalton (2011) also pointed to the fact that there is virtually no evidence relating to 
firm performance regarding these fundamental governance structures. The lack of empirical 
support for the suggested impact of board structure and composition hasbeen associated 
with two main issues. On the one hand, scholars have pointed to the inadequacies of 
analyses used to examine the relationship between governance structure and firm 
performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). These include unclear explanations of how 
board independenceis observed, the inconsistent measures of firm performance that fail to 
capture other variables that likely impacts on performance, and problems with endogeneity 
(Brennan et al., 2004; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 2003; Park et al., 2003). Researchers 
have also tested how board independence (outside directors and/or leadership structure) 
affects critical board decisions (Deutsch, 2005). Research on this relationship has also 
largely produced mixed results (e.g. Boyd,1994; Cole et al., 2007; Deutsch, 2005; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Ya’acob, 2016). 
Apart from the empirical concerns, there are other critiques related to agency theory 
in itself. For example, agency theory identified the potential issues inherent in the principal-
agent relationship and had proposed the use of corporate mechanisms (e.g. boards) to 
reduce the impact of this problem (Georgeta and Ştefan, 2012; Kosse and Senbet, 1998). 
These mechanisms are also expected to strengthen the internal control of companies, 
ensuring monitoring and control for a firm to reduce agents’ opportunistic behaviours and 
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Shapiro, 2005). The main criticism is related to how agency theory has 
described the behaviour of the agent as potentially self-serving. This description is 
dominated by an economic perspective on human behaviour and has been criticised as 
being either overly simplistic or false(Pepper and Gore, 2012; Daily et al., 2003; Hendry, 
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2005; Stout, 2012). Human behaviour is complex and could be motivated by other factors 
beyond self-interest (or indeed pure altruism) (Westphal and Zajac, 2013). Some scholars 
have argued that the imposition of control mechanisms may impact adversely on the self-
esteem and confidence of agents as this will inhibit the motivation of agents (Frey, 1993; 
Shapiro, 2005). These criticisms of agency theory identified amongst others have led to a 
call for an alternative theory that contrasts or complements the agency theoretical 
perspective (Roberts et al., 2005). Examples of these alternative theories include 
stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, and resource dependence theory. The following 
sections will present a review of these theories in light of their alternative recommendation 
on board structure and performance. 
2.2.2 Stewardship Theory 
From the psychology and sociology perspectives, proponents of stewardship theory 
introduced an opposing view to agency theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 
1997). The whole concept of stewardship theory grew from Donaldson and Davis’ (1991) 
seminal paper. In stewardship theory, a behavioural premise is used to explain the 
relationship between stewards/managers and the principal/shareholders (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997). The theory holds that there is no inherent general problem 
of executive motivation in the relationship between the managers and the shareholders 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). According to Davis et al. (1997), the steward is devoted to 
maximising the shareholders’ wealth through higher firm performance. The reason for this is 
that managers are regarded as trustworthy and will serve in the interest of their principal. 
This stewardship behaviour, Hernandez (2012; p.174) is explained to be ‘the extent to which 
an individual willingly subjugates his or her personal interests to act in protection of others’ 
long-term welfare’. According to Hernandez (2012), this represents the moral commitment 
that binds both parties, enabling them to work towards a common goal without taking 
advantage of each other. In describing managers’ loyalty to their employers, stewardship 
theorists used their root perspective in psychology and sociology to describe how humans 
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behave (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997; Fox and Hamilton, 1994). They 
described the ‘steward’s behaviour as organisation centred, seeking to improve 
organisational performance by satisfying the principal’ (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003; p. 154). 
Davis et al. (1997) used the ‘model of man’ to buttress this point. The model described man 
as predominantly pro-organisational and collective. In other words, when there is an 
alignment of interest between shareholders and managers, managers will derive maximum 
utility (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 2010; Hernandez, 2012). Therefore, it is 
recommended that managers should be granted autonomy on the basis of trust (Davis et al., 
1997). This eliminates the need to incur monitoring costs by the shareholder and the 
stewards incurring bonding costs. More so, such autonomy serves as a source of motivation 
to the manager and is organisational-centric. 
Given the absence of motivational problems among executives, stewardship theory 
holds that performance variations are dependent on the structural situation of executives 
(Davis et al., 1997). Therefore, the theory states that high corporate performance can be 
achieved as long as there are clear and consistently structured roles and expectations that 
authorise and empower senior management or the CEO (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
Based on this stewardship view of management, a leadership structure whereby the CEO is 
also the chairperson of the board (i.e. CEO-duality) is recommended because it encourages 
the unity of direction, strong command, and control that benefits the organisation (Davis et 
al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Donaldson, 1990). CEO-duality also enables the 
CEO to exercise complete authority over the corporation, making the role unambiguous and 
unchallenged (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Considering these 
arguments for the fusion of the incumbency of the CEO and the chairperson, stewardship 
theorists holds that CEO duality will facilitate a superior firm performance than when these 
functions are separated (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In harmony with theoretical 
stewardship recommendation on board structure, researchers as Boyd (1995), Kota and 
Tomar (2010), and Chiang and Lin (2007) have found that CEO-duality has a significant 
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positive influence on firm performance. These higher performance outcomes were linked to 
the effectiveness of explicit leadership and unity of command. Irrespective of these findings, 
it is useful to note that accumulated research on the effects of duality on firm performance is 
ambiguous (Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Finegold et al., 2007). For example, studies that have 
used stock market measures for performance have found no significant effect of CEO duality 
(Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993, 1997; Rechner and Dalton, 1989; Baliga et al., 1996; Brickley 
et al., 1997). Studies that have also used financial measures for performance havefound that 
CEO duality has a mixed effect. While some have discovered a positive impact (e.g. Daily 
and Dalton, 1994; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003), others have found 
adverse consequences (e.g. Coles, McWilliams, and Sen, 2001; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). 
Stewardship theoristshave also recommended the optimal board composition that 
involves a significant proportion of inside directors on corporate boards. This is for 
the purpose of effective and efficient decision-making (Davis et al., 1997; Nicholson 
and Kiel, 2007). According to Nicholson and Kiel (2007), stewardship theorists 
recommend a higher proportion of inside directors because it facilitates performance 
in the form of more profit for shareholders. In comparing the impacts of inside 
directors to outside directors, Davis et al. (1997) suggested that if inside directors are 
left unimpeded by outside directors, they are more likely to be motivated and will 
work towards the long-term success of the organisation. Although it is useful to note 
that the finding of Wanger et al.’s(1998) meta-analysis shows that increasing the 
number of both inside and outside directors has different positive impacts on firm 
performance. A possible explanation for this empirical finding can be found in Raheja 
(2005), who argued that inside directors could improve performance as they are a 
major source of firm-specific information and experience. However, they may have 
distorted objectives due to private benefits. As for outside directors, they introduce a 
level of independence and monitoring and are also capable of providing superior 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
D E T E R M I N A N T S  O F  T R U S T  I N  T H E  B O A R D R O O M | 37 
 
performance, but they are less informed about the firm’s constraints and 
opportunities (Arosa et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2015; Raheja, 2005). In Liu et al.’s (2015) 
evidence from China, they showed that independent outside directors play a major 
role in constraining inside directors' self-dealing and are also capable of improving 
investment efficiency. For these reasons, Finegold et al. (2007) argued that theorists 
such as Fama and Jensen (1983) who are pushing for the presence of a higher 
proportion of unaffiliated or outside directors on a corporate board could harm firm 
performance. This prescription deprives the board of valuable firm and industry-
specific knowledge. After building on the meta-analysis conducted by Zahra and 
Pearce (1989), Finegold et al. (2007) found that the ratio of inside and outside 
directors leads to firm performance, not one above the other. This finding is similar to 
that of Wanger et al. (1998).However, other empirical findings have upheld the 
stewardship view that a higher proportion of inside directors has a positive impact on 
performance. For example, in research based on this stewardship proposition, it was 
found that there is a significant positive relationship between boards with a greater 
proportion of inside directors and higher firm performance and shareholders’ wealth 
(Arthurs et al., 2008; Donaldson and Davis, 1991;Klein,1998; Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). 
Considering the recommended structure and composition, proponents of 
stewardship theory lay more emphasis on the strategic role of corporate boards (Boyd, 1995; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Gopinath et al., 1994; Stiles, 2001). The strategic role of boards 
in strategy development and implementation, collaborating, and mentoring of the 
management contributes to the overall stewardship of the management and company (Huse, 
2007; Hung, 1998; Shen, 2003; Stiles, 2001; Stiles and Taylor, 1996; Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003). Stiles and Taylor (1996) indicated that boards take a larger role in the 
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development of strategies. Also in Demb and Neubauer’s (1992) survey of 71 directors, an 
increasing emphasis was found in the formulation of the strategy role of boards in relation to 
their performances. When stewardship theory described the role of boards as collaborative, 
this suggests that boards should collaborate with the management for the development of 
strategic formulation and implementation (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  Additional to 
the strategic role of boards, Shen (2003) highlights the mentoring of management role which 
involves the coaching of management in strategic decision-making.  
2.2.2.1 Stewardship Theory-Summary 
Stewardship theory describes managers as stewards who readily put the interests 
of the principal/shareholders ahead of self-serving interest (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
The interests of the manager and that of shareholders are aligned (Corbetta and Salvato, 
2004; Davis et al., 2010; Hernandez, 2012). For this reason, the principal/shareholders 
should create an organisational structure that encourages stewardship behaviour in a 
collectivist and cooperative manner to facilitate firm performance. Given this, stewardship 
theorists recommend that the roles of the CEO and chair should be conferred on one 
individual for the purpose of consistency and a clearly defined leadership structure (Davis et 
al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Donaldson, 1990). Empirical findings regarding the 
impact of CEO-duality on performance has been mixed and ambiguous (Dalton and Dalton, 
2011; Finegold et al., 2007). Also, stewardship theorists recommend that corporate boards 
should be made up of a higher proportion of inside directors to outside directors (Davis et al., 
1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Empirical evidence regarding this recommendation has 
been inconclusive as well. Some research shows the benefits of insiders on corporate 
boards as they provide organisation-centric knowledge and information to the firm, however, 
they could have distorted objectives due to personal gain (see Arosa et al., 2013; Finegold et 
al., 2007). Other research shows that outside directors can provide the organisation with 
superior performance through independent monitoring, but they are constrained by 
information (Arosa et al., 2013; Raheja, 2005). 
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Stewardship and Agency theories of corporate governance have focused 
more on the benefits of stockholders and have mainly measured firm performance in 
monetary terms (Gilbert et al., 1988). Both theories have failed to consider a broad 
range of other participants that also have a stake in the organisation and other roles 
that corporate boards carry out such as providing resources to the organisation. The 
stakeholder and resource dependence theories of corporate governance have 
focused on these unexplored aspects of corporate boards by agency and 
stewardship theories. The next sections will present a review of these theories. 
2.2.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
Apart from agency theory, resource dependence is another prominent theory that 
has exerted noticeable influence in the domain of corporate governance (Dalton et al., 2007; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Literature reviews on corporate boards have shown that the 
resource dependence theoretical recommendations are often empirically supported than 
other theories in corporate governance (e.g. Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
The resource dependence theoretical perspective views a firm or an organisation as linked 
to its environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to resource dependence theorists, 
one of the reasons for this linkage is to reduce uncertainty, make the acquisition of 
resources easier, and reduce the transaction costs associated with the interdependencies 
between the firm and various institutions in the environment (Hillman et al., 2000; 
Williamson, 1984). Resource dependence theorists also argued that the primary role of 
corporate boards is to provide resources to the organisation (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Such resources could be anything that contributes to the strength or 
weakness of a firm. Also, the theory describes corporate boards as overseers of the external 
dependence of the firm by reducing environmental uncertainty, lowering the transaction cost 
associated with environmental interdependency, and ensuring the company’s continued 
survival (Hillman et al., 2000; Daily and Dalton, 1994; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh et 
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al., 1986). Corporate boards bring a variety of resources into the organisation. Examples of 
such resources include information, skills, access to key constituents (e.g. suppliers, buyers, 
public policy decision-makers, social groups), and legitimacy (Gales and Kesner, 1994). The 
type of resource that a board member brings into the organisation depends on the category 
of the board member. Hillman et al. (2000) divided board members into four main categories 
which are (1) insiders, (2) business experts, (3) support specialists, and (4) community 
influentials. Where there are four categories of board members, the resources and benefits 
they provide are also differentiated (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). For 
example, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) identified some of the benefits board members provide 
according to their categories. These benefits include (1) advice and counsel, (2) legitimacy, 
(3) channels for communicating information between external organisations and the firm, 
and (4) obtaining preferential access to commitments. There is strong support regarding 
these identified four main benefits that boards can bring into an organisation (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001; Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Hillman et al., 2009; Hillman et al., 2000; 
Westphal, 1999).  
Considering how corporate boards provide a variety of resources and links a firm to 
its external environment to provide firm-specific expertise and connections, resource 
dependence theorists have described this as the resource dependence role of boards 
(Hillman et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 1996). Also, scholars have integrated the resource 
dependence theory with network theory due to its similar assumptions regarding 
interdependencies of organisations while emphasising the socially embedded context of 
firms. From this premise, resource dependence theories have also highlighted the 
networking role of corporate boards (Hillman et al., 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). Bae and 
Gargiulo (2004) found that organisation could use a network of inter-organisational 
relationships to gain power and access to resources. Corporate boards accomplish this 
networking role by facilitating inter-dependencies or inter-organisational relationship normally 
through board interlocks (i.e. a practice whereby members of a corporate board areserving 
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on the boards of multiple corporations) (Hillman et al., 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). However, 
it is useful to note that other researchers have also classified the networking and resource 
dependence roles of boards under the service role (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillma et al., 2003; 
Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). According to 
Zahra and Pearce (1989: 292), the service roles of boards as  ‘enhancing company 
reputation, establishing contacts with the external environment, and giving advice and 
counsel to executives’. Most researchers that have described the service role of boards have 
commonly identified their resource dependence and networking roles as originally identified 
by Zahra and Pearce (e.g. Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2008; Zona and Zattoni, 
2007). In sum, according to resource dependence theorists, the main roles of corporate 
boards are to provide resources to the firm and to serve as a network facilitating inter-
organisational dependencies.  
Apart from describing the resource dependence and networking roles of corporate 
boards, resource dependence theorists have also recommended a composition of boards 
that reflects their roles. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the composition and 
structure of directors should reflect a firm’s external environment. In line with this, Pfeffer 
(1973) stated that when the external business environment changes, the composition of the 
board should change to reflect the shift in resource requirement. In Hillman et al. (2000), 
after identifying the taxonomy of directors with the form of resource they bring into a firm, 
they concluded that the function of boards as a link to the environment is important, and the 
firm alters the composition of the board to respond to environmental changes. Resource 
dependence theorists recommend the composition of boards be characterised by size, 
diversity, and interlocks so as to reflect their resource dependence and networking roles. 
The reason for this recommendation is that larger board sizes and the presence of diversity 
increase the connections firms have with the environment, enhances the chance of securing 
organisational centric resources, and could result in better decision-making (Coffey and 
Wang, 1998; Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker, 1994; Hillman et al., 2002; Pfeffer, 1972, 
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1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As for boards’ diversity, this could be in the form of age, 
tenure, gender, functional background, education and professional experiences (Coffey and 
Wang, 1998). There is also board interlocks and the presence of outside directors that 
facilitate the link an organisation haswith the environment, conveying information across 
firms, securing access to resources and the formation of joint ventures (Burt, 1980; Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Gulatiand Westphal, 1999; Hillman et al., 2003; Mizruchi, 1996). 
Studies have focused on board size and composition as an indication of the ability 
of boards to provide critical resources to the firm, as they serve as a linkage between a firm 
and its environment. In Pfeffer (1972, 1973), it was found that board size and composition 
are rational responses to external environmental conditions. Similarly, Boyd (1990) found 
that the size of the board may vary (i.e. become smaller or larger) depending on 
environmental uncertainties. Furthermore, on the size of corporate boards, Goodstein et al. 
(1994) suggested that board size may be a measure of the ability of an organisations form a 
link to the environment to secure critical resources. More so, the resource dependence 
theory has been the primary foundation for the recommendation that larger boards are 
associated with higher levels of firm performance as they provide more links than boards 
with smaller members (e.g. Dalton et al., 1999; Goodstein et al., 1994; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to resource dependence theorist, larger boards also 
tend to utilise greater resources in a way that helps superior firm performance.Therefore 
resource dependence theorists argue that larger firms require larger boards because firms of 
similar size are hypothesised to outperform firms with smaller boards (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In support of these recommendations, in a meta-analysis 
carried out by Dalton et al. (1999), a positive link was found between board size and firm 
financial performance. Daily and Dalton (1992) similarly found a positive relationship 
between board size and firm performance in the case of small firms. Also, apart from 
resource dependence theorists’ recommendation that board size is related to the firm’s 
environmental needs, there is also empirical support for the premise that for greater 
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interdependence firms require a higher ratio of resource-rich outside directors (Boyd, 1990; 
Pfeffer, 1972). In Peng (2004) and Daily (1995), it was found that the presence of resource-
rich outside directors on boards has a positive influence on firm performance and 
organisations suffering from the imminence of bankruptcy are more likely to re-emerge. 
These studies reiterate the role of boards as a link between a firm and its environment and 
as a resource to the organisation. 
2.2.3.1 Resource Dependence Theory-Summary 
The basis of resource dependence theory is that the firm depends on its external 
environment. The corporate board of directors serve as a linkage between the firm and its 
environment. Therefore, the roles of the board are to provide resources to the firm and to act 
as a network of connections that facilitate inter-organisational dependencies (Hillman et al., 
2000; Hillman et al., 2003; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Some 
researchers have summarised these roles under the service and networking role of 
corporate boards (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman et al., 2003; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). Considering these roles, the structure of 
the board should reflect the firm’s external environment (Hillman et al., 2009). For this 
reason, resource dependence theorists have focused on board size and composition as an 
indicator of the ability of boards to provide critical resources to a firm and facilitate 
performance. Therefore, resource dependence theorists recommended a larger board size 
as a response to a firm’s environmental changes and a higher proportion of outside directors 
that reflects greater external interdependencies between a firm and its environment (Pfefffer, 
1972). This recommendation of resource dependence theorists on board size and 
composition has been supported by some empirical findings such as Sanders and Carpenter 
(1998); Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999); Pearce and Zahra (1992), and so on. 
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2.2.4 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is derived from a combination of the sociological and 
organisational perspectives (Wheeler et al., 2003). The theory gained recognition through 
the works of scholars such as Clarkson (1995); Donaldson and Preston (1995); Mitchell et 
al. (1997), and Rowley (1997) as they facilitated further development of the theory. 
Stakeholder theory has been applied to corporate governance in a way that departs from 
other theories of corporate governance. For example, where agency and stewardship theory 
focuses on the leadership structure of a firm and how it is meant to maximise shareholder 
value, stakeholder theory introduces a broader approach. Stakeholder theory addresses the 
issue of corporate governance by suggesting that the main objective of an organisation is to 
maximise the welfare of its stakeholders. This is the fundamental way stakeholder theory 
differs from other corporate governance theories (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In an 
attempt to explain and guide the structure and operation of corporations, stakeholder theory 
views the corporation as an organisational entity characterised by numerous and diverse 
participants with multiple and usually incongruent purposes (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
These participants are stakeholders of a corporation or an organisation. ‘Stakeholder’ is a 
term used by many scholars to capture to whom an organisation is responsible. Mitchell et 
al. (1997) described the stakeholders of an organisation in two ways, i.e. (1) those who have 
a contracted legitimate stake in an organisation as they expect returns from their stake, (2) 
those who affect or can be affected by the achievement of organisational objectives as they 
also are entitled to a measure of return. Freeman (1984) identified stakeholders to be any 
group or individual that can impact and affect the achievement of organisational objectives. 
This is a broad description of corporate stakeholders as it includes those who have a formal 
and informal link to the organisation. Similarly, Evan and Freeman (1988: 79) described 
stakeholders as those who ‘benefit from or are harmed by and whose rights are violated or 
respected by corporate action’. Also, Freeman (2004: 364) described stakeholders as those 
groups who are vital to the survival and the success of the organisation. From these 
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definitions, the description of stakeholders is organisation oriented; moreover, the corporate 
organisation is seen to be part of a larger social system (Hendry, 2001; Kim and Lee, 2012).   
Considering how these researchers have described who stakeholders are, it 
appears that the lists of organisational stakeholders may be inexhaustible. This has 
contributed to the broad understanding of stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995; Shropshire 
and Hillman 2007). For this reason, when discussing stakeholder theory, many scholars 
have narrowed their discussion to ‘primary stakeholders’. According to Hillman and Keim, 
(2001) primary stakeholders are those who are indispensable to the organisation and to 
which the organisation owes its continued existence. These primary stakeholders are 
employees, customers, suppliers, community residents, government, and the natural 
environment (Hillman and Kiem, 2001; Freeman, 1984). The way the organisation interacts 
with these stakeholders is described as a web of interdependent relationship or simply 
stakeholder relations (Post et al., 2002). Maintaining sound stakeholder relations brings 
benefit to the organisation. For example, Hillman and Keim (2001) highlighted some 
advantages of maintaining a healthy relationship with primary stakeholders. They noted that 
good stakeholder relations increases customer or supplier loyalty, improves firm reputation, 
increases employee performance and so on. Considering the list of stakeholders identified 
by Hillman and Keim (2001) and Freeman (1984), the role of the society or the community 
as a stakeholder cannot be undermined. According to Gray et al. (1995), the society bestows 
on an organisation the right to exist. This society also retains such right as long as the 
activities of the organisation are congruent with the interest of the society (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994). If the organisation acts otherwise, such rights could be 
revoked (Deegan, 2002). For this reason, the duty of an organisation to service the interest 
of the society is what is described as corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Carroll, 1991; 
Kakabadse et al., 2006). Even though CSR has been used as a conceptual foundation for 
stakeholder theory, the concept was not developed by stakeholder theorists. CSR is used to 
explain what responsibilities a business organisation ought to fulfil towards the society while 
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stakeholder theory is used to identify to whom the company is accountable (Kakabadse et 
al., 2006). This makes these concepts interrelated, and it has aided the understanding of 
different categories of stakeholder groups which are primary and secondary stakeholders. 
As previously stated, primary stakeholders are those whom the corporation owes it 
continued existence while secondary stakeholders are those whom the corporation can still 
survive.   
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), companies need to maintain good 
relations with stakeholders for two main reasons. First, demands of stakeholders have 
intrinsic value because the company has the responsibility of meeting the legitimate claims 
of stakeholders. This is considered as the normative approach. Second, addressing the 
demands of influential stakeholders can improve a company’s profitability. This is the 
instrumental approach of stakeholder theory. Considering these main reasons, Donaldson 
and Preston (1995) proposed three types of stakeholder theory: normative, instrumental, and 
descriptive. The normative stakeholder theory is used to identify the function of a corporation 
by using moral or philosophical guidelines on how the management of a corporation should 
behave or manage stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Phillips et al., 2003). The 
descriptive stakeholder theory is used to describe or explain specific corporate 
characteristics (i.e. of firms or managers) of behaviours (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). As 
for instrumental stakeholder theory, it is based on the notion that if corporate organisations 
adhere to certain stakeholder principles and practices, there is a likelihood of achieving 
corporate objectives and performance (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In sum, these 
perspectives of stakeholder theory were applied in such a way that it describes the 
behaviour of a firm and its managers. Regarding how stakeholder theory describes firm 
behaviour, Freeman and Evans (1990) proposed the application of stakeholder theory to 
corporate governance. Using the contractual economic theory as an analytical framework to 
examine the variety of organisational stakeholders, Freeman and Evans (1990) placed 
corporate governance centrally within the modern theory of a firm. Freeman and Evans 
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(1990) referred to the contractual view of a firm as a powerful analytical device used to cater 
for the multiplicity of stakeholders interests in a modern corporation. Using Williamson’s 
(1984) innovative schema, Freeman and Evans (1990) described the firm as a mechanism 
of corporate governance used for a set of contracts between a firm and its stakeholders. 
However, considering the multiplicity of stakeholders, it is useful to note that there are a 
variety of corporate governance mechanisms to different stakeholders of a firm (Farquhar, 
2011).  
Despite the attempts of researchers as Freeman and Evans (1990), there is a 
limited body of literature that has applied stakeholder theory to corporate governance 
(Farquhar, 2011). The more prominent of these is the aspect that has to do with allowing 
stakeholder directors on boards (Hillman et al., 2001). Similar to the resource dependence 
view, stakeholder theorists propose that when organisational stakeholders are represented 
on corporate boards, they can provide valuable resources to the firm (Hillman et al., 2000). 
Such resources are made accessible due to stakeholders’ business (such as customers, 
suppliers, and creditors) and non-business (government officials, academics, and community 
representatives) relationships to the firm (Ayuso and Argandona, 2007; Luoma and 
Goodstein, 2009). Stakeholders’ representation on corporate boards has been classified as 
one of the service roles boards carry out (Boeker and Goodstein, 1991; Freeman and Reed, 
1983; Wang, 1991). Within the stakeholder context, corporate boards perform four main 
service roles which are co-opting of external resources, establishing business and non-
business contacts, enhancing the organisation’s reputation (i.e. CSR), and giving advice to 
the organisation (Mintzberg, 1983: 81-86). Where agency and stewardship theories of 
corporate governance have the primary goal of increasing shareholder wealth, stakeholder 
theory contends that the role of the board is to serve the interests of the multiplicity of 
stakeholders through stakeholder representation on boards (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Hillman et al., 2001; Phillips et al., 2003). According to Ayuso and Argandona (2007), there 
has been a small amount of literature that has considered the performance effects of 
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stakeholder representation on corporate boards. However, some studies have confirmed the 
positive link between stakeholder management and shareholder value (e.g. Hillman and 
Keim, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Where there are a handful of studies that have 
considered the impact of stakeholder representation on corporate boards and firm 
performance, studies such as Johnson and Greening (1999) and Hillman et al. (2001), have 
shown its impact on performance. For example, Johnson and Greening's (1999) study of 
stakeholder representation on boards showed a positive influence on the social performance 
of a firm. Also, Hillman et al. (2001) analysed 3268 board members representing 250 
companies and found that the presence of stakeholder directors is positively associated with 
stakeholder performance. Considering the potential positive impact stakeholders' value 
hason firm performance and shareholders’ wealth, stakeholder theorists recommend a 
stakeholder representation on corporate boards. The inclusion of stakeholders on corporate 
boards serves as a formal mechanism for highlighting their importance of corporate boards 
to the firm (Cyert and March 1963; Mitchell et al., 1997). This also indicates the power of 
stakeholders as they form a dominant part of the firm. 
2.2.4.1 Stakeholder Theory-Summary 
Stakeholder theory is centred on maximising the welfare of the stakeholders of an 
organisation. These stakeholders are diverse participants with incongruent objectives that 
have a stake or are linked to the organisation. In order to achieve firm performance, 
stakeholder theorists recommended that a firm must establish good stakeholder relations. In 
light of this recommendation, three types of stakeholder theories are highlighted, which are 
normative, descriptive, and instrumental stakeholder theories (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). Normative stakeholder approach has to do with how an organisation relates with its 
stakeholders based on moral guidelines or principles, rather than using stakeholders to 
maximise profits solely. The descriptive stakeholder approach is used to explain how certain 
corporate characteristics can facilitate firm performance, and instrumental stakeholder theory 
is used to identify the link between stakeholder management (e.g. CSR) and the 
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achievement of a traditional corporate objective or financial performance. Given the role of 
the firm in catering for the multiplicity of stakeholders, stakeholder theorists recommend 
stakeholder representation on corporate boards (Hillman et al., 2001). Stakeholder theorists 
argue that stakeholder representation on a corporate board can facilitate firm performance. 
Where there is some empirical research that has tested this prescription, a positive 
relationship between stakeholder representation and firm performance has been published 
(e.g. Johnson and Greening, 1999; Hillman et al., 2001). 
2.3 Traditional Corporate Governance Theories on Boards- Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the primary theories of corporate governance that have 
commonly offered recommendations on the roles of corporate boards and how their 
composition and structure leads to better corporate performance. Agency theorists described 
the primary role of the board to be the monitoring and control of management (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Other theories such as stewardship theory, resource 
dependence theory, and stakeholder theory have identified the strategic, resource provision 
and service, and the service roles of board respectively (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davies 
et al., 1997; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Hillman and Keim, 2001). Where none of these 
theories havebeen able to capture the roles of corporate boards in theirentirety, research in 
this tradition has been criticised for the lack empirical support for their proposed link between 
board structure and composition (Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Dalton et al. 1998; Dalton et al., 
2008;Dey et al., 2009). Due to this, there has been a call for alternative theorising in the 
research of corporate boards and what makes them more effective (Dalton et al., 2003; 
Davis, 2005; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; Huse, 2003; Van Ees, 2009b). To better 
understand the dynamics of decision-making in the boardroom and what conditions facilitate 
effective corporate governance, a growing number of studies have examined behavioural 
processes (e.g. Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Huse, 1998; Westphal, 1998; Zajac and 
Westphal, 1998; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999; 
Westphal, Seidel and Stewart, 2001). In line with this, Forbes and Milliken (1999) argued 
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that research on structure/composition and performance has been inconclusive because it 
has failed to consider mediating processes or, in the words of Lawrence (1997), it treated 
boards as a ‘black box’. Pettigrew (1992) also made similar arguments against board 
composition and structural studies of corporate governance. Considering these arguments, 
the following section will review behavioural perspectives on boards which have sought to 
open the hitherto ‘black box’.  
2.4 Behavioural Perspectives on Boards 
Traditional perspectives on boards offered a stylized view of boards by analysing 
the link between board characteristics and firm performance, using mainly archival data (Van 
Ees et al., 2009b).As discussed in the previous sections, the empirical research on boards in 
this mainstream tradition so far have offered conflicting and ambiguous results leading to the 
call for an alternative direction to examining boards and governance (Davis and Useem, 
2002; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Huse, 2003; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004).In line 
with these calls, a number of researchers have emphasised the importance of studying 
actual board behaviours and boardroom dynamics in the quest to further understand what 
constitutes effective boards (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 1998; Pettigrew and McNulty, 
1995; Westphal, 1998; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Westphal, Seidel and Stewart, 2001; 
Westphal, 1999; Zajac and Rindova, 1999). These behavioural studies of theboard and 
governance cut across different disciplines and research traditions with the application of 
different methodologies (Huse, 2005; van Ees et al., 2009b). In an attempt to synthesise or 
integrate these behavioural frameworks for a future research agenda on corporate 
governance, van Ees et al. (2009b) developed the behavioural theory of boards based on an 
emerging stream of studies that argue that boards are concerned with the complexity and 
uncertainty associated with their role in strategic decision-making (McNulty and Pettigrew, 
1999; Rindova, 1999; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005).Behavioural theory of boards was 
developed by van Ees et al. (2009b) mainly for two reasons. The first is that there are 
behavioural assumptions regarding boards that are unquestioned (Pettigrew, 1992; Rindova, 
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1999), and a majority of empirical studies infer but do not examine board interactions and 
decision-making processes. The second is to revitalise concepts such as bounded 
rationality, satisficing behaviour, and routinisation of decision-making that are rarely explicitly 
addressed in the economic theorising on boards. How these concepts are applied to boards 
will be discussed in the next section. 
2.4.1 Behavioural Theory of Boards 
The introduction of ‘the behavioural theory of boards’ was to develop an alternative 
theory of boards which takes its cue from the ‘the behavioural theory of the firm’ by Cyert 
and March (1963).When developing the behavioural theory of the firm, Cyert and March’s 
intent was ‘to open the black box of the internal workings of organisations’ (Argote and 
Greve, 2007: 344), just as the behavioural theory of boards was trying to shed light on the 
‘black box’ of boards.The behavioural theory of the firm was used to shed understanding on 
organisational behaviour and decision-making (Argote and Greve, 2007; van Ees et al., 
2009b). The behavioural theory of the firmwas built on the concepts of bounded rationality, 
satisficing, problematic search, the routinisation of decision-making in standard operating 
procedures, and the dominant coalition (Argote and Greve, 2007). The first concept, i.e. 
bounded rationality, refers to the limitation of decision-makers to process information and 
solve complex problems (Cyert and March 1963). According to Greve (2003), rationality is 
costly, and its application to solving complex problems requires considerable cognitive effort. 
The second concept which is satisficing refers to the behaviour of decision-makers in making 
a decision that is good enough instead of seeking an optimal solution to cater for their 
current most important needs (Hendry, 2005; Van Ees et al., 2009b). According to Van Ees 
et al. (2009b), decisions made may not be the optimal solution to problems; however, they 
reflect solutions that satisfy a particular aspiration level. Routinisation of decision-making is 
the third concept, and this is when decision-makers operate based on routines built over 
time (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Routines of decision-making could also be referred to as 
performance programmes (March and Simon, 1958) or standard operating procedures 
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(Cyert and March, 1963). According to Cyert and March (1963), these routines are the 
synopsis of knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, and capabilities of decision-makers 
within an organisation. The fourth concept is more recent, and it was addressed in relation to 
stakeholder expectation of boards (Huse and Rindova, 2001).This links the concept of the 
dominant coalition, and it refers to the coalition of actors or stakeholders of a firm. Cyert and 
March (1963) defined the concept of the dominant coalition as a complex political system 
with agents organised in coalitions and sub-coalitions. 
Despite the usefulness of the behavioural theory of the firm in understanding how 
decisions are made in an organisation, few studies have applied or included this in the 
research of boards and corporate governance (Van Ees et al., 2009b). One of the few 
studies that has done so is Van Ees et al. (2009b) who used the ‘behavioural theory of the 
firm’ to develop the behavioural theory of boards.Van Ees et al. (2009b) applied the four 
concepts from the behavioural theory of the firm but tailored to the context of the board. Van 
Ees et al. (2009b) highlighted these concepts as important because they help in the 
understanding of board behaviours and are useful for issues of problem-solving within and 
outside the boardroom’s principles of decision-making, goal formation, and conflict resolution 
(Osterloh and Frey, 2004; Rindova, 1999; Van Ees et al., 2009b). For example, the 
satisficing concept was applied to boards in a way that redirects research on decision-
making role of boards. This application to boards could enhance the understanding of how 
board members focus on tasks and duties in an organisation, in a way that facilitates 
sustained intrinsic motivation (Osterloh and Frey, 2004). Other concepts, such as bounded 
rationality, domination of coalitions and routinisation of decision-making, could help 
researchers to understand styles of problem-solving of boards and how board members deal 
with thecomplexity of information to aid decision-making (Van Ees et al., 2009b). According 
to Rindova (1999), the concepts could help board members to cope with uncertainty through 
a reduction in the complexity of information, simplification of routines, and structuring of 
information through board members’ perceptual filters and pre-existing structures. Also, 
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these concepts could be used to analyse problem-solving inside and outside the boardroom, 
giving insight into specific board behaviour and decisions (Van Ees et al., 2009b; Rindova, 
1999). Furthermore, the concepts help with the setting of goals and resolution of conflict 
within boards, therefore, placing primary focus on the roles and the position of boards in 
organisational decision-making instead of performance outcomes (Van Ees et al., 2009b). 
2.4.2 Input-Process-Output Approach to boards 
Apart from the behavioural theory of boards, there is another stream of research 
that has sought to investigate actual board behaviours and interactions. Perhaps one of the 
most influential studies here is the conceptual paper by Forbes and Milliken (1999). Based 
on Frances Milliken’s background in small team/organisational group research (Milliken and 
Vollrath, 1991; Milliken and Martins, 1996), they applied the logic from input-process-output 
studies in teams to the specificities of the context of corporate boards. 
After noting the lack of consensus in the studies of board characteristics and 
performance outcomes, Forbes and Milliken (1999) proposed that researchers should 
explore a more precise way of studying board characteristics by accounting for the role of 
intervening board processes. The consideration of these intervening processes constitutes 
the main theme by researchers who called for the opening of the intermediating ‘black box’ 
of actual board behaviour (Daily et al., 2003; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; 
Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; Pettigrew, 1992; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). To study mediating 
processes in the relationship between board characteristics and performance outcomes, 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) took as their starting point studies that examined the 
effectiveness of small teams and work groups and applied it to boards. Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) stated that boards qualify as groups in that they are an ‘intact social system that 
performs one or more tasks in an organisational context’ (Bettenhausen, 1991: 
346).Nevertheless, boards are different to other teams in insofar as they constitute ‘large, 
elite, episodic decision-making groups that face complex tasks regarding strategic issue 
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processing’ (p. 492). Because of these specificities, Forbes and Milliken (1999) argued that 
boards more than any other team are prone to process losses, and thus knowledge of board 
processes and behaviours is pivotal in understanding what makes boards effective.  
Forbes and Milliken (1999) highlighted four main reasons for studying boards. 
These reasons are that: (1) there is an increasing need to give attention to boards as regard 
what they do, (2) it is necessary to legally scrutinise the activities of boards, (3) the growing 
competitive market for corporate control, and (4) the need to go beyond structural or 
demographic research on boards (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992).Since prior 
research on board structure/composition did not produce convincing evidence for 
understanding board effectiveness, the need to focus on actual board behaviours and board 
processes was highlighted (Forbes and Miliken, 1999; Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989).Forbes and Milliken (1999) established from their review of prior studies that 
the structure-performance relationship is not as simple as it is being depicted in the literature 
on board composition and structure. For this reason, it is imperative to study board 
behaviour alongside board demographics or structure so as to account for the intervening 
roles of board processes (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
In sum, Forbes and Milliken (1999) developed an alternative approach to boards by 
drawing on small team and workgroup literature. They developed a conceptual model of 
board processes in order to understand what makes boards more effective, and focused 
especially on cognitive dimensions. They described this as the input-process-output model 
(Barrick et al., 2007; Gist et al., 1987; LePine et al., 2008). The next section will summarise 
the key ideas within the board process literature before moving on to a discussion of specific 
board processes. 
2.5 Boards Processes: Meanings and Use in Board Models 
According to Bailey and Peck (2011), board processesare defined as the 
interactions of team members in making strategic decisions which include activities such as 
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how board members gather, share, and use information, build knowledge and make 
decisions. Similarly, Ong and Wan (2001) described board processes as mainly the 
decision-making activities of directors of companies. Also, Dulewicz et al. (1995) interpreted 
board processes to be the organising and running of a corporate board to accomplish 
corporate objectives. Board processes are necessary for achieving board goals or tasks 
(Mathieu et al., 2008). Most scholars view such processes as being dependent on or related 
to social-psychological factors such as team participation, critical discussion, and exchange 
of information (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Ongoing research has identified potential board 
processes. For example, Forbes and Milliken (1999) identified three key processes that 
could enable boards to achieve effectiveness and their full potential as a strategic decision-
making group. These processes are cognitive conflict, effort norms, and the use of 
knowledge and skills. Subsequently, other scholars such as Zona and Zattoni (2007) have 
tested and expanded Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) theoretical research and found that these 
processes explain how boards perform their tasks. Over the years, more processes have 
been identified and researched, including trust (Van Ees et al., 2008; Farquhar, 2011; Huse 
and Zattoni, 2008), effort norms (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2012), cohesiveness (Huse, 2007; Isbella and Waddock, 1994; 
Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2007; Ong and Wan, 2001), use of knowledge and skills 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009, 2012; Bankewitz, 
2016) and conflict (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Walker et al., 2015; 
Minichilli et al., 2012). 
Extant studies have operationalised and tested these board processes in a variety 
of ways especially in relation toboard performance outcomes (board tasks). Researchers 
whohave investigated board processes have found them to have greater explanatory power 
than board structural/compositional variables in explaining board performance (e.g. Minichilli 
et al., 2012; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Zattoni, Gnan, and Huse, 2015). While research on 
board processes is still ongoing, there is still a gap within literature concerning what triggers 
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these processes in the boardroom, i.e. the determinants of board processes. This research 
contributes to ongoing knowledge on how board processes facilitate board effectiveness by 
investigating the determinants of these processes. The objective of this following sectionis 
illustrated below in Figure 2.1, which is to present a review of previous studies on board 





Figure 2.1 Review of the determinants of board processes 
The aim is to review the meaning of these processes (also using insights from the 
small team literature), how extant studies on boards have related these to performance 
outcomes (board task performance) and what, if any, determinants have been investigated 
by scholars. 
2.5.1 Use of Knowledge and Skills 
According to Hackman and Morris (1975) and Forbes and Milliken (1999), the use 
of knowledge and skills refers to the ability of board members to utilise and apply available 
knowledge and skills to required board tasks. In this definition, the use of knowledge and 
skills is when the knowledge and expertise of a board are extracted and coordinated towards 
achieving board tasks. Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) similarly defined the use of 
knowledge and skills as the integration of individual director’s skills and knowledge through 
delegation of duties to match members’ capabilities. Before the use of knowledge and skill, 
there must be a smooth flow of information between directors (Finkelstein and Mooney, 
2003; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). Wageman (1995) and Zona and Zattoni (2007) stated that 
the ability of a group, such as boards to be able to extract individual knowledge and skills, is 
important because this is a criterion for the effectiveness of any work group or team. 
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According to Minichilli et al. (2012) and Zona and Zattoni (2007), before a board can be 
effective, the board must be able to actively use and integrate the variety of expertise and 
skills present for the benefit of group decisions. This is consistent with Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) who stated that the use of knowledge and skill might prevent process losses within 
boards.  
The use of knowledge and skills within boards has been examined to find out if it 
enables directors to carry out their tasks effectively. In Zona and Zattoni (2007), the impact 
of the use of knowledge and skills was tested on board task performance. They found that 
the use of knowledge and skills significantly influenced board service and networking task 
performances. Also in Wan and Ong's (2005) research into the relationship between board 
processes and board task performance, they found a positive relationship between the use 
of knowledge and skill alongside other board processes and board performance (i.e. 
monitoring, service and strategy formulation tasks). Where Minichilli et al. (2012) found no 
interaction between the use of knowledge and skills and control and advisory board tasks, 
they still acknowledged the importance of this board process. They stated that the active use 
and integration of board members’ abilities did have benefits. Contrary to the findings of 
Minichilli et al. (2012), similarly, Zattoni et al. (2015) found that the use of knowledge and 
skills has a significant positive impact on boards' advisory and control tasks. 
Where it has been established from empirical studies that the use of knowledge and 
skills facilitates certain board task performances, studies that have examined what triggers 
the use of knowledge and skills in the boardroom are sparse. In order to identify what 
triggers the use of knowledge and skills, it is good to revisit Forbes and Milliken’s seminal 
paper. Inthepaper, Forbes and Milliken (1999) posited that there must be the ‘presence of 
knowledge and skills’ before its usage is possible. They used two separate constructs to 
buttress this point (i.e. the presence and use of knowledge and skills). According to Forbes 
and Milliken (1999), the presence of knowledge and skills within boards could be either 
‘functional’ or ‘firm-specific’. The presence of functional knowledge and skills refers to the 
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expertise of a board member that touches a variety of disciplines and areas that relate a firm 
to its environment (e.g. financial, technical or firm-specific knowledge, law and so on). The 
presence of firm-specific knowledge and skill refers to the ability to know how the firm 
operates as well as other internal management areas associated with a firm. This skill is 
important because it helps in strategic decision-making within boards (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999). In Wan and Ong’s (2005) study, when testing for the presence and use of knowledge 
and skills, they adopted the measurement scale of Dulewicz et al. (1995). According to them, 
the only way to test for the presence of knowledge and skills within a board is to examine the 
perception of boards on result orientation, strategic and analytical thinking. However, 
Kaczmarek et al. (2012) in their research measured functional knowledge and experience of 
a board member by individual qualification of boards and identifying how long each member 
has served as a board member. This classification of the presence of knowledge and skills 
falls within Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) function and firm-specific classifications. 
Researchers who have investigated the impact the use of knowledge and skill has on board 
tasks performance have measured the variable in different ways. For example, where 
Kaczmarek et al. (2012) used the qualifications and functional knowledge of board members 
to operationalise the use of knowledge and skills in their model, Zona and Zattoni (2007) 
used the alignment of directors’ knowledge to their responsibilities. In Wan and Ong (2005), 
they used the same measures as Dulewicz et al. (1995) to capture the use of knowledge and 
skills. The measures used in these studies are the strategic perception of board members’ 
abilities, their analytical thinking, and their result-oriented perspectives.Despite the similar 
but differentiated ways of operationalising the use of knowledge and skills, hardly has any of 
these studies referred to these measures as the determinants of the use of knowledge and 
skills. Although these studies’ measures are consistent with Forbes and Milliken (1999), who 
argued that before the use of knowledge and skills, there must be the presence of 
knowledge and skills. Therefore, one may conclude that the determinants of the use of 
knowledge and skills are firm specific and functional presence of knowledge and skill which 
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may include board members’ analytical thinking, abilities, and result-oriented perspectives 
(Dulewicz et al., 1995; Kaczmarek et al.,  2012). 
To sum up, the use of knowledge and skills is the integration of individual director’s 
skills and knowledge through delegation of duties to match members’ capabilities (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999) and it has also been found to facilitate certain board effectiveness 
significantly. Specifically, the use of knowledge and skill has been found to enable theboard 
of directors to carry out their advisory, control, service, networking, and strategic tasks (Wan 
and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Zattoni et al., 2015). In a consistent way with 
Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) arguments about what leads to the use of knowledge and skills, 
how the use of knowledge and skills have been operationalised in board research suggest 
its determinants to be the presence of knowledge and skills which may include a wide range 
of skill that will enable board members to carry out their tasks effectively. 
2.5.2 Effort Norms 
Effort norms is another board process that was identified by Forbes and Milliken 
(1999). Drawing on Wageman (1995), Forbes and Milliken (1999: 493) defined effort norms 
as a ‘group-level construct that refers to the group’s shared beliefs regarding the level of 
effort each is expected to put towards a task’. Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggested that 
strong effort norms can enhance group performance. Similarly, Zona and Zattoni (2007: 855) 
defined effort norms as a process within boards that specifically has to do with the ‘board’s 
shared beliefs on the level of effort a board is expected to work towards’. The presence of 
effort norms in teams in teams such as boards is imperative to their performance (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). For example, researchers such as Lorsch 
(1989) and Mace (1970) found in their studies that poor performing boards are associated 
with their lack of effort. Similarly, Forbes and Milliken (1999) and Zona and Zattoni (2007) 
argued thatthe effectiveness ofdirectors in accomplishing tasks could be enhancedby the 
presence of a strong effort norms. The researcherhas suggested that board effort norms can 
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impact on how tasks (service, monitoring, strategy, control, and networking tasks) are 
accomplished (Gabrielson and Winlund, 2000; Huse, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005; Wan and 
Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007).For example, Zona and Zattoni’s (2007) empirical 
research discovered a significant positive relationship between effort norms and monitoring, 
service, and networking tasks. In a similar vein, Minichilli et al. (2012) and Wan and Ong 
(2005) found that effort norms are imperative to the accomplishing of control, advisory, 
service and strategic board tasks. In more recent studies, researchers such as Heemskerk 
et al. (2014) and Zattoni et al. (2015) similarly found that effort norms positively impacts the 
ability of boards to carry out their strategic, advisory and control tasks. These findings are 
consistent with the Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) arguments that strong effort normsenhance 
the individual efforts of board members which in turn enhance monitoring and service roles 
of workgroups.Based on the presented empirical findings that highlights the importance of 
effort norms, it is possible to infer that boards will benefit from the positive effect of effort 
norms, if they actively participate in discussions and support in the implementation of board 
tasks while using their individual skills to benefit the board (Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; 
Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005; Stiles and Taylor, 2001).Effort norms could 
also mean that they spend more time together accomplishing their tasks so asto increase 
the degree of their contributions to strategy formulation, control of management behaviour, 
and critical assessment of their resources (Zona and Zattoni, 2007). 
The determinants of effort norms within boards can be deduced from Wan and 
Ong’s (2005) research. Wan and Ong (2005) identified two main factors that facilitateeffort 
norms in the boardroom. The first is board ‘meeting frequency’. By meeting intensity, they 
implied the number of meetingsheld or the number of productive time board members spend 
with each other during these meetings. The second is ‘general efforts’ of board members. By 
general efforts, Wan and Ong (2005) referred to the efforts board members put into going 
through the information carefully before meetings and their feeling of being responsible for 
the work that needs to be done. Some researchers have also identified board structural 
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variables that could trigger effort norms in the board. For example, Wan and Ong (2005) 
stated that when there is CEO duality on board, it can lead to lower levels of effort norm and 
other processes. This was consistent with Jensen’s (1993) argument who noted that time 
and effort spent on board meetings isnot necessarily useful because CEOs always set 
agendas before the commencement of meetings. Wan and Ong (2005) also suggested that 
the presence of outsiders on boards could also enhance effort norm. When executive 
directors are aware of the presence of non-executives, they are motivated to contribute more 
effort towards the performance of the board. These claims made by Wan and Ong (2005) 
were consistent with their empirical findings. They found the presence of CEO-duality to 
negatively impact on the effort norms of directors, while a larger proportion of outside 
directors had a positive impact. 
 In sum, effort norms are the shared beliefs regarding individual expectations of 
teams or board members (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Empirical research shows that effort 
norms enable board members to effectively carry out their monitoring,service, advisory, 
networking, and strategic roles (Minichilli et al., 2012; Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007). As for the potential determinants of effort norms in the boardroom, these are 
thegeneral efforts of board members, board meeting intensity, CEO-duality, and the 
proportion of outside directors (Jensen, 1993; Wageman, 1995; Wan and Ong, 2005). 
2.5.3 Cohesiveness 
There have been debates on whether cohesiveness is a team process or a team 
outcome. Forbes and Milliken (1999: 493) stated that ‘board cohesiveness captures the 
affective dimension of board members’ inclusion on board which reflects on the ability of 
boards to continue working together as team’. By this statement, Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
saw cohesiveness as an outcome; however, there have been other researchers whohave 
described cohesivenessas a process (e.g. Beal et al., 2003; Guth and MacMillan, 1986; 
Isabella and Waddock, 1994). For the purpose of this section, cohesiveness will be treated 
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as a board process, an activity amongst others that facilitates decision-making (Ong and 
Wan, 2001). According to Summers et al. (1988), board cohesiveness is when board 
members are attracted to each other and are motivated to remain on the board. Similarly, 
Beal et al. (2003) described cohesiveness as an interpersonal attraction among board 
members or workgroups, group pride, and task commitment. Beal et al. (2003) explained 
that the presence of cohesiveness within groups facilitates group members’ motivation and 
members are easily inclined to work together in a coordinated way to achieve higher levels 
of performance. For this reason, cohesiveness in teams such as boards is said to influence 
the effectiveness in carrying out their roles or tasks(Beal et al., 2003; Gully et al., 1995; 
Mullen and Copper, 1994). Regarding the relationship between cohesiveness and board 
task performance, Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggested a significant curvilinear relationship 
between these two variables because boards are charged with complex and interactive 
tasks, and the degree of interpersonal attraction between board members is likely to 
influence the way they carry out their tasks effectively. For example, carrying out control and 
service tasks require that board members engage in extensive communication and 
deliberations, and for them to do this effectively, members must have a minimum level of 
personal interaction for themselves (Forbes and Milliken, 1999).Trust, and the perception of 
board members’ abilities is another factor of cohesiveness that was identified by Forbes and 
Milliken (1999). 
Considering the relationship between team cohesiveness and performance, it is 
useful to note that empirical literature has shown inconsistency in the findings. Beal et al. 
(2003) revealed such inconsistency in their findings and concluded that it is difficult to 
analyse the relationship between team cohesiveness and performance. According to Beal et 
al. (2003), one of the major factors that hascontributed to this are the varied ways of 
conceptualising group cohesiveness and performance. For example, many researchers have 
measured cohesiveness as an individual perception of the group in relation to aspects of 
performance (Beal et al., 2003). Considering the ambiguity in the relationship between 
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cohesiveness and performance, some researchers (cf. Evans and Dion, 1991; Gully et al., 
1995; Mullen and Copper, 1994) have carried out a meta-analysis to identify situations 
where the effect of cohesiveness is stronger or weaker. Inspite strong theoretical 
expectations of a positive relationship between cohesiveness and performance (Cartwright, 
1968; Shaw, 1971), it has been found that the relationship between cohesiveness and 
performance lacks clarity (Evans and Dion, 1991; Gully et al., 1995; Mullen and Copper, 
1994). These studieswere conducted in the context of teams or groups. In boards, to date, 
there have been sparse empirical studies that have investigated cohesiveness in them and 
how they impact on task performance.This makes a confident empirical validation of the 
claims that cohesiveness facilitates board task performance.  
In identifying what leads to team cohesiveness, Beal et al. (2003) identified three 
components of cohesiveness, i.e. interpersonal attraction, group pride, and task 
commitment. Beal et al. (2003) found in their research that these components of 
cohesiveness all relate to team performance. Forbes and Milliken (1999) also identified 
communication, trust, and the perception of board members’ abilities as factors that could 
influence board cohesiveness. Some researchers have identifiedcompositional variables 
such as board size and diversity as a facilitator to board cohesiveness. For example, Sah 
and Stiglitz (1991) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) found in their research that larger boards that 
are characterised by diversity lack cohesiveness. Also, in Amason (1996); Pelled et al. 
(1999); Smith et al. (1994) and Williams and O’Reilly’s (1998) findings in the context of 
management teams, the heterogeneity of team members due to larger sizes reduces 
cohesiveness. Based on these identified empirical studies, larger boards and the presence 
of diversity could be associated with lower levels of board cohesiveness. Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1993) similarly found a negative relationship between top management team 
size and cohesiveness. From these empirical studies, it is possible to conclude that the 
determinants of cohesiveness are task commitment, interpersonal attraction, group pride, 
board size, and diversity. 
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In sum, cohesiveness in teams or boards refers to a shared interpersonal attraction, 
which is demonstrated by the ability to continue working together as a team (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). Although the relationship between cohesiveness and performance is 
suggested, the empirical studies available, especially in teams, remains unclear (Evans and 
Dion, 1991; Gully et al., 1995; Mullen and Copper, 1994).In boards, empirical literature 
regarding board cohesiveness and board task performance is scarce. Regarding what 
triggers cohesiveness, team and board researchers have identified commitment to task, 
interpersonal attraction, group pride (Beal et al., 2003; Mullen and Copper, 1994), 
communication, perception of board members’ abilities, trust (Forbes and Milliken),  board 
size and diversity (Pelled et al., 1999; Sah and Stiglitz, 1991) as determinants. It would be 
interesting to subject these determinants to empirical testing in the context of corporate 
boards to see how they contribute to the cohesiveness of board members (as a process) 
and how they impact on board task performance.  
2.5.4 Cognitive and Affective Conflict 
Conflict is commonly classified into cognitive and affective dimensions (Amason, 
1996; Jehn, 1995; Li and Hambrick, 2005; Pelled, 1996). Cognitive conflict is defined as 
‘task-oriented conflict which focuses on judgemental differences about how to achieve 
common objectives’ (Amason, 1996; 127). In other words, cognitive conflict is a task-
oriented conflict (see also Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Langfred, 2007; Minichilli, 2012; Pelled, 
1996; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). During the process of cognitive conflict, there is an exchange 
of ideas, rigorous brainstorming for solutions, and the sharing of various perceptions of the 
solution in achieving board tasks (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; 
Watson and Michaelsen, 1988). Cognitive conflict creates an open debate, fosters the 
asking of critical questions, and giving directors of a board an opportunity to openly express 
personal judgements or viewpoints (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Simon 
et al., 1999; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). When cognitive conflict occurs between directors, it 
creates an intense desire to harness external resources due to its rigorous style (Zona and 
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Zattoni, 2007; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Additionally, cognitive 
conflict facilitates achieving effectiveness during the process of making strategic decisions 
after scanning and interpreting the organisation’s environment (Milliken and Vollrath, 1991). 
Empirical studies have tested the impact of cognitive conflict on teams and board 
performance. Some researchers have found a positive relationship between cognitive 
conflict and some board tasks. For example, Zona and Zattoni (2007) found a positive 
relationship between cognitive conflict and board task performance (i.e. monitoring and 
networking tasks). This is consistent with Forbes and Milliken (1999) who suggested that 
cognitive conflict could improve the performance of monitoring and networking tasks. In 
teams, Baron (1990) also found that task conflict positively impacts on performance. 
Eisenhardt et al. (1997) presented similar results in their study when they found that high 
cognitive conflict results in high performance, whereas low cognitive conflict within teams led 
to low performance. After arguing that cognitive conflict is crucial for board effectiveness 
(see Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008), Zattoni et al. (2015) found that 
cognitive conflict has a positive impact on board control and strategic task performance. 
Similarly, in Minichilli et al. (2012), the impact of cognitive conflict on board control and 
advisory tasks was investigated. The positive impact of cognitive conflict was found only on 
board control tasks.  
As for affective conflict, it is defined as an emotional conflict which involves 
interpersonal incompatibilities, involving annoyance, mistrust and animosity (Amason and 
Schweiger, 1994; Li and Hambrick, 2005; Pelled, 1996). There has been empirical support 
for this description of affective conflict. For example, empirical studies testing the impact of 
affective conflict on performance have found a negative impact (e.g. De Dreu and Weingart, 
2003; Gladstein, 1984; Langfred, 2007; Li and Hambrick, 2005; Wall and Nolan, 1986). Jehn 
(1995), when testing the impact of affective conflict on team effectiveness,found that 
affective conflict negatively impacts on team task performance. She explained further that 
affective conflict adversely impacts on teams’ abilities.These findings are similar to that of 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
D E T E R M I N A N T S  O F  T R U S T  I N  T H E  B O A R D R O O M | 66 
 
Baron (1991). Amason (1996) also found that affective conflict has a negative impact on 
decision quality within teams. Similarly, within boards, lower levels of affective conflict has 
been associated with a well-functioning board (Heemskerk, Wats, and Heemskerk, 2015). 
Heemskerk et al.’s (2015) findings are consistent with Farquhar (2011) who also found that 
affective conflict negatively impacts on board control tasks, but has no significant effect on 
the service role of boards. However, in Heemskerk et al.’s research, when board members 
avoid this form of conflict, it negatively impacts on board task performance (i.e. board control 
and service tasks) as it leads to cognitive blindness. Considering this, Heemskerk et al. 
(2015) suggested that a board of directors should manage affective conflict rather than avoid 
it completely. 
Cognitive conflict is usually associated with effectiveness and performance and 
affective conflict is associated with poor performance. It is useful to note that these two types 
of conflict are often found to be correlated in studies measuring the impact of these forms of 
conflict (Simons and Peterson, 2000; Mooney et al., 2007). Examples of studies that have 
found a correlation between these two types of conflict are Amason and Sapienza (1997), 
Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999), Mooney et al. (2007), Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 
(1999), and Simons and Peterson (2000).These researchers found that there is a positive 
correlation between cognitive and affective conflict. The correlation between cognitive and 
relationship conflict creates a perspective dilemma regarding the impact of these conflicts in 
team or board performance. According to Simons and Peterson (2000), the reason for the 
correlation is because cognitive conflict is often confused for affective conflict and vice-
versa. Also, when there is severe cognitive conflict, it often develops into affective conflict. 
Similarly, Mooney et al. (2007) revealed in their research that the presence of cognitive 
conflict could provoke affective conflict. 
The literature on conflict can be used to unveil possible determinants of team/ board 
conflict. Some researchers have identified diversity as a determinant of both cognitive 
conflict and affective conflict. For example, Mitchell et al. (2008) identified functional diversity 
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to be a determinant of cognitive conflict. Functional diversity refers to board members with 
different backgrounds, divergent preferences, interpretations, and values. The presence of 
such diversity easily facilitates cognitive conflict. More so, Pelled et al. (1999) similarly 
identified diversity to be a determinant of cognitive conflict. They also found that multiple 
forms of diversity influence affective conflict. Additionally, Nielsen and Huse (2010) revealed 
‘a’ demographic diversity variable as a potential determinant of both cognitive and affective 
conflict, i.e. the ratio of women on boards. Nielsen and Huse (2010) posited that women on 
boards influence a board’s key processes which include conflict. They found that the 
proportion of women on boards positively affects board of director effectiveness. Apart from 
diversity, other researchers such as Dawes and Massey (2005, 2007) have also suggested 
communication as another determinant of conflict. They found that communication frequency 
and directionality strongly facilitates affective conflict. Personality traits and differences 
areother determinants of conflict identified in the empirical literature. In Walker et al. (2015), 
where personality traits were found to be a determinant of cognitive conflict, personality 
differences were seen to facilitate affective conflict. Task routines and the size of a team are 
other determinants of both cognitive conflict and affective conflict identified by Amason and 
Sapienza (1997) and Jehn (1995). To better understand the nature of cognitive and affective 
conflict, some researchers have summarised their determinants into three basic sets, i.e. 
team, task, and organisation (Calabrò et al., 2009). Team determinants of conflicts include 
team size, composition, and team diversity. Task determinants are complexity and task 
scope (Calabrò, Di Carlo, and Ranalli, 2009). As for organisational determinants, they 
include organisational norms and strategies. These classifications of the determinants of 
team/board conflict were also supported by the findings of Amason and Sapienza (1997), 
Jehn (1995), Pelled et al. (1999), and Mooney et al. (2007). Considering these identified 
determinants of cognitive and affective conflict, it is useful to note that these forms of conflict 
often share the same determinants (Mooney et al., 2007). This further buttresses why most 
researchers that have investigated both forms of conflict have found a correlation between 
cognitive and affective conflict. In view of this, it is possible to conclude that the determinants 
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of cognitive and affective conflict are team size, composition, and diversity (i.e. team conflict 
determinants), complexity and task scope (i.e. task conflict determinants), organisational 
norms and strategies (i.e. organisational conflict determinants), communication, personality 
traits, and task routines. 
In sum, it has been identified that conflict is a bi-dimensional construct, i.e. cognitive 
and affective conflict. Cognitive conflictsaretask-related conflicts, whereas affective conflicts 
are emotional conflict (Jehn, 1995; Li and Hambrick, 2005; Pelled, 1996). These forms of 
conflict have been investigated to see their impacts on board task performance. Cognitive 
conflict was found to enable boards to carry out their control, advisory, and strategic tasks 
effectively (Minichilli et al., 2012; Zattoni et al., 2015) while affective conflict was found to 
negatively impact board control and service task performance (Farquhar, 2011; Heemkerk et 
al., 2014). Studies have also shown that cognitive conflict and affective conflict are positively 
correlated in a way that one of these leads to the other. Researchers have described this as 
creating a perspective dilemma (Simons and Peterson, 2000; Mooney et al., 2007), 
suggesting that when there are higher levels of cognitive conflict, this could potentially 
escalate intoaffective conflict. Finally, in identifying the determinants of these forms of 
conflict, functional and demographic diversity (Mitchell et al., 2008; Pelled et al., 1999), 
communication (Massey and Dawes, 2005, 2007), and personal traits (Walker et al., 2015) 
have been found to be trigger factors. 
2.5.5 Trust 
Trust is often examinedin an interpersonal relationship. When researchers attempt 
to define the concept of trust, they usually explain a dualistic relationship. This usually 
involves the decision of one person to trust (trustee) the other person (trusted) (Costa, 2003; 
Huff and Kelly 2003; Mayer et al., 1995; Whitener et al., 1998). This form of relationship 
could be perceived from how some researchers as Mayer et al. (1995) have defined trust. 
They defined trust as the ‘willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
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party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party’ (p. 712). Similarly, 
Costa (2003: 608) defined trust as a psychological state based on expectations, and on 
perceived motives and intentions of others, but also a manifestation of behaviour towards 
others. According to researchers such as Costa (2003) and Gillespie and Mann (2004), trust 
is a multi-dimensional construct, and it is usually classified as an individual-level and a team-
level concept (De Jong and Elfring, 2010; Langfred, 2004; Simons and Peterson, 2000). The 
difference between these levels of trust will be elaborated on in the following Chapter 3: 
Research Model and Hypotheses. Other researchers such as Clarke and Payne (1987) and 
Mayer et al. (1995) amongst others have classified trust into cognitive and affective. Where 
cognitive trust is based on the belief of the trustworthiness of another, affective trust is the 
trust that is stimulated by emotions (Farquhar, 2011; Clarke and Payne, 1987; Mayer et al., 
1995). Cognitive trust is knowledge driven with a need to trust based on a state of complete 
knowledge. Williamson (1993) described this form of trust as ‘calculative trust’. As for 
affective trust, this is the confidence a person places on another person on the basis of 
feelings generated by the level of care and concern both parties exchange (Johnson and 
Grayson, 2005). 
Despite these classifications of trust, most researchers whohave investigated the 
impact of trust in teams have not independently examined how cognitive and affective trust 
impacts team effectiveness. Rather these researchers have described trust as a multi-
component variable, while other researchers have referred to these components as the 
determinant of trust (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995; Colquitt et al., 2007). Before identifying these 
determinants and discussing this aspect of research in trust in thenitty-gritty, the impact of 
trust on team effectiveness derived from the empirical literature will be presented. Six (2004) 
described trust as a lubricant for social relations which improves efficiency. Considering this, 
it is proposed that trust can positively impact on team performance. Researchers such as 
Costa (2003), De Jong and Elfring (2010), Smith and Barclays (1997) and Mach et al. (2010) 
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have investigated the impact of trust on team performance as an outcome. For example, in 
Costa’s (2003) study, trust was described as a multi-component variable, and it was found 
that trust and its components facilitate team effectiveness in term of members’ continued 
commitment to the team, task performance, and team satisfaction. Smith and Barclays 
(1997) similarly found a positive relationship between trusting behaviours and perceived 
trustworthiness with task performance using a different rationale that examined trust 
between selling partners. In De Jong and Elfring (2010), the impact of trust on the 
performance of ongoing teams was investigated. They found that trust had a positive impact 
on team performance. However, this relationship is mediated by some team processes. De 
Jong and Elfring’s (2010) findings are similar to that of March et al. (2010) whose findings 
revealed that team members’ trust has a direct and indirect effect on team performance. 
They also identified that the relationship is mediated by team player trust and team 
cohesiveness. Where there are some researchers whohave considered the impact of trust 
on team performance, it is worth mentioning that research that has examined trust within 
boards is scarce (Farquhar, 2011). Amongst these few is Van Ees et al. (2008), and they 
found that trust had an adverse impact on the performance of a board’s monitoring role. 
Research on the determinants of trust is ongoing. Some of the researcherswhohave 
identified the determinants of trust in their research include Bijlsma and Van de Bunt (2003), 
Bierly et al. (2009), Costa (2003), Gladstein (1984), Kerkhof et al. (2003), Salas et al. (1992) 
and Sundstrom et al. (1990). For example, Butler (1991) identified a variety of determinants 
of trust by extending the key elements of trust proposed by Butler and Cantrell (1984). These 
elements are competence, integrity, consistency, discreetness, fairness, promise fulfilment, 
loyalty, availability, openness, receptivity, and overall trustworthiness. Butler (1991) 
described these elements as the conditions that the trusted party might be expected to fulfil. 
Mayer et al. (1995) found the determinants of trust to include trustworthiness, ability, 
benevolence, integrity, and the propensity to trust. These determinants of trust are similar to 
those Butler (1991), Costa et al. (2001), and Dietz and Den Hartog (2006) identified as key 
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determinants of trust. Considering these identified determinants of trust, it is noteworthy that 
there are different determinants of trust at an individual level and at a teamlevel. The 
determinants of trust identified in these studies are usually classified as an individual-level 
determinant (see Costa, 2001, 2003; Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). At a team 
level, some of these determinants were also identified. The following chapter will fully 
discuss the difference between individual-level and team-level trust and their determinants. 
In sum, the commonly identified determinants of trust include competence, integrity, 
consistency, discreetness, fairness, promise fulfilment, loyalty, availability, openness, 
receptivity, and overall trustworthiness amongst others. 
2.6 Summary ofChapter 2 
The study of board structure and composition is a prominent stream of research 
that has considered how board and firm performance could be achieved (Daily et al., 2003; 
Dalton et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 1996). However, the board structural and compositional 
literature has failed to explain how input variables are converted to output or performance 
variables (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Lawrence, 1997). This has led to the development of 
behavioural perspectives on boards(Forbes and Millkien, 1999). Behavioural perspectives on 
boards has provided an alternative lens for understanding what leads to board effectiveness 
or performance.Board processes that mediate between board input and output variables 
were identified in this review, as well as thegap in the research on board processes (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Minichilli et al., 2012; Zona and Zattoni, 2007), specifically the lack of 
attention to the determinants of board processes. This led to the review of board and team 
literature in an attempt toidentify potential determinants of board processes. 
This research sets out to focus on trust and will investigate what can trigger trust 
in the boardroom (i.e. among board members) (Bierly et al., 2009; Costa et al., 2001; 
Gillespie and Mann, 2004). To do this, concepts from team literature will be appliedto 
boards. The following chapter will explain in more detail why this research has 
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chosen to examine trust in the boardroom amongst other board processes. Trust as 
a team construct, and its determinants will be discussed. A model will be developed 
to explain the relationship between trust and its determinants. In view of this, the 
next chapter presents the hypothesised relationship between trust in the boardroom 
and the determinants of trust. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, research on board structure and board 
effectiveness have been criticised for its insufficient empirical support (Daily et al., 2003; 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Huse, 2005; Johnson et al., 1996; 
Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). Researchers such as Pettigrew (1992) highlighted this limitation 
and opened the ‘black box’ that ignited research on board processes and behaviours. In 
view of this, Forbes and Milliken (1999) developed a model that compared boards to work 
groups or teams. They described boards as a large episodic team whose output is cognitive. 
By this definition, Forbes and Milliken (1999) implied that social-psychological factors are 
triggered when board members work together to carry out their tasks. Those social-
psychological factors refer to board processes. According to corporate governance scholars, 
board processes mediate between board structural inputs and performance outputs and they 
have a significant impact on board and firm effectiveness (e.g. Van Ees et al., 2008; Zona 
and Zattoni, 2007). Examples of such processes include trust (Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006; 
Van Ees et al., 2008), communication quality (Farquhar, 2011), effort norms (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007), cohesiveness (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999), and conflict (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989) amongst others. 
Despite the growing research on board processes, some processes have been 
under-researched especially in the context of UK boards (Farquhar, 2011). Also, studies that 
have examined the determinants of board processes are rare. However, these processes 
and their determinants have been extensively studied in team research. Just as Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) have applied concepts from team research to boards, the determinants of 
team processes will be applied to boards in this research. To do this, attention will be given 
to an example of an under-researched board process: ‘trust’. Trust as a board process is 
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desirable of attention because it describes the social relationship present in the boardroom, 
especially when examining how other board processes emerge and how they lead to 
performance outcomes. More so, board processes are embedded in social relationships 
(Huse, 2005; Van Ees et al., 2008). This social relationship is characterised by types and 
degrees of trust (Brundin and Nordqvist, 2004; Huse, 2005). For this reason, trust as a board 
process requires further exploration. In view of this, trust and its determinants will be 
considered. A research model testing the relationship between the determinants of trust and 
trust in the boardroom will be developed (see Figure 3.1.). The components of this model are 
discussed in the following sections. 










Table 3.1: Definition of trust 
AUTHORS DEFINITION OF TRUST 
Mayer et al., (1995: 712) trust is the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party. 
Clark and Payne (1997) trust as a process model where the decision to trust is based on an 
underlying subjective base of trust that is accompanied by conditions to 
trust.  
Whitener et al., (1998: 
513) 
trust can be viewed as a positive attitude towards others and thus 
involves a willingness to be vulnerable and risk that the other party may 




Board Members’ Competence 
Communication Efficacy 
Board Members’ Familiarity 
Affective Conflict 
Board Tenure Board Meeting 
TRUST 
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not fulfil that expectation. 
Costa (2003: 608) trust as a psychological state based on expectations and perceived 
motives and intentions of others, but also a manifestation of behaviour 
towards others. 
Huff and Kelley (2003) trust is the decision to trust another party or the willingness to render 
one’sself-vulnerable 
 
3.2 The Dependent Variable: Trust 
As noted in the literature review chapter, there has been a paucity of studies 
examining the determinants of boards processes. The seminal conceptual model of Forbes 
and Milliken (1999) identified a number of board processes and how that mediates the 
relationship between board structure and compositional variables and performance 
outcomes. However, both theoretical and empirical literature in small team research pay 
greater attention to the determinants of these processes. This research thus attempts to 
shed further light on the factors that influencing board processes by focusing on the 
determinants of trust. Trust has been described as the glue, a medium or a social practice 
that holds relationships together (Colquitt et al., 2007; Kohyakov, 2007). This highlights trust 
to be a process that involves a series of actions or responsibilities of parties involved 
(Kohyakov, 2007). Considering how trust mediates between team structural inputs and 
outputs, empirical studies have revealed trust to be a variable that facilitates and sustains 
the effectiveness of teams such as boards (e.g. Langfred, 2004; McAllister, 1995; 
Schoorman et al., 2007). As shown, trust is frequently treated as a process and a 
determinant of team effectiveness. For the current purpose,trust will be treated as an 
outcome or dependent variable. To do this, it is necessary to consider factors that impact on 
trust, i.e. determinants of trust. Social scientists have examined the determinants of trust by 
examining the characteristics of trustees as a criterion for higher or lower trust (Colquitt et 
al., 2007; Costa, 2003; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995). This study will be adopting a 
similar approach to identify the determinants of trust.  
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In management and organisational research, trust has been investigated and 
applied to areas such as teams, interpersonal work relationships, and organisations amongst 
others (Bijlsma, 2003; De Jong and Elfring, 2010; Langfred, 2004; Mollering et al., 2004; 
Schoorman et al., 2007). This has led to a variety of definitions of trust (as depicted in Table 
3.1) that reflect in many roles, functions, and levels of analysis (Costa, 2003). Considering 
thisvast domain of trust, it is necessary to define clearly the concept of trust so as to 
understand how trust emerges in light of its relationship to its determinants. In this thesis, the 
dependent variable ‘trust’ will be treated as a team-level construct in order to investigate and 
understand its determinants (see Figure 3.1). In previous studies, trust has been defined as 
a multi-dimensional construct (Costa, 2003; Gillespie and Mann, 2004). Trust has been 
separated into cognitive-based trust and affective- or emotion-based trust (Costa, 2003; 
Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995). Cognitive trust is the beliefs of trustworthiness while 
affective trust refers to the role of emotions in a trust process. Trust has also been 
considered at both an individual level and at a team level. The individual level of trust refers 
to interpersonal trust while the team level concept of trust refers to intra-team trust (De Jong 
and Elfring, 2010; Langfred, 2004; Simons and Peterson, 2000). Interpersonal trust is the 
trust between a trustor and a trustee, whereas, an intra-team trust is a general form of trust 
expected from members of a team or group. 
As this thesis will be examining team level trust, it is useful to consider how 
interpersonal trust differs from the intra-team trust. According to Dirks and Skarlicki, (2009), 
interpersonal trust is a psychological state of individuals which involves having confident and 
positive expectations from the actions of the other person. This definition of interpersonal 
trust highlights the perception of trust that resides at an individual level (De Jong and Elfring, 
2010). This is when individuals, despite recognising their vulnerability, reach a state of 
positive expectation using factors of trustworthiness as a good reason to trust (Costa et al., 
2001; Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995; Mollering et al., 2004). As for intra-team or 
trust as a team level construct, it implies a collective or generalised form of trust that team 
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members have for their fellow team-mates (Langfred, 2004; Simons and Peterson, 2000). 
Where perception of trust, on the one hand, refers to individual level trust, intra-team trust is 
a generalised perception of trust or a shared quality of individual level perceptions (De Jong 
and Elfring, 2010). Similarly, Langfred (2004) described intra-team trust as the aggregate 
perception of individual trust. Such aggregate perceptions of individual trust emerge from 
factors such as team membership, social categorisation processes, collective sensemaking 
and shared experiences (Shamir and Lapidot, 2003; William, 2001). To examine trust in the 
boardroom, this thesis will be adopting the definition of intra-team trust from De Jong and 
Elfring (2010). For the purpose of this research, trust is defined as the willingness to be 
vulnerable to another board member and this feeling is shared across the board as members 
use evidence of trustworthiness as a valid reason to trust (i.e. competence, integrity, and 
benevolence) (Colquitt, Scott, and LePine 2007; Gabarro, 1978; Mayer et al., 1995).  As 
depicted in this definition, trust within the board is a generalised perception of trust that 
members share amongst themselves. In other words, the perception of trust of a board 
member towards another board member is shared across the boardroom leading to intra-
team trust (De Jong and Elfring, 2010; Langfred, 2004).  
Having defined trust, in order to identify its determinants, it is imperative to note that 
the determinants of trust vary depending on the two dimensions of trust (i.e. cognitive trust 
and relationship trust). Where cognitive trust is triggered by rational factors that are based on 
knowledge, non-rational factors such as feelings, emotions or homophily are triggers of 
affective trust (McAllister, 1995). On the left-hand section of the model (see Figure1.1), the 
determinants of trust are depicted. These determinants are selected to capture both 
cognitive and affective factors that trigger trust in the boardroom. As depicted in the model, 
cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ competence and communication are 
suggested to be determinants of cognitive trust, while board members’ familiarity and 
affective conflict are intended to capture the affective factors triggering or suppressing 
affective trust.  
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Studies that have identified the determinants of trust have done so in different 
contexts and relationships. For example, determinants of trust have examined interpersonal 
relationships (Colquitt et al., 2007; McAllister, 1995), organisational relationships (Mayer et 
al., 1995) and inter-firm relationships (Gulati, 1995) amongst others. Researchers whohave 
examined the determinants of trust have mostly done so while studying an individual level 
construct of trust (e.g. Costa, 2001 and 2003; Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). They 
have done so by examining the characteristics of a trustor and a trustee. Some of these 
theorists have considered the determinants of trust by using similar variables such as ability, 
expertise, competence or interpersonal competence, benevolence and integrity (see Colquitt 
et al., 2007; Cook and Wall, 1980; Butler, 1991; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995). Some 
researchers summarise these determinants as trustworthiness (ability, integrity, and 
benevolence) and propensity to trust (Butler, 1991; Costa, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2007; Erdem 
and Ozen, 2003; McAllister, 1995; Morrow et al., 2004; Mayer et al., 1995). From these 
studies, the components of trustworthiness and the propensity to trust appear to be 
important variables explaining trust, as they capture cognitive and affective factors that are 
conditions to trust. More so, trust itself is commonly categorised into these factors, i.e. 
cognitive trust and affective trust.  
The determinants of trust have also been identified as a team level construct (i.e. 
intra-team trust). An example of researchers whohave identified the determinants of this 
collective form of trust includes Bierly et al. (2009) and Simons and Peterson (2000). Bierly 
et al. (2009) identified cognitive conflict, affective conflict, team member familiarity, 
theperception of team members’ training, and team goal clarity as determinants of intra-team 
trust. Simons and Peterson (2000) identified determinants associated with interpersonal trust 
and explained how these variables could also be the determinants of intra-team trust. They 
mentioned that trust had typically been associated with benevolence, honesty, and 
competence at an interpersonal level. At a group level, it entails the general expectations of 
these variables from all team members (De Jong and Elfring, Zand, 1972). Therefore, a 
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shared ascription of benevolence, honesty, and competence by all team members are 
described to be determinants of intra-team trust (Simons and Peterson, 2000). In other 
words, when the interpersonal determinants of trust are shared across the team, they 
become intra-team determinants of trust. 
This research departs from the consideration of determinants of interpersonal trust 
and will be examining a collective form of trust, i.e. trust in the boardroom. Therefore, an 
attempt will be made to capture essential factors leading to trust which are peculiar to teams 
rather than individuals (see Figure 3.1). Cognitive and affective determinants of trust will also 
be distinguished. The selected cognitive determinants of trust are board members' cognitive 
conflict (Bierly et al., 2009; Grovier, 1994; Kramer, 1999; Langfred, 2007), perception of 
board members’ competence (Bierly et al., 2009; McAllister, 1995; Sitkin and Roth, 1993), 
and communication efficacy (Bulu and Yildirim, 2008; Crisp and Jarvenpaa). The selected 
affective factors suggested to leading to higher or lower trust are board members' affective 
conflict (Bierly et al., 2009; Jones and George, 1998; Langfred, 2007), and board members’ 
familiarity (Bierly et al., 2009). 
These determinants capture determinants of trust that are commonly identified by 
team researchers. For example, board members’ competence is synonymous to expertness 
or ability (Cock and Wall, 1980; Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006; Giffin, 1967; Kee and Knox, 
1970; McAllister, 1995; Lieberman, 1981; Sitkin and Roth, 1993). As for benevolence and 
integrity, these are commonly examined in interpersonal relationships between a trustor and 
a trustee (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). These variables are described using 
synonyms such as openness and consistency respectively (Mayer et al., 1995; Colquitt et 
al., 2007). The determinant board members’ familiarity has been selected to capture these 
variables through the internalisation of interests in an intra-team context (Bierly et al., 2009; 
Gefen, 2000). More so, Bierly et al., 2009) have proposed this variable to be a determinant 
of intra-team trust. Just as other researchers have proposed that cognitive conflict, affective 
conflict, and communication are determinants of intra-team trust, these also have been 
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included in the model (Curseu and Schruijer, 2010; Lacono and Weisband, 1997; Jarvenpaa 
and Leidner, 1999; Johnson and Grayson, 2005; Simons and Peterson, 2000). The 
hypothesised relationship between trust and these determinants will be discussedin the 
following sections. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
3.3.1 Cognitive conflict and trust 
Cognitive conflict is ‘the disagreement among group members about decisions, 
viewpoints, ideas, and opinions’ (Langfred, 2007: 885). Studies have also described 
cognitive conflict as synonymous to task conflict and substantive conflict. For example, 
Amason (1996: 127) defined cognitive conflict to be ‘task-oriented conflict’, and Pelled 
(1996b) further describes this type of conflict to be a ‘substantive conflict’. Cognitive conflict 
has been associated with positive outcomes in prior research and, because of this, it has 
been described as a functional conflict (Amason, 1996; Eisenhardt and Bourgeoibs, 1988; 
Jehn, 1997; Dawes and Massey, 2005; Pondy, 1967; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). According to 
Amason (1996), functional conflicts are forms of conflict that enhance team and 
organisational performance. During cognitive conflicts, teams benefit from differences in 
opinions about how team task could be accomplished (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Jehn, 1995). Also, cognitive conflict leads to a synthesis of ideas that supersedes individual 
perspectives within a team which leads to improved decision quality (Jehn and Mannix, 
2001). Empirical research has evidenced the positive impact of cognitive conflict on team 
performance (e.g. Dawes and Massey, 2005; Jehn, 1997; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). This 
positive impact can similarly suggest on trust in a team such as boards. 
According to Zona and Zattoni (2007), cognitive conflict may arise in the boardroom 
because the board is made up of members who are a diverse group of successful and 
experienced people. When cognitive conflict emerges in the boardroom, it creates an 
atmosphere of cognitive trust and a relationship that is based on rationality (Simons and 
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Peterson, 2000). Cognitive trust is developed based on accumulated knowledge which is 
from observation of board members’ behaviours during board meetings, and it allows 
members to pre-empt themselves with some level of confidence (Johnson and Grayson, 
2005). Cognitive conflict makes such observation possible when board members engage in 
the questioning and challenging of the rival hypothesis of members (Huse, 2005; Mitchell et 
al., 2008; Simons et al., 1999). This cognitive interaction helps board members find 
credence in their intra-team relationship through the accumulation of knowledge-based 
evidence that facilitates higher trust in the boardroom. Also, some researchers found that 
cognitive conflict led to increased satisfaction and facilitated the desire of members to want 
to work with team members due to trust (Amason, 1996; Korsgaard et al., 1995). According 
to Amason (1996), such desire is developed through enhanced understanding. This 
understanding is a product of members’ cognitive evaluation of alternative perspectives 
leading to team commitment. The decision to remain committed to the team will be based on 
rational reasons rather than affective grounds. This highlights how higher trust develops from 
cognitive conflict. Considering these arguments, cognitive conflict creates an avenue for 
members to develop knowledge-based trust in the boardroom. Therefore, it is possible to 
hypothesise that:  
H1: Board members’ cognitive conflict impacts positively on trust in the 
boardroom 
3.3.2 The Perception of Board Members’ Competence 
Based on the theoretical arguments of Butler (1991) and Sitkin and Roth (1993), 
competence is commonly identified as an important determinant of trust. Competence has 
been described using synonymous terms such as ability, expertise or interpersonal 
competence (e.g. Butler, 1991; Cook and Wall, 1980; Deutsch, 1960; Giffin, 1967; Gabarro, 
1978; Kee and Knox, 1970; Lieberman, 1981). For example, Albrecht (2002) explained 
competence as being qualities such as influence, impact, ability, expertness, knowledge, 
and the ability to do what is needed (p. 322). Similarly, Mayer and Davis (1999) defined 
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competence to be ‘a group of skills, competencies and characteristics that allow a party to 
have influence within some domain’ (p. 124). Sitkin and Roth (1993) and McAllister (1995) 
found that the perceived abilities of team members, as well as their professional credentials,  
will increase the degree of trust. Such trust is based on the confidence that team members 
have the ability to carry out their tasks effectively.  
In an attempt to explain the link between competence and trust in interpersonal 
relationships (i.e. trust between a trustor and a trustee), Mayer et al. (1995) explained that 
the ability or the competence of a trustee in a domain implies that a trustee may be 
competent in certain task related areas but not in all areas. Therefore, before competence 
may lead to trust in an interpersonal relationship, such trust must be related to the area of 
specialisation of the trustee, i.e. a trust that is domain specific (Mayer et al., 1995; Zand, 
1972).  This link between competence and trust could also be perceived in board members’ 
intra-team relationship. Teams are made up of members with domain-specific competencies 
who are allocated tasks or roles according to their specialities (Gabarro, 1978). Gabarro 
(1978) described this feature of a team as ‘functional and specific competence’. This is 
similar to the definition of a functional diversity characteristic of a team which is a reflection 
of the variety of knowledge, skills or abilities (Qian, 2012). In the presence of such variety of 
competencies, the allocation of roles should be congruent with the ability of members. 
Therefore, the expertness or competencies of members may facilitate higher trust because 
the team will be confident that board members will carry out their roles due to their 
specialisation in the task allocated to them (Giffin, 1967). 
The creation or the enhancement of trust due to the presence of competence within 
a team has been described by some researchers as cognitive-based-trust (McAllister, 1999; 
Parayitam and Dooley, 2007). McAllister (1999) described cognitive-based-trust as a trust 
based on competence, responsibility, reliability, and dependability. This form of trust 
supersedes emotional grounds because it is based on rationality and evidence. The 
credentials and working experiences of members are examples of such evidence (Sitkin and 
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Roth, 1993; McAllister, 1995). When a team perceives the competence of their members 
(i.e. available knowledge), the team uses this as a foundation to decide to trust. McAllister 
(1999) describes such available knowledge as a platform from which a team makes a leap of 
faith and trust each other. Therefore, when tasks or roles of members are matched to their 
competencies this leads to higher trust in a team but when there is asymmetry in the 
competence and roles, this may lower trust within the team. Also, when a team perceives the 
expertise of their members, it makes them willing to establish a higher trust using such 
competence or expertise as a good reason or a rational ground for trust. Considering this, it 
can be hypothesised that: 
H2: Perception of board members’ competence positively impacts on trust in 
the boardroom 
3.3.3 Communication Efficacy and Trust 
Communication in a team involves the sharing of information, experience, and 
understanding between team members (Aral et al., 2008). The objective of communication, 
according to Farquhar (2011), is to reduce ambiguity, to process information, and coordinate 
activities within a team. To define communication, researchers such as Mohr and Nevin 
(1990), Mohr et al. (1996), Fisher et al. (1997), and Massey and Dawes (2007) have 
proposed models highlighting facets that explain effective communication. Mohr et al. (1996) 
identified the facets of communication to be frequency, bi-directionality, formality, and non-
coercive content. Fisher et al. (1997) similarly identified frequency, bi-directionality, and 
coerciveness of influence as attempts to be facets of communication. By frequency, these 
researchers imply the amount of communication, by bi-directionality they refer to the vertical 
and horizontal flow of information and by non-coerciveness of content they refer to the 
consequences associated with non-compliance with the communication process (Fisher et 
al., 1997; Mohr et al., 1996). Mohr et al. (1996) added formality as another facet and, by this, 
they refer to the media of communication, i.e. formal or informal media. After Massey and 
Dawes (2007) had identified frequency and bi-directionality, they added communication 
Chapter 3: Research Model and Hypothesis 
D E T E R M I N A N T S  O F  T R U S T  I N  T H E  B O A R D R O O M | 84 
 
quality as another dimension which refers to the credibility, relevance, usefulness, and how 
easy it is to understand what is being communicated. How these researchers have 
explicated communication reveals communication to be a multi-dimensional construct. In 
other words, they suggest that communication is mainly made up of three dimensions, 
namely, frequency, bi-directionality, and quality (Farquhar, 2011; Eisenhardt et al., 1997; 
Massey and Dawes, 2007). These dimensions play a vital role in describing communication 
efficacy. 
Communication efficacy has been suggested to be an important variable that 
facilitates the building of trust (Aral et al., 2008; Bulu and Yildirim, 2008; Eisenhardt et al., 
1997; Hinds and Bailey, 2003). For example, Bulu and Yildirim’s (2008) study found that 
communication leads to higher trust. However, in virtual teams, trust is fragile due to the 
virtual form of communication. Therefore, to ensure higher trust in a team, members should 
engage in continuous and frequent communication that focuses on the work content (Iacono 
and Weisband, 1997). Considering this, a communication efficacy - especially when it is 
regular and predictable -develops and sustains trust especially in non-virtual teams such as 
boards (Bulu and Yildirim, 2008; Crisp and Jarvenpaa, 2000; Kayworth and Leidner 2000). 
Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1999) explained that it is impossible for trust to exist without a social 
context, i.e. communication and interaction. However, for communication efficacy to lead to 
trust within a team, such communication should be focused on accomplishing tasks 
(Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999; Iacono and Weisband, 1997; Ishaya and Macaulay, 1999). 
When examining trust in groups, Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1999) observed that groups that 
focus on tasks during their communication enjoyed higher trust while groups that focused 
less on accomplishing tasks during their communication experienced lower trust. Similarly, 
Ishaya and Macaulay (1999) noted that before communication efficacy can lead to trust, 
communication within a team or group should be in pre-categorised messages that are task 
defined. Where communication is infrequent and unequal with the lack of task identification, 
this reduces trust within the team and inhibits performance (Ishaya and Macaulay, 1999). 
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Therefore, if the efficacy of communication is frequent and predictable as well as task-
focused, communication should lead to trust. Considering this, it could be hypothesised that: 
H3: Communication Efficacy impacts positively on trust in the boardroom 
3.3.4 Affective Conflict and Trust 
Affective conflict refers to ‘inconsistency in interpersonal relationships which occurs 
when organisational members become aware that their feelings and emotions regarding 
some of the issues are incompatible’ (Rahim, 2002: 210). Affective conflict has been 
alternatively referred to as emotional and relationship conflict (Amason and Schweiger, 
1994; Li and Hambrick, 2005). Evidence indicates that affective conflict has an inhibitive or 
dysfunctional impact on team effectiveness (Amason, 1996; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
1988; Jehn, 1995; Jehn, 1997; Dawes and Massey, 2005; Pondy, 1967; Zona and Zattoni, 
2007). The reason for this is that affective conflict fosters intra-team and interpersonal 
animosity that is detrimental to the functioning of a team (Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Roseman 
et al., 1994). For example, affective conflict has been described to be potentially harmful or 
detrimental to group processes and the decision quality of teams (see De Dreu and 
Weingart, 2003; Llgen et al., 2005; Jehn, 1995; Langfred, 2007; Peterson and Behfar, 2003; 
Simons and Peterson, 2000). Amongst these inhibitive impacts of affective conflict on team 
processes is its impact on trust.  
The presence of affective conflicts indicates that teams members do not share a 
mutual understanding and appreciation (Langfred, 2007). According to Jones and George 
(1998), the absence of mutual appreciation clearly, involves negative emotions in a team 
which leads to lowered trust. Also, the lack of mutual appreciation within a team will lead to 
team members viewing other members they dislike as unhelpful or uncooperative. This will 
lead to a lowered willingness to be vulnerable to other team members (i.e. lowering their 
trust of them) as implied by the definition of trust (De Jong and Elfring, 2010; Colquitt, Scott, 
and LePine 2007; Gabarro, 1978; Langfred, 2007; Mayer et al., 1995).Consistent with this, 
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Simons and Peterson (2000) found that groups having less destructive relationship conflict 
enjoyed higher trust. Similarly, Curseu and Schruijer (2010) described how relationship 
conflict blocks the emergence of trust by associating its negative impact in a team with a lack 
of commitment and dissatisfaction. These highlighted impacts of affective conflict create an 
atmosphere of negative emotionality within the team (Curseu and Schruijer, 2010; Curseu, 
2011). In the presence of such a negative atmosphere, intra-team trust is easily lowered. 
Considering this, it issuggested that affective conflict can adversely impact trust in the 
boardroom. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
H4: Board members’ affective conflict impacts negatively on trust in the 
boardroom 
3.3.5 Board Member Familiarity and Trust 
According to Gefen et al. (2003: 63), ‘familiarity is one’s understanding of an entity, 
often based on previous interactions, experience, and learning of the what, who, how, and 
when of what is happening’. In a team, familiarity is gained from the knowledge acquired 
from previous work with team members (Goodman and Garber, 1988; Littlepage et al., 
1997). Applying this to an interpersonal relationship, familiarity allows a trustor to gather 
trust-relevant knowledge about the trustee which the trustor uses as a basis for trust 
(Komiak and Benbasat, 2006). This highlights how familiarity may lead to the building of trust 
not only in interpersonal relationships but also in teams (Rempel et al., 1985). Familiarity has 
also been discovered to be a builder of inter-firm trust (Gulati, 1995), and customer trust 
(Gefen, 2000). As familiarity is acquired based on previous experiences, it leads to higher 
trust in intra-team relationships (Komiak and Benbasat, 2006; Luhmam, 1979). In intra-team 
relationships, when experience with team members is negative, this may inhibit the building 
of higher trust in a team. However, when experiences are positive, it facilitates the 
emergence of trust in a team (Luhmann, 1979). Such experiences that build familiarity 
reduce the possibility of uncertainty in the expectations from the relationship in a team 
(Doney and Cannon, 1997; Komiak and Benbasat, 2006). Therefore, based on the 
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increased understanding of what has happened in the past, familiarity allows team members 
to predict teammembers’ future behaviours based on the consistency of previous dealings, 
hence facilitating trust.  
Considering this in the case of corporate boards, before familiarity resulting from 
cumulative knowledge and working experience can develop in the boardroom, board 
members must have been working together for a considerable period. Such anextended 
period spent working together helps board members establish a relationship that facilitates 
higher trust (Gefen, 2000). Before familiarity can facilitate higher trust, board members 
should have met the favourable expectations of members during their previous interactions. 
Over a period of extended interaction, board members easily become fond of each other as 
they use the consistency in their previous relationship as a framework for future expectation 
(Gulati, 1995). According to Gulati and Sytch (2008), team members use such extended 
interaction as an opportunity to develop higher trust. They described this form of trust as 
non-calculative, in other words, affective trust. Familiarity develops this type of trust in a 
team by enabling members to understand the behavioural inclination of each other. This 
stems from an increased identification and internalising of interest between members (Gulati 
and Sytch, 2008). In this way, board members’ familiarity satisfies the socio-psychological 
needs of members (Majchrzak et al., 2005). When such needs are satisfied, it gives 
members a sense of belonging and identification (Sluss and Ashforth, 2008). In other words, 
familiarity fosters a social bond in the boardroom. In sum, familiarity refers to a fond and 
genial relationship that develops from an extensive continuous interaction between board 
members (Espinosa et al., 2007; Gulati and Sytch, 2008; Komiak and Benbasat, 2006; 
Luhmann, 1979). Such interaction creates a framework that allows the internalising of 
interests between board members which leads to the development of higher affective or non-
calculative trust between them (Gulati and Sytch, 2008). Considering this, it is hypothesised 
that: 
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H5: Familiarity between board members positively impacts on trust in the 
boardroom 
3.4 Moderating Variables: Board Tenure 
Board member tenure is the period a director has been sitting on a board (Canavan 
et al., 2004; Livnat et al., 2016). According to Canavan et al. (2004), the average tenure for a 
director is approximately three terms (i.e. nine years). However, this can significantly vary in 
the case of some boards as some directors’ tenure may range up to 15 to 20 years. 
Considering this, it is useful to note that board member tenure is different from board tenure. 
Where board member tenure refers to a director, board tenure refers to the board as a 
whole. Therefore, board tenure can be defined as the period of time all members have been 
sitting on a board together. Board tenure will be considered as a moderating variable of the 
hypothesised relationships. Therefore, in this subsection, a moderating effect of board 
tenure is suggested between the determinants of trust and trust. 
Cognitive conflict is hypothesised to impact positively on trust in the boardroom. 
This is because it allows board members to engage in cognitive debates and helps them to 
find knowledge-based credibility in their relationship. Board tenure is suggested to weaken 
this relationship. According to Forbes and Milliken (1999), long-tenured boards experience 
lowered cognitive conflict. This is because members are likely to have developed a shared 
understanding over a long period of interaction. Members tend to rely on previous 
interactions and develop a repertoire towards tasks instead of harnessing new stimuli, ideas 
or innovation that cognitive conflict introduces to the board (Katz, 1982). Cognitive conflict is 
important because it leads to higher trust in the boardroom as members continue to find 
rational reasons to trust themselves when they engage in debates over tasks. Considering 
this, board tenure weakens the impact cognitive conflict has on trust as members are less 
inclined to engage in cognitive conflict. This is because the knowledge-based trust of 
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members would retrograde overtime as they engage in fewer debates (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999). Considering this, it is hypothesised that: 
H6: Board tenure negatively moderates the relationship between board 
members’ cognitive conflict and trust in the boardroom 
The impact that the perception of board members’ competence has on trust is 
suggested to be strengthened by the moderating effect of board tenure. Competence refers 
to the expertness of board members and their ability to carry out board tasks that are 
specific to their expertise. When the board is aware of the task-related expertise of 
members, it facilitates higher cognitive trust. Such trust is based on the knowledge that 
board members specialise in carrying out the tasks allocated to them. Board tenure 
strengthens the impact of the perception of board members’ competencies by creating a 
space of time that allows them to further enhance their abilities and the knowledge of each 
others’ competences. According to Forbes and Milliken (1999), long-tenured boards tend to 
acquire additional knowledge and skills that are organisation and board specific. Tenure 
does not only allow board members to gather job-specific knowledge; it introduces members 
to creativity and openness to new ideas (Pfeffer, 1983). Tenure allows board members to 
acquire additional skills on top of their previously accumulated abilities. Considering this, the 
impact of the perceived competencies of board members on trust is enhanced because 
members acquire more knowledge and skills over time.   
Additionally, board tenure also allows board members to observe themselves and 
find a more rational basis to develop higher trust. In long-tenured boards, members can 
witness the strength and weaknesses of each board member. They can also observe the 
growth and decline in the competencies of themselves. Board tenure also makes it possible 
for members to sharpen their competencies to match the needs of the board (Tesluk and 
Jacobs, 1998). When board members observe or perceive the development of each other’s 
competencies, the impact on trust is strengthened. Such trust is based on the accumulated 
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knowledge of the growth in the competencies of board members over time. Considering 
these arguments, it is possible to hypothesise that: 
H7: Board Tenure positively moderates the relationship between the 
perception of board members’ competence and trust in the boardroom 
Communication efficacy in the boardroom is proposed to impact positively on trust. 
Efficacy of communication refers to a frequent and task focused or cognitive communication. 
In other words, this is a cerebral form of communication. This sort of communication enables 
board members to gather task-related information. It also facilitates a mutual understanding 
of what task needs to be accomplished. When board members’ knowledge on the task is 
unified through communication, this leads to higher trust. When board tenure moderates the 
relationship between communication efficacy and trust, a weakening effect is suggested. 
According to Katz (1982), extended tenures reduce the effectiveness of intra-group 
communication and isolate the group from information sources. Board tenure weakens the 
impact communication efficacy has on trust by increasing the level of conformity of board 
members’ expectations especially when it comes to accomplishing tasks (Kosnik, 1990). 
When board members become susceptible to such conformity, they become increasingly 
reliant on standard practices and traditions (Katz, 1982). As a result, this may make 
members uncertain of board tasks and reduce their confidence (McGrath, 1984). When 
board members’ confidence is reduced, this could be interpreted as a weakened or lowered 
board members’ trust. Since tasks can be clarified through communication, communication 
efficacy sustains higher trust. When board tenure introduces conformity to the impact 
communication efficacy has on trust, a weakening effect is assumed. Considering this, it can 
be hypothesised that: 
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H8: Board tenure negatively moderates the relationship between 
communication efficacy and trust in the boardroom 
Affective conflict has been described using components as tension, animosity, 
friction and incompatibility (Jehn and Mannix, 2001). These components highlight the 
negative effects of affective conflict on trust. Considering this relationship, the moderating 
effect of board tenure is proposed to be negative. In other words, board tenure further 
worsens the impact affective conflict has on trust in the boardroom. Affective conflict has 
also been associated with negative emotionality. When such emotionality pervades the 
board, it negatively impacts on trust. Board tenure allows time for such emotions, animosity 
and incompatibilities caused by affective conflict to grow until it is self-sustaining. Affective 
conflict then becomes fertile which leads to the worsening effect that it has on trust. When 
such nurtured negative emotions and animosity is well developed, it completely obliterates 
the chances of higher trust in the boardroom. In sum, board tenure exacerbates the impact 
board members’ affective conflict has on trust by allowing time for affective conflict to 
flourish. Based on this, it is hypothesised that: 
H9: Board Tenure positively moderates the relationship between board 
members’ affective conflict and trust in the boardroom 
Board member familiarity occurs when board members share similar interests or 
when their interests are aligned. According to Gulati and Sytch (2008), such alignment may 
imply that board members have a mutual understanding of each other’s behavioural 
inclination. The alignment of interests makes bonding between board members possible as 
they becomefond of each other. This has been suggested to facilitate trust based on 
homophilous reasons. Board tenure strengthens the impact of board members’ familiarity on 
trust by enabling an extended period of interaction. This period of time allows them to further 
internalise their interests (Mallette and Fowler, 1992). In other words, board members would 
become more familiar with themselves due to continued interaction that board tenure 
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facilitates. As familiarity positively impacts on trust, tenure moderates between these two 
variables by creating an opportunity for continued interaction between board members that 
further strengthens their relationship. Therefore, the more familiar board members are with 
each other, the higher the impact it has on affective trust that members share. Considering 
this, it is possible to hypothesise that: 
H10: Board Tenure positively moderates the relationship between board 
members’ familiarity and trust in the boardroom 
3.5 Moderating Variables: Board Meeting Frequency 
Board meetings are the number of general board meetings held each year (Vafeas, 
1999). These meetings are usually held at definite intervals. How boards meet differentiates 
them from regular groups or teams. Unlike conventional teams, boards meet episodically 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). According to Monks and Minow (2008), full board meetings are 
held on an average of 7 times per year, where members spend less than two weeks per year 
working on the board they serve. These meetings are used to measure the intensity of board 
activities (Vafeas, 1999).  Board meetingsbring benefits such as allowing members to 
engage in intra-team interaction and discussing how board tasks would be accomplished 
(Vafeas, 1999). Considering this, this section suggests the moderating effect of board 
meeting frequency on the impact the determinants of trust has on trust in the boardroom.  
Cognitive conflict leads to trust in the boardroom because members engage in task-
related debates (Johnsona and Grayson, 2005). From these debates, members discover 
sagacious reasons to trust themselves, such decision to trust goes beyond affective 
grounds. Before such cognitive debate is possible in the boardroom, engaging in face-to-
face interaction is imperative. Board meetings make this interaction possible. With board 
meeting frequency, members would have the opportunity to participate in productive debates 
more often. From these debates, members will be able to sustain their rational reasons to 
trust. However, when board members frequently meet, the impact of cognitive conflict on 
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trust may weaken over time. The reason for this is that when board members frequently 
meet and engage in recurrent cognitive conflicts this could quickly escalate into emotional rift 
in the boardroom which could impede positive impact on trust (cf. Amason and Sapienza, 
1997; Jehn, 1995; Mooney et al., 2007; Pelled, 1996; Simons and Peterson, 2000; Yang and 
Mossholder, 2004).Where the apriori relationship between cognitive conflict and trust is 
assumed to be positive, the moderating effect of board meeting frequency introduces a 
negative impact on the relationship. In sum, the reasons for this assumed effect is because 
the frequency of board meetings sets the stage for board members to engage in repeated 
cognitive conflict which potentially deteriorates into the negative effects. Considering this 
feature of board meeting frequency, the assumed positive impact of cognitive conflict on 
trust is weakened. Therefore, it could be hypothesised that: 
H11: Board meeting frequency negatively moderates the relationship between 
board members’ cognitive conflict and trust in the boardroom 
Regarding the relationship between the perception of board members’ 
competencies and trust in the boardroom, a positive moderating effect of board meeting 
frequency is suggested. Board members’ perception of each other’s competencies implies 
that members can witness, observe, and understand the abilities of their colleagues. Board 
meeting frequency makes such perceptions possible. During board meetings, members are 
given the opportunity to exhibit their expertness or competencies, while others observe 
(Vafeas, 1999). The higher the frequency of board meetings, the more members are given 
the opportunity to observe themselves. This is so because board members would be able to 
gather sufficient compelling evidence on which they would base their decision to trust 
cognitively. Considering this, the perception of board members’ competencies’ impact on 
trust is strengthened by board meeting frequency. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that: 
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H12: Board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between 
the perception of board members’ competence and trust in the boardroom 
The positive impact of communication efficacy on trust has been suggested. 
However, this impact depends on the context within which such communication occurs  
(Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999; Iacono and Weisband, 1997; Ishaya and Macaulay, 1999). 
Based on this, board meeting frequency may weaken the relationship between trust and 
communication efficacy. This is because the more frequently board members meet, the less 
inclined they are to engage in an efficacious form of communication that is task focused. 
According to Katz (1982) and Kosnik (1990), the more time teams such as corporate boards 
spend with each other; the more conformity to routines is created which undermines 
effective communication in the boardroom as they become easily susceptible to standard 
practice. In a similar vein, Vafeas (1999) argued that during board meetings communication 
in the boardroom may be based on an agenda set by the CEO, and for this reason, board 
communication is hardly productive. This enables board meeting frequency to weaken the 
positive relationship between communication efficacy and trust in the boardroom. Another 
reason why a weakening effect of board meeting frequency is suggested is that board 
meetings create impediments to communication efficacy (Malenko, 2014). Amongst these 
impediments is that board communication is usually very limited during board meetings 
(Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Malenko, 2014). The other reason mentioned by Malenko 
(2014) is that during board meetings, directors are usually reluctant to communicate freely 
due to reputational concerns as they do not want to appear uninformed or incompetent when 
expressing controversial opinions. Therefore, directors succumb to conformity allowing 
board meetings to weaken the impact of communication on trust. Based on these 
arguments, it could be assumed that the relationship between board members’ 
communication efficacy and trust is weakened by the moderating effect of board meeting 
frequency. This is because the frequency of board meetings introduces conformity and 
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impediments to the relationship between communication efficacy and trust. Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H13: Board meeting frequency negatively moderates the relationship between 
communication efficacy and trust in the boardroom 
Board meeting frequency is suggested to negatively moderate the relationship 
between affective conflict and trust in the boardroom. In the presence of affective conflict in 
the boardroom, it is unlikely that members develop higher trust for themselves. This is 
because affective conflict is fuelled by incompatibilities and negative emotions. When such 
an atmosphere permeates the board, interaction during board meetings becomes frustrating 
and upsetting (Pelled, 1996). Board meetings give members an opportunity to let out their 
animosity, antagonism, and the discomfort they experience from relating to other board 
members. Board meetings also allow members to cultivate or nurture feelings of animosity 
especially when treated as such by other members. This fragile interaction that board 
meetings facilitate may also incline board members to ponder and retaliate how they have 
been treated by other members. This creates a vicious circle of negativity in the boardroom. 
With the presence of such self-sustaining affective conflict, the possibility of higher trust will 
be annihilated. In sum, board meeting frequency creates an avenue to intensify affective 
conflict through retaliation of experienced frustration and bias from other members. 
Considering this, it is therefore hypothesised that:   
H14: Board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between 
board members’ affective conflict and trust in the boardroom 
Board members’ familiarity is hypothesised to lead to higher trust in the boardroom. 
The rationale behind this positive relationship is that board members’ familiarity helps satisfy 
members’ socio-psychological needs (Majchrzak et al., 2005). Board members become 
familiar with themselves through an extended period of interaction (Gulati, 1995). Over time, 
members’ interests are internalised as they use past favourable experiences with members 
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as a basis for higher trust (Gulati and Sytch, 2008). Board members’ familiarity facilitates a 
relational attachment in the boardroom. Before an affective relationship develops from board 
members’ familiarity, the proximity of face-to-face interaction is imperative. Board meeting 
frequency makes such interaction possible. Board meetings create an environment where 
board members can learn about each other’s interests. With the frequency of board 
meetings, board members’ interests are easily aligned over time. Board meeting frequency 
also makes the building of intra-team relationship possible, and this involves board members 
getting familiar with each other. To sum up, board meeting frequency helps members to 
satisfy their social needs. As board meeting, frequency creates an environment for 
familiarity, higher trust in the boardroom is sustained. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that: 
H15: Board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between 
board members’ familiarity and trust in the boardroom 
3.6 Research Hypotheses Summary 
The lack of empirical support for the structural approach to board and firm 
effectiveness has led to the increase of theoretical and empirical literature exploring board 
processes and behaviours (e.g. Farquhar, 2011; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Van Ees et al., 
2008; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Following Forbes and Milliken’s 
(1999) application of concepts drawn from team research to board, studies on board 
processes have been ongoing. In a similar way, this research attempts to contribute to the 
knowledge on board processes by investigating how these processes are triggered. To do 
this, trust among other board processes is being examined. Trust is a process that facilitates 
and sustains team effectiveness (Langfred, 2004; McAllister, 1995; Schoorman et al., 2007). 
It is also a social practice that holds relationships together through the facilitation of intra-
team interaction (Colquitt et al., 2007; Kohyakov, 2007). For this reason, the process ‘trust’ is 
desirable of attention. Therefore, to examine trust and the determinants of trust, a model 
explaining the relationship between trust and its determinants was developed. The model 
proposes that cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ competence, 
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communication efficacy are cognitive determinants of trust while affective conflict and board 
members’ familiarity are affective determinants of trust.  
Considering the relationship between trust and these determinants, it has been 
hypothesised that cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ competence, 
communication efficacy and board members’ familiarity positively impacts on trust. As for the 
affective conflict, its negative impact on trust has been hypothesised. The moderating 
variables that influence the relationship between these variables have also been identified. 
These moderating variables are ‘board tenure’ and ‘board meeting frequency’. The 
relationship between the perception of board members’ competence, affective conflict, board 
members’ familiarity and trust was shown to be positively moderated board tenure and board 
meeting frequency. As for the relationship between cognitive conflict, communication 
efficacy, and trust, it was shown to be negatively moderated by board tenure and positively 
by board meeting frequency. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Formulated Hypotheses 
 
HYPOTHESES 
H1 Board members’ cognitive conflict impacts positively on trust in the boardroom 
H2 Perception of board members’ competence positively impacts on trust in the boardroom 
H3 Communication efficacy impacts positively on trust in the boardroom 
H4 Board members’ affective conflict impacts negatively on trust in the boardroom 
H5 Familiarity between board members positively impacts on trust in the boardroom 
H6 Board tenure negatively moderates the relationship between board members’ cognitive 
conflict and trust in the boardroom 
H7 Board tenure positively moderates the relationship between the perception of board 
members’ competence and trust in the boardroom 
H8 Board tenure negatively moderates the relationship between communication efficacy and 
trust in the boardroom 
H9 Board tenure positively moderates the relationship between board members’ affective 
conflict and trust in the boardroom 
H10 Board tenure positively moderates the relationship between board members’ familiarity 
and trust in the boardroom 
H11 Board meeting frequency negatively moderates the relationship between board members’ 
cognitive conflict and trust in the boardroom 
H12 Board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between the perception of 
board members’ competence and trust in the boardroom 
H13 Board meeting frequency negatively moderates the relationship between communication 
efficacy and trust in the boardroom 
H14 Board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between board members’ 
affective conflict and trust in the boardroom 
H15 Board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between board members’ 
familiarity and trust in the boardroom 
Above is the summary of the hypotheses formulated in this chapter. Hypotheses 1 
to 5 test the hypothesised relationship between trust and cognitive conflict, theperception of 
board members’ competence, communication efficacy, affective conflict, and board 
members’ familiarity. Hypotheses 6 to 10 tests for the moderating effect of board tenure, 
whereas hypotheses 11 to 15 tests the moderating effects of board meeting frequency.The 
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nextchapter will outline the methodology and methods used to test the model and 
hypotheses developed in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 outlined the research model and hypotheses to investigate the 
determinants of trust in the boardroom. This chapter reviews choices of research design and 
methodology and their respective strengths and weaknesses. Considering the nature of this 
study, which aims to identify causal relationships between variables, the research design 
and methodology employed in this research is quantitative. Data analysis is conducted using 
SPSS. As quantitative research is theory-driven and often deductive, it is critical that the 
research constructs, models and hypotheses are based on strong theoretical foundations. 
For this requirement, an extensive literature review on all the theoretical and conceptual 
matters was carried out, and this is reported in Chapter 2. This chapter will be structured as 
follows: first, a review of alternative research designs and paradigms is detailed. Second, the 
chosenresearch method and design areoutlined. Third, this research uses a quantitative 
approach with data collected via a postal survey. This section will include discussion ofthe 
data collection procedures, identify the selected instruments for the chosen research design 
and method,reportthe results of factor analysis and reliability of the constructs of the 
variables. The final section of this chapter provides a summary of the tests conducted to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the measurement model. 
4.2 Research Design 
Research design involves the selection of methods, sampling, data collection, and 
interpretation procedures (Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2007). According to 
Blumberg et al. (2008) and Bryman and Bell (2007), research design considers how best to 
carry out research to save time and cost. Saunders et al. (2009) defined research design as 
the general plan to answer a research question. Similarly, Royer and Zarlowski (2001) 
defined research design as the link between the research question, the literature review, the 
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data analysis, and the results. Royer and Zarlowski’s (2001) definition is consistent with 
Blumberg et al.’s (2008) overview of a research design in which they described it as an 
outline showing the overall structure and orientation of a study. In sum, a research design is 
a framework created to answer a research question or questions. This framework includes 
the type of study (i.e. correlational, descriptive, experimental, review, or meta-analytic) that is 
defined by the collection, measurement, and analysis of data (Blumberg et al., 2008; Phillip, 
1971; Royer and Zarlowski, 2001). 
After the research is designed, the validity and the reliability of the selected 
measures is examined. Measurement validity refers to the extent to which what was 
intended to be measured was accurately measured (Blumberg et al., 2008). According to 
Saunders et al. (2003), validity is concerned with whether the findings of the research are 
really about what they appear to be about. In order to evaluate the validity of research, Yin 
(2009) proposed four measures to test the quality of a research design. These measures are 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. Construct validity refers to 
the operational measures of the concept being studied. Internal validity has to do with 
establishing a causal relationship between variables (i.e. between a dependent variable and 
an independent variable). External validity has to do with the domain within which the study 
can be generalised. Reliability ensures that there is consistency in the result if the study 
were to be repeated (Yin, 2009). According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2002: 53), the reliability 
of research has to do with the answering of the following questions: 
 Will the selected measure yield the same result on other occasions? 
 Will there be similar observations when others observe? 
 Is there transparency in how sense was made from the raw data? 
There are underlying philosophical assumptions on which all research is based, and 
they constitute what makes research 'valid'. These philosophical assumptions have to do 
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with the research method(s) that is appropriate for the development of knowledge in a given 
study. Research methods refer to data collection techniques which are associated with 
specific research paradigms. Where the two most important research paradigms are 
qualitative and quantitative, their approaches to research are inductive and deductive 
respectively (Saunders et al., 2003). The following section will discuss these paradigms 
more. 
Table 4.1: Research Paradigms and Dimensions 
Subjectivity/ Qualitative 
Paradigm 
Assumptions Objectivism/ Quantitative 
Paradigm 
Nominalism: Multiple realities Ontology Realism: A single reality 
Interpretivism: anti-positivism 
focuses on subjective world view 
of humans 
 
Epistemology Positivism: based on the principle 
of reductionism and demanding 
reliability and validity 
 
Voluntarism  Human Nature Determinism 
Ideographic: Inductive Methodology Nomothetic: Deductive 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979) 
4.3 Research Paradigms 
The term ‘paradigm’ was coined from the Greek word paradeigma which means 
pattern. The term was first introduced by Kuhn (1962) to denote a conceptual framework that 
was shared by a community of scientists. This conceptual framework served as a convenient 
model for examining problems and finding solutions. According to Kuhn (1977), the term 
paradigm referred to a research culture based on a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions 
that a group of researchers have in common with regard to the way to conduct research. 
This is line with Olsen et al. (1992: 16), who defined research paradigm as the ‘structure and 
framework or system of scientific and academic idea, values, and assumptions. According to 
TerreBlanche and Durrheim (1999), a research paradigm is an all-encompassing system of 
interrelated practices and thinking that is used to define the nature of the enquiry. These 
practices refer to a research process that has four major dimensions. In Table 4.1, these 
dimensions are identified to be ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology 
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(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; TerreBlanche and Durrheim, 1999). The first is ontology 
whichrefers to the perception of reality, whether it is objective and external to humans or 
whether it is created by one’s consciousness. The second is epistemology, and it is 
concerned with how knowledge can be acquired, i.e. whether knowledge is a hard body of 
objective reality or a subjective experience. The third is human nature,and it is concerned 
with the socio-cultural assumption on whether or not the researcher perceives man as the 
controller or as the controlled. The fourth is methodology which refers to the researcher’s 
tools, i.e. the means available to social scientists to investigate phenomena. 
There are two main research paradigms,the qualitative research paradigm and the 
quantitative research paradigm. These paradigms are differentiated by their research 
dimensions (ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology) and methods as 
depicted in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Where the qualitative research paradigm uses an inductive 
approach that is based on subjectivity, a quantitative approach uses an objectivist theory-
driven deductive approach (Gill and Johnson, 1997; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Smith and 
Dainty, 1991). A deductive approach is one where theory is developed and then tested using 
data. An inductive approach is where data is collected, and theory is developed from the 
data (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Gill and Johnson, 1997; Holden and Lynch, 2004; Smith 
and Dainty, 1991).These research paradigms are also separated by their research methods. 
Research methods refer to the data collection techniques associated with these paradigms. 
Qualitative methods of data collection are usually through observations and interviews, while 
quantitative methods are usually through experiments and surveys. The taxonomies of the 
qualitative and quantitative research paradigms are illustrated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The 
following sections will contrast these two paradigms. 
Table 4.2: Research Paradigms and Methods 
Research Paradigms Research 
Approached 
Research Methods 
Positivism Quantitative Surveys: longitudinal, cross-sectional, 
correlational; experimental, and quasi-
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Qualitative Biographical (interviews); 
phenomenological; ethnographical; 
case studies; observations 
Critical Theory 
(Triangulation) 
Critical and action 
oriented 
Ideology critique; action research  
(Conen et al., 2000) 
4.3.1 Positivism: Quantitative Research Paradigm 
The positivist, quantitative research paradigm is based on the ideas of theFrench 
philosopher, August Comte (Antwi, 2015). According to Comte, knowledge is based on the 
experience of senses, and this can be acquired through observation, reason, and 
experiment (Antwi, 2015; Henning et al., 2004). The positivist paradigm is based on the 
concepts of determinism, empiricism, parsimony, and generality (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; 
Conen et al., 2000). Determinism refers to an event caused by circumstance, i.e. causal 
relationships or events caused by one or more factors(Salmon, 2007). Empiricism refers to 
the use of empirical evidence to support hypotheses. Parsimony refers to how phenomena 
are explained in the most economical or simple way possible. Because it is cumbersome to 
collect all necessary information about phenomena or a theory, parsimonious or simple 
explanations are useful in shading understanding on complex social events. As for 
generality, it refers to the process of generalising findings or observations to world at large 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Conen et al., 2000). Considering these assumptions on which 
the positivist's paradigm is based, positivists argue that reality or knowledge is objective and 
quantifiable. This implies that reality can be objectively measured in a way that is 
independent of the researcher, and the research instrument used, i.e. reality is independent 
of social construction (Henning et al., 2004; Walsham, 1995). In this positivists’ approach to 
reality, human behaviour is viewed as passive, controlled, and determined by the external 
environment. Hence, objectivists’ quantitative approach to research is based on establishing 
cause and effect. 
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Positivists’ quantitative approach to research uses mathematical and statistical 
measures to analyse causal relationships (Blumberg et al., 2008). These methods of 
research are used to synthesise the process of generating knowledge through quantification. 
Quantification is used to enhance precision in the description of parameters or variables and 
the relationship between them. This quantitative deductive approach essentially represents 
the classical positivist tradition. However, there is a modified version of the positivist 
tradition. This is called post-positivism (Phillips, 1990). The post-positivists agree that reality 
and the object of our inquiry are determined by the external environment and independent of 
the human mind. However, they suggest that reality and acquisition of knowledge cannot be 
entirely objective and perceived accurately simply by observation (Philips, 
1990).Nonetheless, just as with the positivists, they uphold that objectivism is ideal when 
carrying out the search of knowledge. 
Apart from the post-positivist tradition, positivism has been critiqued by alternative 
traditions due to its lack of subjectivity in interpreting phenomena or reality. The reason for 
this is found in Buckingham (1918) who critiqued the quantitative methods of positivists’ 
research approach for its lack of isomorphism between its measures and reality and its 
failure to produce truths useful to educational practice. These main criticisms of the positivist 
research paradigm in social sciences have been echoed by contemporary researchers such 
Campbell (1978), Gould (1981), Kemeny (1956), and McNemar (1960). Due to these 
criticisms, an alternative research paradigm to positivists’  methods was proposed. This is 
the interpretivist constructivist paradigm. This tradition argues against positivism that 
objectivism should be replaced with subjectivity in the process of inquiring of knowledge and 
interpreting reality (Flick, 2006; Miles and Huberman, 1994).This has led to the suggestion of 
an alternative theoretical, methodological, and practical approached to research. The next 
section will discuss the interpretivist qualitative research paradigm and their recommended 
approach to research. 
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4.3.2 Interpretivism: Qualitative Research Paradigm 
According to interpretive researchers, reality is defined by people’s subjective 
experience of the external world (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The ontological and 
epistemological grounding of the interpretivist paradigm is that reality is socially constructed, 
hence, their anti-positivist approach to science (Flick, 2006). They also believe that reality is 
multi-layered and complex (Cohen et al., 2000). In other words, a single phenomenon can 
have multiple interpretations. The interpretivist paradigm is marked by three schools of 
thought. These are phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and symbolic interactionism (see 
Table 4.2) (Cohen et al., 2000). Phenomenology rules out the possibility of any objective 
reality. Therefore, experience and reality are gained by interaction with the phenomenon. 
When humans interact with phenomena, they interpret them subjectively, thereby 
constructing new experiences. Ethnomethodology is concerned with the process of how 
commonsense reality is constructed through face-to-face interaction. It has to do with the 
interpretation of people’s behaviour in their natural environment or social setting. 
Interactionism emphasises on interpretation of interactions between humans and from these 
interactions, social processes are derived (Cohen et al., 2000). According to this 
perspective, rather than reacting to each other’s actions, humans interpret and define other’s 
actions. In the interpretivist tradition, there are no correct or incorrect theories (Walsham, 
1993). This is because the interpretation of phenomena, human behaviour in his/her natural 
environment is subject to the researcher’s interpretation and how interesting it is to the 
researcher. In other words, the researchers try to derive their constructs from an in-depth 
examination of the phenomenon of interest. This is consistent with Reeves and Hedberg 
(2003) who describes the interpretivist paradigm as concerned with the understanding of the 
world from the subjective experience of individuals. 
From the interpretivist premise, access to reality is through social constructions 
such as language, consciousness, and shared meaning. This is in line with the interactionist 
school of thought (Cohen et al., 2000). The interpretive paradigm uses a qualitative 
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approach to research. Their approach is underpinned by a variety of methods through which 
data or information is gathered (e.g. observations, interviews, and so on) and interpretation 
of the observed (drawing inferences from abstract patterns). According to Deetz (1996), this 
is an attempt to understand phenomena from a shared meaning, or from the meaning 
assigned to it by people assign. The qualitative tools of the interpretivist paradigm are 
summarised in Table 4.2.  
The interpretivist’s approach to research hasbeen criticised for its problem of 
interpretation (Bryman and Bell, 2007) and the problem of data analysis (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). These problems associated with qualitative research are linked to 
suspicion regarding the legitimacy of qualitative research, i.e. the validity, reliability, and 
especially the generalisability of qualitative research method of the interpretivist paradigm 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Despite the 
criticism of the lack of objectivity and generalisability of interpretivist research methods, 
Adelman, Jenkins, and Kemmis (1980) argued that the knowledge generated by the 
aggregation of single qualitative studies are significant in their right. Stake (1980) counters 
the claim that single qualitative studies are not an adequate basis for generalisations. In 
addition to the issue of generalisability, qualitative research methods have been critiqued for 
its poor replicability due to its methods of data collection (Mayers, 2000; Stake, 1980). These 
critiques of the interpretivist paradigm amongst others have contributed to the emergence of 
the third alternative approach to research, i.e. triangulation. 
4.3.3 Triangulation 
Triangulation in social sciences began with Campbell and Fiskel (1959), was further 
developed by Web et al. (1966) and elaborated by Denzin (1970). Triangulation in research 
is a verification procedure to increase the validity of research (Denzin, 1970; Yeasmin and 
Rahman, 2012). The debate regarding which research paradigm is appropriate for which 
research has contributed to the emergence of the concept of triangulation (Smith and Dainty, 
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1991). This ‘paradigm debates’ werebetween three schools of thoughts. These schools of 
thoughts are the purists, situationists, and pragmatists (Hassard, 1991). The purists argued 
that differing paradigms and different methods should not be mixed, while the situationists 
argued that certain methods are appropriate for specific types of research, and there is no 
‘one size fits all’ regarding research methods. The pragmatists argue that the methods of 
different paradigms could be mixed when carrying out a single study.  This helps the 
researcher to benefit from the advantages of different paradigms (Hassard, 1991). This 
pragmatist argument describes the concept of triangulation. In line with the pragmatists’ 
argument, Hassard (1991) noted that combining the methods of different paradigms allows 
the researcher to utilise the richness of data fully. Triangulation attempts to overcome the 
weaknesses arising from the two different philosophical (i.e. quantitative and qualitative) 
approaches, by adopting several methods to study the same phenomenon (Jack and Raturi, 
2006). As illustrated in Figure 4.1., triangulation in social sciences involves the combination 
of two or more paradigms, data sources, and methods for the purpose of quantitative 
validations and qualitative inquiries (Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012). Although, it is worth 
noting that this depends on the type or method of triangulation. 
 
Figure 4.1 Triangulation Model 
There are a variety of approaches to triangulation. Denzin (1970; 2006) identified 
data, investigator, theoretical, and methodological triangulation. Data triangulation refers to 
the sourcing of data through multiple sources in order to test a single phenomenon (Hussein, 
2009). According to Denzin (2006) and Denzin (1989), there are three types of data 
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research, space is when data is collected at more than one site, and person refers to the 
collection of data from more than one set of individuals, groups, or collectives (Denzin, 
1989). Theoretical triangulation involves the use of multiple theoretical lenses for a single 
research study or to analyse a research problem (Hussein, 2009). Investigator triangulation 
refers to the situation where there are multiple observers or researchers carrying out the 
same research (Hussein, 2009). As for method triangulation, it involves the use of more than 
one methodological approach during an investigation in research (Hussein, 2009). Amongst 
these forms of triangulation, methodological triangulation best describes the term 
‘triangulation’ (Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012). This is so because method triangulation occurs 
during the research design and data collection stage (Hussein, 2009). However, the type of 
triangulation applied is dependent on the type of research. Also, it is useful to note that these 
forms of triangulation have their strengths and weaknesses (Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012). 
As mentioned above, triangulation is an intermediate approach to research. 
Researchers such as Patton (1990) and Brannick and Roche (1997) have argued that the 
matching of the research method to the research problems may result in debatable or 
problematic results (i.e. the situationists’ arguments). Considering this, they recommend the 
use of both philosophical approaches of the objectivist and the subjectivist, i.e. using both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods, hence triangulating results. The intermediate 
philosophical stance just as the objectivists believe that reality exists. Intermediate 
philosophers also acknowledge subjectivism that humans contribute to its concreteness or 
refinement. Considering the epistemological stance of the intermediates, they believe that 
knowledge is not absolute. However, it can be tested. Therefore, the decision to retain or 
discard a given knowledge could be made(Holden and Lynch, 2004). According to Gordon 
(1991), the intermediates argue that it is possible to generalise or explain a phenomenon 
with the aid of triangulation given a research finding. Considering these arguments for 
triangulation, the main thrust of critique against the approach especially in social sciences 
has to do with its multi-theory and method approach in investigating reality. One of the main 
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reasons for introducing triangulation has to do with the criticisms against the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to research, i.e. the issues of replicability and validity and bias 
(Golafshani, 2003; Zohrabi, 2013). According to Fielding and Fielding (1986), triangulation 
does not necessarily reduce bias and increase validity with its multi-theoretical and multi-
methodological measures. Fielding and Fielding (1986) mentioned that combining methods 
and theories may give the researcher a fuller picture, however, such a picture may not be 
‘objective’. Considering this, combining methods should be for the purpose of adding breadth 
and depth to the research analysis, not for the purpose of pursuing an ‘objective truth’ 
(Fielding and Fielding, 1986: 33). Based on a similar argument, some researchers have 
called for the abandonment of the concept of triangulation and its terminology in social 
sciences (e.g. Denzin, 1978; Fielding and Fielding, 1986, McFee, 1992). The reason for 
such a suggestion is summarised in Blaikie (1991:131) as follows: 
1. for a moratorium on the use of the concept in social science research 
2. to identify the appropriateness and inappropriateness of combining methods 
and data sources due to the incommensurability of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of methodological perspectives 
3. to develop a suitable new label for these appropriate combinations 
Irrespective of these arguments against triangulation, there is aconsensus that 
triangulation can indeed increase thecredibility of scientific knowledge by enhancing its 
internal consistency and generalizability (Hussein, 2015). 
4.4 Chosen Research Design and Paradigm 
As discussed in the previous section, researchers usually base their research on 
one or multiple paradigms, depending on the research problem. The underlying 
philosophical assumption for this study comes mainly from the positivists’ quantitative 
research paradigm. As previously discussed, positivists’ research paradigm and their 
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quantitative approach are often concerned with establishing a causal relationship between 
variables or concepts (Popper, 1959). This involves a deductive process. The deductive 
approach involves reasoning from the particular to the general in a way that follows a top-
down logic. The deductive process of research begins with the review of theory, 
development of hypothesis based on reviewed theoretical perspectives or premises (Babbie, 
2010; Monette et al., 2005; Popper, 1959; Wilson, 2001). This deductive process is 
illustrated in Figure. 4.2. This process of a deductive means of reasoning involves the 
‘reasoning from the general to the particular’(Gulati, 2009; Pelissier, 2008). Gulati (2009) 
describes a deductive approach to be a way of testing relationships between variables so as 
to isolate the causal link between them. Such relationships between variables are usually 
clearly depicted in the hypothetical statement for research (see the research model in 
Chapter 3, Figure3.1: The Model of the Determinants of Trust). After the formulation of a 
hypothesis, the deductive approach follows through with the implementation of relevant 
research methods. These research methods are usually quantitative, and they reveal 
findings that show if the hypothesis is to be accepted or rejected. This is the process of 
validating the theory from which the hypothesis was formulated (Beiske, 2007; Snieder and 
Larner, 2009). This research has adopted this deductive process by presenting an extensive 




Figure 4.2 Deductive Process 
Through generalisability and replicability, the validity and reliability of the deductive 
approach are ensured (Podsakoff and Dalton, 1987). Generalisability refers to the ability to 
generalise research findings beyond the specific context within which the research was 
conducted. Replicability refers to the means of checking if the research findings are 
applicable to other contexts. The deductive approach testing causal relationships are 
Theory Hypothesis Methodology Analysis Accept/ 
Reject
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commonly used in the stream of board process literature (Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; 
Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009; Van Ees et al., 2009; Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007). Within this stream of research, a quantitative research method is usually 
adopted (e.g. Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; Minichilli et al., 2009; Wan and Ong, 2005; 
Zona and Zattoni, 2007). Since this research is positioned in the board process literature, it 
would be adopting a similar approach. This is because the objective of this research is to 
test the relationship between trust and the determinants of trust (i.e. the cause and effect on 
trust in the boardroom), hence the appropriateness of a quantitative research method. 
Moreover, the quantitative research method is widely used in the social sciences field of 
study (Blumberg et al., 2008). The following section will discuss in detail the selected 
quantitative research method. 
4.5 Research Method- Survey Research 
Survey research is just one amongst several approaches to quantitative research. 
Other approaches include experiments, structured observations, content analysis, and 
secondary data analysis (Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2007). Survey research 
involves collecting information from a sample population using their responses to answer 
research questions (i.e. questionnaires). Survey research is a popular quantitative research 
tool commonly used in social sciences (Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2007). It 
owes its popularity to its versatility, efficiency, and generalisability (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Surveys are efficient in that many variables can be measured without substantially 
increasing time or cost. Surveys also allow the sampling of larger populations. This, 
therefore, makes generalisability of the sample population possible (Alreck and Settle, 2004; 
Bryman and Bell, 2007). The characteristics of a survey also highlight the versatility of 
survey research. The efficiency and success of a survey depend on the ability of the 
researcher to minimise two types of errors. These errors are: (1) errors of observation and 
(2) errors of non-observation. The error of observation has to do with poor measurement of 
variables that are being surveyed. This problem or error can stem from the way questions 
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are formulated and presented in the questionnaire, and the characteristics of the respondent. 
Non-observation errors refer to the omission of variables that should be included in the 
survey or when the intended measurement cannot be carried out. In the case of a non-
observation error, there is an issue of an under-coverage of elements in the target 
population or the sampling frame. The sources of non-observation errors arise from a poor 
sample frame (i.e. covering inadequate population), engaging in random sampling, and non-
response from respondents (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005). 
There are two types of surveys, descriptive surveys and analytical surveys 
(Oppenheim, 2000). Descriptive surveys are used for fact-finding such as gathering 
information about what a population thinks about a subject matter and making predictions. 
Analytical surveys are designed to establish and explore causal relationships between 
variables and cases. This research used investigated the causal relationship between the 
determinants of trust and trust in the boardroom, hence the appropriateness of the analytical 
survey.  
In sum, a hypothetical relationship between the determinants of trust and trust in the 
boardroom has been formulated through the review of the literature. Quantitative research 
will be conducted to test the research model and hypotheses.  Data will be collected using a 
survey, and data collected will be analysed statistically. The sampling methods, 
measurements and scales, validity and reliability of the selected research design and 
method will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
4.5.1 Sampling Method 
In an attempt to answer a research question or achieve a research objective, it is 
impossible to utilise all the data available to a researcher due to the constraint of time, 
money, and often access (Saunders et al., 2003). A sampling technique offers a number of 
methods that helps the researcher to reduce the amount of data required to carry out 
research. Sampling methods allow a researcher to collect a sample data, cases or elements 
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that are representative of the population (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005).The full set of cases 
from which a sample is selected is called the population (Saunders et al., 2003: 151). The 
difference between a sample, cases and the population is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The 
sampling method selected by the researcher also makes a generalisation across the whole 
population possible.  










There are two principal types of sampling. These are probability and non-probability 
sampling (Blumberg et al., 2008; Maylor and Blackmon, 2005; Saunders et al., 2003). 
Probability sampling is usually associated with survey-based research. This sampling 
method requires making inferences from a sample of a population to answer research 
questions. To do this, a suitable sampling frame in line with the research question should be 
identified; a sampling size should be decided, selecting an appropriate probability sample 
technique, and checking if the sample is representative of the population using statistical 
inferences (Saunders et al., 2003). With probability sampling, each case selected from the 
population isknown. As for non-probability sampling, cases selected from the total population 
are unknown, and it is impossible to use statistical inferences to answer research questions 
(Saunders et al., 2003). A probabilistic and non-probabilistic sampling are alternatively 
known as random sampling and non-random sampling (Blumberg et al., 2008; Brymon and 
Bell, 2007). These alternative references to probabilistic and non-probabilistic samplings are 
Sample 
Population 
Cases or elements 
Saunders et al. (2003) 
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associated with their sampling techniques. These techniques are illustrated below in Figure. 
4.4 which shows the various techniques associated with the two sampling methods (i.e. 
probability sampling and non-probability sampling). 
Figure 4.4 Types of Sampling and Sampling Techniques 
 
(Saunders et al., 2003) 
In Figure 4.4, the techniques associated with probabilistic sampling are simple 
random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling, and cluster sampling (Blumberg 
et al., 2008; Brymon and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2003). Simple random sampling 
involves selecting a random sample from a complete list of the population using either a 
random number table. Systematic sampling involves selecting samples at a regular interval 
from a sampling frame. Stratified random sampling is a modified form of simple random 
sampling, and it involves dividing a larger population into two or more relevant and 
significant strata (Saunders et al., 2003). The population is divided into subpopulations 
based on one or more attributes, after which random samples are obtained from them. 
Cluster sampling just like stratified sampling divides thepopulation into discrete groups 
before sampling. These groups are naturally occurring clusters or groups. 
Unlike probabilistic sampling, non-probabilistic sampling does not involve random 
selection from a research population. Non-probabilistic techniques are quota sampling, 
purposive sampling, snowball sampling, and convenience sampling (Blumberg et al., 2008; 
Brymon and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2003). Quota sampling is similar to stratified 
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surveys. The researcher non-randomly selects subjects from unidentified strata until the 
desired number is achieved. Purposive sampling alternatively known as judgemental 
sampling is when the researcher uses his/her judgement to select cases that best answers a 
research question or meets a research objective (Saunders et al., 2003). Snowball sampling 
is usually used when there is difficulty in identifying members or cases of the desired 
population. In this scenario, the actual size of the population is usually unknown. It involves 
the researcher identifying one or fewer cases or subjects that link other subjects with similar 
characteristics. Convenience sampling involves selecting samples for a research 
haphazardly. An example of such a sampling technique involves conducting a random 
interview with random respondents on the street. The sample selection continues until the 
desired sample size is achieved. 
Considering the different types of sampling and their techniques, this research will 
be adopting the probabilistic sampling method and will be using a random sample method. 
The following sub-section will discuss the sampling frame for this research. 
4.5.2 Sampling Frame 
The population of the study was extracted from the Morningstar Company database 
and the database of business contacts available to the University of Wolverhampton 
Business school. Morningstar, formerly known as Hemscott, is a database subscribed to by 
the University of Wolverhampton. The database provides fundamental information on the 
United Kingdom's top300,000 companies which includes charts, ratios, latest news, and 
descriptive information about directors. Using the Morningstar and the University of 
Wolverhampton databases, information about UK listed companies and their directors were 
extracted. The information obtained about companies include the number of employees and 
the turnover of these companies. Information about the characteristics of the board of 
directors of these companies was also obtained from the database. These include the 
number of directors sitting on the board, the contact details of the directors, the proportion of 
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male to female directors, the proportion of executive and non-executive directors, and the 
presence of CEO duality. Although, some of this information wasincluded in the survey to 
obtain a more recent overview of the corporate boards. From the Morningstar and the 
University of Wolverhampton Faculty of Social Sciences contacts’ database, 905 companies 
that have corporate boards were selected for the sampling frame. The primary contact for 
these companies were the Chief Executive Officers. 
4.5.3 Validity and Reliability of Research Design 
When conducting a survey study, there are some things to consider in collecting 
high-quality data. Amongst these are the validity and reliability of the research tool. The 
reliability and the validity of a research instrument are mainly rooted in positivist 
epistemology or quantitative research (Watling, 2002). Validity is concerned with the 
accuracy of the research tool or instrument and the degree to whichit(i.e. survey) measures 
what it is expected to measure (Hinton, 2004). When developing a survey tool, the face 
validity of the survey is usually considered. Face validity of the survey refers to what extent 
the survey appears to measure what it is meant to measure (Gravetter and Forzano, 
2012).There are also other forms of survey validity that should be considered. These are the 
content validity, internal validity, and external validity of the survey amongst others. These 
types of validities were discussed in this chapter in Section 4.3: Research Paradigm. To 
ensure the content validity of the research instrument (i.e. survey), an extensive review of 
theliteratureon theories and the research findings on the subject being researched (i.e. trust) 
was carried out. The questions included in the survey were ensured to reflect the issue being 
researched. For example, the operationalisation of the measures used for trust and its 
determinants were checkedagainst the relevant content domain of the constructs used in the 
questionnaire. The measures used for trust and its determinants were derived from theboard 
and team literature that have previously tested these measures or constructs. Although, 
modifications were made to the constructs to suit the purpose of this research. The 
constructs used to measure trust and its determinants will be listed in the following sections. 
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As previously discussed in Section 4.3, internal validity refers to the ability of the researcher 
to make causal inferences between variables while external validity refers to an extent in 
which the result can be generalised from the sample of study to the entire population. To 
ensure internal and external validity, this research adopted a quantitative research strategy. 
A model showing the casual relationship between trust and its determinants was developed 
(see Figure 3.1: The Model of Trust and its Determinants) from the critical review of 
theliterature. Also, to ensure the generalisability of the findings of the proposed relationship, 
a survey research was adopted. The administration of thequestionnaire will be discussed in 
later section. 
According to Joppe (2000), the reliability of a research instrument has to do with the 
replicability and consistency of the research under a similar methodology. Corbetta (2003) 
and Best and Kahan (2006) similarly explained reliability as the degree in which the concept 
of measurement produces the same result when the same tool is used. To achieve this, the 
researcher has used questions tested for validity and reliability in previous research, by 
adapting it to suit this research’s objectives. According to Cohen et al. (2012), there are 
three commonways of measuring the reliability of a questionnaire. These are test, re-test, 
split-half, and internal consistency methods. Testing and re-testing for reliability is 
accomplished by administering the same questionnaire twice over a period to the same 
group or respondents. Split-half reliability is when the test is split into two halves and 
compared for similarities and differences. After comparing the two halves, similar results will 
suggest a level of reliability of the research instrument. Internal consistency reliability is a 
measure based on the level of correlation between items or variables being tested. Internal 
consistency is usually measured using the Cronbach’s alpha (α) which is calculated using a 
pairwise correlation, a statistical tool. In this study, the internal consistency method was used 
to find out the reliability of the items in the questionnaire and will be shown by the alpha (α) 
values which will be reportedlater in this chapter. 
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4.6 Questionnaire Design and Format 
To carry out the survey, the questionnairewas divided into 5sections was designed. 
The first section covered board practices measuring trust and four of its determinants with a 
7-point Likert scale using 30 items. The7-point scale was ranked as follows: 1 is ranked as 
strongly disagree, 2 for disagree, 3 for slightly disagree, 4 for neither disagree nor agree, 5 
for slightly agree, 6 for agree and 7 for strongly agree. The items measured in this section 
were trust, board cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ competencies, 
communication efficacy, and board affective conflict. Trust was measured using six 
statements adopted and modified from Langfred’s (2004) and Simons and Peterson’s (2000) 
measures of intra-team trust. The determinants of trust are divided into cognitive 
determinants and affective determinants (see Chapter 3,Figure 3.1: The Model of Trust and 
its Determinants). The cognitive determinants of trust measured in this section are a board’s 
cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ competencies, and communication 
efficacy. For board members’ cognitive conflict, measurements proposed by Wang and Ong 
(2005) and Jehn (1995) were adopted. Statements measuring the perception of top 
management abilities were modified from Mayer and Davis (1999) to measure the 
perception of board members’ competencies. As for communication efficacy, measurements 
were adopted from Hassall (2009)who measured how team and task explain variance in 
communication. The affective determinants of trust are a board’s affective conflict and board 
members’ familiarity. Only board affective conflict was measured in the first section. The 
statements measuring affective conflict were adapted fromOng and Wan (2005) and Jehn 
(1995). 
The second section was designed to measure a board’s familiarity using a 4-point 
Likert scale and consisted of 15 items.This measurement of board familiarity was adopted 
from Maynard (2007). For the 4-point scale, 1 is ranked as not at all, 2 as to a limited extent, 
3 as to a reasonable extent, and 4 as to a great extent. Trust, and its first five determinants 
were measured differently to familiarity (i.e. 7-point Likert scale and 4-point Likert scale) to 
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ensure consistency with the source of the components used to measure the main variables 
in the questionnaire. Moreover, trust, cognitive conflict, communication efficacy, the 
perception of board members’ competence, and affective conflict were measured using 
statements that described practices in the boardroom.A Likert scale describing the extent to 
which the respondents agree to the statements as a description of the practices was 
imperative in capturing the variables considered in this research. For this reason, a 7-point 
Likert scale was used as a measure. As for familiarity, the measure adopted contrasted from 
that of other variables. Rather than statements, familiarity consisted of 15 items identifying 
different levels of familiarity (i.e. personal life, professional life, and personality). Board 
members were to describe the extent to which theyare familiar with their co-members using 
these items, hence the appropriateness of a 4-point Likert scale. 
The third section of the questionnaire covered information about the board the 
respondent wassitting on. This section is designed to obtain data on variables that moderate 
the relationship between trust and the determinants of trust (i.e. board tenure and board 
meeting frequency).  
The fourth and fifth sections were used to gather information about the organisation 
and the respondent respectively. The fourth section was designed to obtain data on board 
and firm control variables. These variables are commonly referred to as the ‘usual suspects’ 
of board research (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Machold et al., 2011). The fifth section 
was completely optional to the respondents, and it was designed to gather data about the 
respondentsregardingthe board they werepresiding on. 
Finally, a cover letter introducing the purpose of the study and its importance was 
composed. In the letter, respondents were also assured of the confidential nature of their 
responses and how the information they have provided was to be used. A sentence 
expressing gratitude to the respondents for choosing to participate in the survey was further 
issued. The cover letter was then attached to the questionnaire. 
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4.6.1 Pilot Test 
A pilot test of the questionnaire was conducted in May 2015. The pilot test was 
used to examine the wording, sequencing, and the layout of the questionnaire (Veal, 2005). 
Three board members participated in the pilot test. The researcher made contact with one of 
the three board members who assisted in administering the questionnaire to the other two. 
These participants proferred recommendations regarding the structure of the questionnaire 
and the wording of its items. Some of these recommendations were taken on board, and the 
final draft of the questionnaire was produced. 
4.6.2 Response Rate 
The cover letter and the pretested questionnaire were administered between May 
2015 and July 2016. Between May 2015 and May 2016, the questionnaire was e-mailed to 
respondents on an E-survey platform: SurveyMonkey. The point of contact of these emails 
were the CEOs of the 1203 companies included in the company database extracted from 
Morningstar and the University of Wolverhampton database. This research has used CEOs 
as the point of contact in a way that is consistent with a vast amount of corporate 
governance studies for two reasons: one, there is difficulty in gaining access to primary data 
on boards of directors, hence the reason to use a single respondent (e.g. Zona and Zattoni, 
2007; Minichilli et al., 2009; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Zahra, 1996; Zahra, Neubaum and 
Huse, 2000). Two, boards of directors have a tendency to conduct their meetings in secrecy 
and are usually less open on activities that are carried out in the boardroom (e.g. Daily, 
Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992). 
The response rate of the E-survey is reported in Table 4.3. Due to the low response 
rate,the E-survey was re-administered as a follow-up between May 2016 and June 2016 to 
enhance the response rate. The response rate of the re-administered questionnaire 
remained low as only one respondent replied (see Table 4.3). To enhance the response 
rate, copies of the questionnaire were printed. Companies that are public corporations (such 
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as councils) and companies with bounced emails - reported in Table 4.3 - were taken out of 
the database, amounting to 298 contacts. The printed questionnaires were then mailed out 
to the remaining 905 respondents via post. The mailed questionnaire produced 97 (i.e. 
10.7%) responses. A summary of the mailed questionnaire is reported in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.3: Morningstar and University Database E-Survey Response Rate 
1203 Questionnaires Number Percentage 
Opened Emails 274 22.8% 
Unopened Emails 773 64.3% 
Bounced Emails 77 6.4% 
Responses Rate 7 0.58% 
Follow-up Email Response 1 0.083 
Total Responses 8 0.67% 
Table 4.4: Post Questionnaire Response Rate 
905 Questionnaires Number Percentage 
Responses (First Wave) 75 8.29% 
Responses (Second Wave) 14 1.5% 
Follow-up 8 0.88% 
Non-responses 808 89% 
Total Response Rate 97 10.7% 
 
4.6.3 Summary of Data Collected on Trust and its Determinants 
The data obtained from the administered questionnaire has revealed some 
significant findings regarding board behaviour and the atmosphere in the boardroom 
regarding trust and its determinants. Based on the responses received regarding the level of 
trust in the boardroom, directors widely held that there was a high level of trust among their 
directors. As depicted in Figure 4.5, 88% of the directors either agreed or strongly agreed 
that there was a high level of trust within their board. On a scale of 1 to 7, a higher 
percentage of directors ranked the level of trust in their boardroom as 7. 
As illustrated in Figure4.6, the vast majority of directors saidthat their board 
members possessed the required skills and experience needed to carry out board tasks and 
oversee the company. 78% to 90% of the directors strongly agreed that they wereconfident 
Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology 
D E T E R M I N A N T S  O F  T R U S T  I N  T H E  B O A R D R O O M | 124 
 
in their fellow directors’ competencies. Regarding how board members perceive each other’s 
competencies, directors have mostly ranked themselves as ‘7’on the scale of 1 to 7 (see 
Figure 4.6). Also, 78% of the directors said that the members of their board werecapable of 
carrying out board tasks. 
Regarding cognitive conflict, 78% of directors whoparticipated in the study signified 
that overall the discussions in the boardroom wereusually open and candid, and often 
resulted in clear decisions. In the process of engaging in task-related conflict, 78% of the 
directors saidthat the viewpoints of other members wereoften considered. Also, that the 
atmosphere in the boardroom often encouraged critical thinking (see Figure4.7). 
Directors have widely responded to the survey by stating that communication in 
their boardroom wasaveragely frequent and task-related. The data gathered showed that a 
lowly 19% of directors strongly agreed that the communication in their boardroom 
waseffective. More directors agreed or slightly agreed that the communication during board 
interactions werefrequent and task-related. Specifically, 44% of the directors stated how the 
board’s taskswhichwereaccomplishedwasunclear. This implies that the level of 
communication efficacy is average at around 50% in the boardroom (see Figure 4.8). 
From a scale of 1 to 7,  77% of directors responded to the survey by stating that 
there werehardly any emotional or personal rifts between fellow directors. 80% of the 
directors strongly agreed that they gotalong very well with other directors in the boardroom. 
Overall, the level of board affective conflict in the boardroom waslow (see Figure4.9). 
The level of familiarity in the boardroom of the sample is high, as most directors 
statedthat they werefamiliar with their co-directors either to a great extent or to a reasonable 
extent. Where 91% stated that they werefamiliar with each other’s professional lives to a 
great extent, 94% said that they werefamiliar with each other’s personalities. However, the 
director stated that they wereless familiar with each other’s personal lives (see Figure4.10). 
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Seven Six Five Four Three Two One
There is considerable trust amongst 
members of the board (89%)
I know I can strongly depend on other board 
members (85%)
Other members of the board know they can 




































Seven Six Five Four Three Two One
Board members are capable of performing their 
role (91%)
Board members are knowledgeable about the 
task that needs to be done (85%)
Board members are confident about the skills of 






















Seven Six Five Four Three Two One
Board members consider the viewpoints of other 
members (76%) 
The atmosphere on the board encourages critical 
thinking (75%) 




























Seven Six Five Four Three Two One
Board members frequently communicate 
about tasks (53%)
Board members are clear on how board 
tasks are to be accomplished (56%)
Board members are provided with a clear 
explanation of what each task involves 
(60%)
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Seven Six Five Four Three Two One
There are personality clashes during the process of 
decision-making in the boardroom (31%) 
Board members do not get along very well (20%) 
At least one director disagrees with a decision made in the 
boardroom (19%) 
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4.6.4 Non-Response Bias 
Selection bias is one of the problems associated with a survey study.This bias is 
commonly due to the choice of firms selected for the survey study (Balasubramanian et al., 
2007). In an attempt to investigate the determinants of trust in the boardroom, the study 
focused on companies who have corporate boards. This excludes the boards of public 
sector corporations, such as councils and small companies, with only one director rather 
than a team of directors.To carry out a response bias test, acomparison of the respondents 
and the non-respondents’ company sizes (measured by the number of employees), and the 
characteristics of their businesses (in terms of their sectors within which they operate) was 
carried out. This is reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. The comparison shows that there is no 
significant differencesbetween the respondents and the sample - indicating that there is no 
non-response bias. 
Table 4.5: Sample Characteristics of Business Sector 
Business Sectors Number of 
Responding 
Companies 
Response Sample % 
(n=97) 
Original Sample % 
(n=905) 
Construction Sector 9 9.3% (9) 10.3% (93) 
Manufacturing Sector 27 27.8% (27) 20.2% (183) 
Financial Sector 19 19.6% (19) 20.4% (185) 
Service Sector 42 43.3% (42) 49.1% (444) 
Total 97 100% 100% 
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0-499 41 42.1% (41) 40.5% (367) 
500-999 9 9.1% (9) 10.3% (93) 
1000-1999 10 10.6% (10) 10.7% (97) 
2000-3000 7 7.1% (8) 8.1% (73) 
3000 and above 30 30.1% (29) 30.4% (275) 
Total 97 100% 100% 
 
 
4.6.5Common Method Bias 
Common method bias is another type of bias peculiar to a survey study which is the 
measure of error that could potentially threaten the validity of the conclusions that will be 
drawn upon the statistical result of this research (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff, 
2012). This biasis investigated by observing the systematic percentage variance that could 
make the conclusions of a statistical result unsound (Bagozzi and Yi, 1990; Doty and Glick, 
1998). To carry out a test for common method bias, either a procedural or a statistical 
measure can be used. The procedural measures are used to examine the approach of data 
collection and the instrument design, while the statistical method is used to test and control 
the influences of common method bias (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff, 2003). 
As highlighted in Podsakoff, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff (2003), the measures for 
testing common method bias using the procedural method include: (1) Adopting the 
measures of the predictors from different sources; (2) Using temporal, proximal, 
psychological or methodological separation of measurement; (3) Protect respondent 
anonymity and reduce evaluation apprehension; (4) Counterbalance question order and (5) 
Improve scale for the items. This research has adopted two of the procedural methods(i.e. 
protecting respondents anonymity and improving the scale items) to test for common method 
bias.To protect respondents’ anonymity, the cover letter attached to the questionnaire 
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assured respondents of the confidentiality of their responses; that the names of their 
companies nor the names of the respondents would not be included in the final report. As for 
ensuring an improved scale for the items being measured, a pilot test was carried out on the 
survey instrument. This is to make sure that the questions are unambiguous, succinct, and 
straight to the point. 
The statistical methods for testing for common method bias include: (1) Harman’s 
single factor test; (2) Partial correlation procedures; (3) Control the effects of a directly 
measured latent method factor; (4) Control the effects of an unmeasured latent method 
factor and (5) Multiple methods factors (multi-traits multi-method, i.e. confirmatory factor 
analysis model, correlated uniqueness model, and direct product model).The Harman’s 
single factor method is the most widely used method in literature to test for common method 
bias (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff, 2003). This study adopted the Harman’s single 
factor as a statistical method for testing for common method bias. To do this, all the 
measures of the variables considered in this research (trust, cognitive conflict, the perception 
of board members’ competence, communication efficacy, affective conflict, and familiarity) 
were loaded onto a factor analysis on SPSS, but the factor extraction was constrained to 
one factor. Also, no factor rotation was adopted in this process. From the results reported on 
the ‘Total Variance Explained’ table, the first component is taken into consideration to ensure 
that the percentage of variance explained is not more than 50% of all the variables in the 
model. This implies that the instrument used in the research is free from a significant 
common bias effect. The Harman’s single factor method was carried out and is reported in 
Table 4.7. The percentage of variance explained is 41% which shows that common method 
bias is not likely to be viewed as a problem. 
Table 4.7: Common Method Bias 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 11.911 41.071 41.071 11.911 41.071 41.071 
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Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
4.7 Factor Analysis 
This section presents a factor analysis of the items used to measure trust and its 
determinants. The analysis that was carried out to ensure the reliability and validity of these 
items will also be presented in this section. Before this, a factor analysis was performed to 
examine the interrelationships between the variables and if the variables are linked to their 
underlying factors. Carrying out a factor analysis involves a collection of steps used to 
examine how a construct influences responses to the variablesbeing measured. These steps 
are to carry out a correlation matrix, a factor extraction, factor rotation, and the computation 
of factor score. However, before carrying out a factor analysis, a preliminary test (i.e. the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test and Bartlett’s test of sphericity) is required to find out if it is 
appropriate to proceed with a factor analysis. The following section reports the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin test and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. 
4.7.1 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett’s Tests 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is used to compare 
the magnitude of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitude of the partial 
correlation. The KMO value varies between 0 and 1. If the KMO value is or closer to 0, the 
sum of partial correlation is large compared to the sum of correlations, and this implies that a 
factor analysis is likely to be inappropriate. When the KMO value is or is closer to 1, the 
patterns of correlations is compact, and a factor analysis is more likely to produce reliable 
and distinct factors. According to Kaiser (1974), KMO values greater than 0.5 are 
acceptable. Furthermore, KMO values between 0.5 and 0.7 are medicore, 07 and 0.8 are 
good, 0.8 and 0.9 are great, and values above 0.9 are superb (Burns and Burns, 2008; 
Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999; Kaiser, 1974). As for Bartlett’s test of sphericity, this is used 
to test the null hypotheses by comparing the observed correlation matrix to the identity 
matrix so as to check for redundancy between the variables that could be summarised with a 
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fewer number of factors. For a factor analysis to be carried out, the correlation matrix must 
be the identity matrix, and this is depicted when all correlation coefficients are zero with a 
significance of less than 0.001. 
Table 4.8: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Test for Trust, Cognitive Conflict, 
Communication Efficacy, Perception of Board Members’ Competence, 
Affective Conflict 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .862 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2113.615 
Df 435 
Sig. .000 
KMO and Bartlett’s Test (Trust, Cognitive Conflict, Communication Efficacy, Perception of Board Members’ 
Competence, Affective Conflict) 
A KMO and Bartlett’s tests were carried out on the constructs used to measure 
trust, board cognitive conflict, board communication efficacy, the perception of board 
members’ competence, and board affective conflict as depicted in Table 4.8. Table 4.8 
reports that values of KMO measure of sampling adequacy at 0.862 and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity value at a significance of 0.000. These values imply that it is safe to carry out a 
factor analysis because the KMO value is adequately greater than 0.5 and Bartlett’s test 
significance is less than 0.001.These results suggest that it is safe to progress into a factor 
analysis of the constructs. 
Table 4.9: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Test for Familiarity 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .807 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 844.300 
Df 105 
Sig. .000 
KMO and Bartlett’s Test (Board Familiarity) 
Table 4.9 is the KMO and Bartlett’s test for board members’ familiarity. Separate 
tests were undertakenbecause their scales of measurement were different. Where a 7 point 
Likert scale was used to measure the former, board familiarity was measured using a 4 point 
Likert scale. The separate tests were to ensure consistency of the scales of the 
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constructs.Table 4.9 reports the value of KMO measure of sampling adequacy at 0.807 and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity value at a significance of 0.000. These values are also 
satisfactory to progress into the factor analysis of the constructs. 
As it was for the KMO and Bartlett’s test, a factor analysis was carried out for trust, 
cognitive conflict, communication efficacy, theperception of board members’ competence, 
and affective conflict and for board familiarity separately. Factor analysis is usually carried 
out in three main stages which are in the form of tables showing the correlation matrix, factor 
extraction, factor rotation, and factor scores. The first stage which is the correlation matrix is 
used to investigate the dependence between multiple variables at the same time. The 
methods of doing this are thePearson parametric correlation test and 
the Spearman and Kendall rank-based correlation analyses. 
The second stage is the factor extraction. This is when the factor weights are 
computed so as to extract the maximum possible variance in a successive factoring until 
there is no further meaningful variance left. A common way of doing this is carrying out a 
principal component analysis (PCA) which involves an orthogonal or linear transformation of 
observations of possibly correlated variables into a set of values that are linearly 
uncorrelated variables (Burns and Burns, 2008; Hair et al., 1987). This stage of factor 
analysis is usually reported in a table called ‘total variance explained’. The table is used to 
decide which factors will be utilised for further analysis, and these factors are determined by 
their eigenvalues. Factors with eigenvalues greater than one are usually considered as they 
explain more variation in the items or variables being measured (Kaiser, 1974). Apart from 
using eigenvalues to decide on factors, there is also the scree plot. The scree plot is utilised 
in a principal component analysis to visually display the eigenvalues associated with a 
component or a factor in descending order in a graphical illustration (Cattell, 1978). Based 
on the curve in the scree plot, the number of factors are selected till the inflexion point of the 
curve. The point the curve begins to even out shows eigenvalues that explain minor 
variations in the factors that are usually lesser than one. 
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The third stage of the factor analysis is the rotation of factors. Factor rotation is 
carried out to enhance the interpretation of the factor solutions by showing the factors on 
which the items of the variables that are being examined are loaded (Burn and Burn, 2008). 
In the result of the factor rotations, items that do not load satisfactorily on factors reported in 
the ‘factor extraction table’ (i.e. items with component values of below 0.5) are excluded from 
further analysis. In social sciences, varimax is themostly commonly used form of factor 
rotation, and this method was adopted for the purpose of this research. 
Having considered the stages involved in a factor analysis, more attention was 
given to the results of the factor extraction and the factor rotation for the purpose of 
interpretation. Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 presents the factor extraction and factor rotation 
results for the measures of trust, board cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ 
competence and board affective conflict. As for the results of the factor extraction and 
rotation on the measures of board members’ familiarity, this is presented in Tables 4.12 and 
4.13 respectively. 
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Table 4.10: Factor Extraction for Trust, Cognitive Conflict, Perception of Board 
Members’ Competence, Communication Efficacy, and Affective Conflict 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Componen
t 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 




















41.851 41.851 4.722 15.741 15.741 
2 1.958 6.527 48.378 1.958 6.527 48.378 4.443 14.810 30.552 
3 1.795 5.985 54.363 1.795 5.985 54.363 3.346 11.152 41.704 
4 1.550 5.166 59.529 1.550 5.166 59.529 2.691 8.970 50.674 
5 1.416 4.719 64.248 1.416 4.719 64.248 2.404 8.012 58.686 
6 1.157 3.856 68.104 1.157 3.856 68.104 2.067 6.891 65.577 
7 1.066 3.552 71.657 1.066 3.552 71.657 1.455 4.849 70.426 
8 1.006 3.352 75.009 1.006 3.352 75.009 1.375 4.583 75.009 
9 .863 2.876 77.886       
10 .795 2.649 80.534       
11 .754 2.515 83.049       
12 .668 2.227 85.276       
13 .548 1.827 87.103       
14 .475 1.584 88.687       
15 .441 1.470 90.157       
16 .367 1.225 91.382       
17 .341 1.136 92.518       
18 .304 1.013 93.531       
19 .272 .908 94.438       
20 .267 .889 95.328       
21 .237 .789 96.117       
22 .206 .687 96.803       
23 .174 .578 97.382       
24 .166 .554 97.935       
25 .147 .490 98.425       
26 .139 .462 98.887       
27 .108 .359 99.246       
28 .093 .310 99.556       
29 .071 .236 99.793       
30 .062 .207 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Figure 4.11: Scree Plot for Trust, Cognitive Conflict, Perception of Board 
Members’ Competence, Communication Efficacy, and Affective Conflict 
Table 4.10 and Figure 4.11 shows the results of the factor extraction carried out on 
the first 30 items in Section 1of the questionnaire (see Appendix 1). These items were used 
to measure trust, cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ competence, 
communication efficacy, and affective conflict. The result of the factor extraction suggests an 
8-factor solution. The 8factors extracted all have eigenvalues of 1and above accounting for 
75% of the variance. The eigenvalues are depicted in the scree plot inFigure 4.11 on the 
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Table 4.11: Factor Rotation for Trust, Cognitive Conflict, Perception of Board 
Members’ Competence, Communication Efficacy, and Affective Conflict 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Items Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 There is considerable trust amongst members of the board .275 .655 .421 .017 -.342 .132 -.007 .040 
2 I know I can strongly depend on other board members .134 .729 .325 .046 -.235 .312 .008 .162 
3 Other members of the board know they can rely on my full support .129 .770 .208 .168 -.077 .245 .031 .156 
4 I trust all members on my board .493 .394 .182 -.016 -.261 .368 .016 .173 
5 Board members have complete trust in each other’s level of competence .229 .149 .673 .092 -.336 .308 -.027 .109 
6 Board members operate with absolute integrity .715 .165 .310 .141 -.043 .204 -.003 .013 
7 Board members consider the viewpoints of other members .674 .367 .169 .091 .073 .272 -.103 .024 
8 Decisions are arrived at amicably .303 .695 .226 .294 -.106 .057 .010 .035 
9 Discussions are open and candid .288 .569 .090 .482 .293 .221 .079 -.127 
10 The atmosphere on the board encourages critical thinking .760 .055 .152 .312 -.036 .056 .007 .047 
11 Discussions at board meetings often result in a clear decision .483 .313 .422 .233 -.123 -.105 -.163 -.076 
12 It is common for the directors of this board to have differences of opinions -.015 .267 .034 -.037 .239 .004 -.138 .792 
13 Board members are capable of performing their role .384 .253 .748 .073 .024 -.042 .106 -.108 
14 Board members are knowledgeable about the task that needs to be done .340 .242 .751 .234 -.083 .168 .117 -.001 
15 Board members are successful in the things they try to do .161 .253 .424 .240 -.201 .575 .032 -.063 
16 Board members are confident about the skills of other board members .200 .353 .641 .102 -.186 .275 -.138 .247 
17 Board members have specialized capabilities that can help to increase board 
performance 
-.003 .009 .067 -.042 -.065 .042 .938 -.015 
18 Board members are well qualified for the task of the board .659 .133 .379 .066 -.142 .172 .227 .010 
19 Board members communicate frequently about tasks .120 .047 -.006 .784 -.127 .137 -.172 -.104 
20 Board members spend a lot of time discussing how tasks are to be completed .117 -.117 .015 .483 -.188 .138 .239 .664 
21 Board members are clear on how board tasks are to be accomplished .185 .259 .302 .707 -.094 .162 -.142 .169 
22 Board members are provided with a clear explanation of what each task 
involves 
.170 .208 .179 .726 -.085 -.080 .181 .190 
23 Board members understand how to perform their duties .277 .324 .150 .244 -.124 .403 -.335 .050 
24 There are personality clashes during the process of decision-making in the 
boardroom 
-.120 -.478 -.135 -.062 .658 -.318 .047 .130 
25 Board members do not get along very well -.571 -.453 -.054 -.100 .467 -.189 -.139 -.041 
26 Board members are not ready to cooperate -.352 -.651 -.146 -.107 .377 .012 .191 -.050 
27 At least one director disagrees with a decision made in the boardroom -.164 -.115 -.168 -.160 .734 -.045 -.058 .077 
28 Emotional conflict is often evident on this board -.602 -.284 -.156 -.162 .482 -.162 -.159 -.023 
29 Anger occurs amongst some members of the board at most meetings -.744 -.152 -.183 -.053 .326 .040 .266 -.005 
30 There is rarely any personal friction between directors at the board meeting -.167 -.192 -.102 -.060 .074 -.783 -.065 -.072 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 11 iterations. 
Table 4.11 shows the factor loadings of the eight-factor model reported in Table 
4.10. Factor loadings with values greater than 0.4 are considered as significant and were 
included in the construct of variables being measured (Hair et al., 1987). The items that have 
significant cross-loadings (>0.4)were excluded.  
The first factor is predominantly cognitive conflict items (i.e. items 4, 6, 7, 10, 
and18) and is thus termed cognitive conflict.Item 11 was cross-loaded on two factors and 
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was thus excluded. As for items 4 and 6, these were excluded from the construct as these 
items do not capture the concept of cognitive conflict in the boardroom. 
The second factor mainly consists of items measuring trust. These items are 1, 2, 3, 
8, and 9. Item 9 is cross-loaded onto factor 4 and is thus discarded.These items mainly 
measure trust in the boardroom. As for Item 8, this item was considered to be distinctively 
different from items 1, 2, and 3 and was dropped from the construct measuring board trust. 
Factor 3 is made up of items measuring the perception of board members’ 
competence (i.e. items 5, 13, 14, and 16). Item 5 was excluded from the construct 
measuring the perception of board members’ competence. This is because in item 5 ‘Board 
members have complete trust in each other’s level of competence’does not measure the 
awareness of board members’ competence in a similar way to items 13, 14, and 
16.Therefore, items 13, 14, and 16are the items for the perception of board members’ 
competence construct. 
The fourth factor consists of items19, 20, 21, and 22, which are items measuring 
board communication efficacy. Item 20 was dropped as it was found to cross-load on factor 
8. 
Factor 5is largely made up of items measuring board affective conflict. These items 
are items 24, 25, 27, and 28. 
As for factors 6, 7, and 8, only one item has loaded on each of these factors. Where 
item 15 is loaded on factor 6, items 17 and 12 are loaded on factors 7and 8respectively. 
These factors will be dropped from thefurther analysis becausethese items measuredo not 
measure any of the variables included in the factor analysis.  
Table 4.12: Factor Extraction for Familiarity 
Total Variance Explained 
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Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
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Rotation Sums of Squared 
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1 6.466 43.105 43.105 6.466 43.105 43.105 3.729 24.858 24.858 
2 1.833 12.219 55.324 1.833 12.219 55.324 3.540 23.600 48.458 
3 1.454 9.691 65.015 1.454 9.691 65.015 2.483 16.556 65.015 
4 .909 6.057 71.071       
5 .783 5.220 76.292       
6 .660 4.403 80.695       
7 .634 4.228 84.922       
8 .463 3.090 88.012       
9 .416 2.775 90.787       
10 .357 2.383 93.170       
11 .346 2.308 95.479       
12 .238 1.586 97.065       
13 .190 1.264 98.329       
14 .139 .927 99.257       
15 .111 .743 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Figure 4.12: Scree Plot for Familiarity 
Above is the factor extraction for the 15 items in Section 2of the questionnaire 
measuring board members’ familiarity. Table 4.12 and Figure 4.12 suggests a three-factor 
solution. Based on the dissertations of Hanft (2002) and Maynard (2007), board members’ 
familiarity was proposed to be a multi-dimensional construct consisting of board members’ 
knowledge of each other’s personal life, professional life, and personality. Board members’ 
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knowledge of each others’ personal life include: (1) values, attitude and beliefs, (2) likes and 
dislikes, (3) background, (4) hobbies,professional life (1) strengths and weaknesses, (2) 
competences, (3) reputation, (4) work performance, (5) abilities and personality, (1) 
trustworthiness, (2) honesty, (3) conscientiousness, (4) dependability and (5) attention to 
detail. According to Maynard (2007), prior research that has commonly used 'experience' to 
proxy for team familiarity often ignored the fact that familiarity is a product of team members' 
interpersonal knowledge of others. Such interpersonal knowledge is obtainable during work 
interactions and social activities. The forms of familiarity that emerge during these activities 
are captured by these three constructs and were accounted for in the three-factor solution 
reported in Table 4.12. The three-factor solution is depicted by point 3 where the inflexion of 
the curve begins in the scree plot (Figure 4.12). All three factors have eigenvalues of 1.4 and 
above, accounting for 65% of the variance. 
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Table 4.13: Factor Rotation for Familiarity 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Items Component 
1 2 3 
1 Familiarity1 .278 .731 .104 
2 Familiarity2 .281 .797 .096 
3 Familiarity3 .003 .851 .083 
4 Familiarity4 .320 .758 .204 
5 Familiarity5 .244 .672 .134 
6 Familiarity6 .263 .357 .442 
7 Familiarity7 .144 .374 .544 
8 Familiarity8 .187 .225 .549 
9 Familiarity9 .084 .006 .862 
10 Familiarity10 .212 -.027 .783 
11 Familiarity11 .776 .224 .341 
12 Familiarity12 .786 .209 .220 
13 Familiarity13 .866 .135 .240 
14 Familiarity14 .840 .231 .149 
15 Familiarity15 .748 .369 .050 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Table 4.13 provides a clearer interpretation of the three-factor solution reported in 
the factor extraction in Table 4.12. Where items 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 measuring board 
members’ personality are loaded on factor 1, items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 measuring board 
members’ professional life are loaded on factor 2. As for factor 3, 4out of 5items measuring 
board members’ personal life are loaded (i.e. items 7, 8, 9, 10). Since Familiarity 6 is not 
loaded on any factor, this will be excluded from further analysis. 
4.7.2 Summary of Factor Analysis 
After examining the results of the factors’ analysis (i.e. the rotated factor loadings), 
factors greater than 0.4 were considered as significant, and factors below this threshold 
were excluded from further analysis. Based on the outcome of the factor analysis, trust items 
are items 1, 2, and 3. Board members’ cognitive conflict items are items 7, 10, and 18. As for 
the perception of board members’ competence, the items measuring this construct include 
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items 13, 14, and 16. Board communication efficacy items are items 19, 21, and 22, while 
board affective conflict items are items 24, 25, 27, and 28. Although items 15, 17, and 12 are 
loaded on factors6, 7, and 8respectively, these items were dropped because they are not 
loaded on any of the factors measuring the constructs of any of the variables included in the 
factor analysis. Finally, board members’ familiarity was divided into 3separate constructs. 
Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 measuring familiarity with professional life, 7, 8, 9, and 10 measuring 
familiarity with personal life, and items 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 measuring familiarity with 
board members’ personality. 
4.7.3 Reliability and Validity of Measurement Scales 
The Cronbach Alpha test was used to determine the reliability of the constructs. 
According to Cronbach (1951), the Cronbach Alpha provides a measure of the internal 
consistency of a test or scale. The internal consistency is the extent to which items in a test 
measure a concept or a construct. This is usually expressed as a number between 0 and 1 
(Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). When the result of the reliability test shows a Cronbach Alpha 
value that is closer to 1, this implies that the items measure the concept or construct of the 
variable. 
Trust 
The items in the trust construct are 3 items from Simons and Peterson (2000), and 
these items are reported in Table 4.14. 
 
Table 4.14: Trust Items 
TRUST 
1  There is considerable trust amongst members of the board  
2  I know I can strongly depend on other board members  
3  Other members of the board know they can rely on my full support  
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Table 4.15 shows that the Cronbach Alpha for the 3-items was 0.901, indicating that 
trust construct is reliable. 
Table 4.15: Reliability Analysis for Trust 
Reliability Statistics Trust 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.901 3 
 












Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
There is considerable trust amongst 
members of the board 12.59 2.495 .825 .853 
I know I can strongly depend on other 
board members 12.62 2.759 .870 .800 
Other members of the board know 
they can rely on my full support 12.48 3.502 .756 .908 
Board Members Cognitive Conflict 
The items used to measure cognitive conflict are 3-items reported in Table 4.16. 
These items are from Jehn (2005) and Wan and Ong (2005).  
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Table 4.16: Board Cognitive Conflict Items 
BOARD COGNITIVE CONFLICT 
7 Board members consider the viewpoints of other members 
10 The atmosphere on the board encourages critical thinking 
18 Board members are well qualified for the task of the board 
The Cronbach Alpha of these items was 0.783 as reported in Table 4.17. This 
implies that cognitive conflict construct was reliable. 
Table 4.17: Reliability Analysis for Board Cognitive Conflict 
Reliability Statistics Cognitive 
Conflict 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.783 3 
 













Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Board members consider the viewpoints of 
other members 
12.03 3.801 .589 .739 
The atmosphere on the board encourages 
critical thinking 
12.25 3.271 .662 .659 
Board members are well qualified for the task of 
the board 
11.93 3.568 .614 .713 
 
Communication Efficacy 
Communication efficacy is a 3-item construct from Hassall (2009). These items are 
reported in Table 4.18. 
Table 4.18: Communication Efficacy Items 
COMMUNICATION EFFICACY 
19 Board members frequently communicate about tasks  
21 Board members are clear on how board tasks are to be accomplished 
22 Board members are provided with a clear explanation of what each task involves  
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Table 4.19 shows the Cronbach Alpha for the items was 0.754.This implies that 
communication efficacy construct is reliable. 
Table 4.19: Reliability Analysis for Communication Efficacy 
Reliability Statistics Communication 
















Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Board members frequently communicate 
about tasks 
10.93 4.818 .491 .814 
Board members are clear on how board 
tasks are to be accomplished 
10.76 5.099 .687 .559 
Board members are provided with a clear 
explanation of what each task involves 
10.78 5.734 .612 .652 
 
Perception of Board Members’ Competence 
The perception of board members’ competence is a 3-item construct from Mayer 
and Davis (1999). These items are reported in Table 4.20. 
 
Table 4.20: The Perception of Board Members’ Competence Items 
PERCEPTION OF BOARD MEMBERS’ COMPETENCE 
13 Board members are capable of performing their role 
14 Board members are knowledgeable about the task that needs to be done 
16 Board members are confident about the skills of other board members 
The reliability test produced a Cronbach Alpha value of 0.861, indicating that the 
construct is reliable (see Table 4.21). 
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Table 4.21: Reliability Analysis for the Perception of Board Members’ 
Competence 
 
Reliability Statistics Competence 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.861 3 
 
Item-Total Statistics Perception of Board Members’ Competence 










Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Board members are capable of 
performing their role 12.36 3.400 .756 .788 
Board members are knowledgeable 
about the task that needs to be done 12.48 2.982 .804 .740 
Board members are confident about 
the skills of other board members 12.62 3.676 .659 .874 
 
Board Members’ Affective Conflict 
Board members' affective conflict is a 4-item construct derived from Wang and Ong 
(2005). These items are reported in Table 4.22.  
Table 4.22: Board Members’ Affective Conflict Items 
BOARD AFFECTIVE CONFLICT 
24 There are personality clashes during the process of decision-making in the boardroom  
25 Board members do not get along very well  
27 At least one director disagrees with a decision made in the boardroom  
28 Emotional conflict is often evident on this board  
The reliability test of these items produced a Cronbach Alpha of 0.839 as shown in 
Table 4.23. 
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Table 4.23: Reliability Analysis for Affective Conflict 
 
Reliability Statistics Affective Conflict 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.839 4 
 
Item-Total Statistics Affective Conflict 










Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
There are personality clashes during 
the process of decision-making in the 
boardroom 
6.20 12.555 .700 .791 
Board members do not get along very 
well 6.67 15.598 .728 .780 
At least one director disagrees with a 
decision made in the boardroom 6.37 15.611 .575 .837 
Emotional conflict is often evident on 
this board 6.68 14.678 .725 .774 
Familiarity 
The 14-item construct measuring board members’ familiarity was derived from 
Hanft (2002) and Maynard (2007). These items were divided into 3 separate constructs 
measuring familiarity of members’ professional life (a 5-item construct), personal life (a 4-
item construct), and personality (a 5-item construct). These items are reported Table 4.24. 
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Table 4.24: Familiarity Items 
FAMILIARITY LEVELS OF FAMILIARITY 
1  Strength and Weaknesses   
 
Board Members’ Professional Life 
2  Competences  
3  Reputation  
4  Work Performance  
5  Abilities  
7  Likes and Dislikes   
 
 
Board Members’ Personal Life 
8  Background  
(i.e. Education, employment history, etc)  
9  Hobbies  
10  Family Situation  
(i.e. married, divorced, kids, etc.)  
11  Trustworthiness   
 
Board Members’ Personality 
12  Honesty  
13  Conscientiousness  
14  Dependability  
15  Attention to details  
The 3 sub-constructs of familiarity were subjected to a reliability test and the 3 sub-
constructs were found to be reliable as reported in Table 4.25. The Cronbach Alpha for the 
familiarity of boards’ professional life, personal life, and personality were 0.871, 0.712, and 
0.913 respectively.This shows that the 3 sub-constructs of familiarity were all reliable. 
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Table 4.25: Reliability Analysis for Board Members’ Familiarity Components 
 
Reliability Statistics Professional Life 





As a single construct, the 14-item of familiarity construct was also subjected to a 
reliability test. The Cronbach Alpha for the 14-items was 0.888, implying that the construct 
was also reliable. 
Table 4.26: Reliability Analysis for Board Members’ Familiarity 
Reliability Statistics for Familiarity 













Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Strength and Weaknesses 41.93 36.338 .594 .879 
Competences 41.78 36.442 .620 .878 
Reputation 41.73 37.323 .456 .885 
Work Performance  41.88 35.089 .693 .874 
Abilities 41.76 37.058 .546 .881 
Likes and Dislikes  42.54 35.897 .492 .884 
Background  
(i.e. Education, employment history, 
etc.)  
42.19 36.153 .455 .886 
Hobbies 42.90 35.698 .427 .889 
Family Situation 
(i.e. married, divorced, kids, etc.)  42.51 35.482 .438 .889 
Trustworthiness 41.75 35.001 .739 .873 
Honesty 41.68 35.553 .664 .876 
Conscientiousness 41.74 35.297 .679 .875 
Dependability 41.68 35.407 .683 .875 
Attention to details 41.75 35.313 .644 .876 
Reliability Statistics Personal Life 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.712 4 
Reliability Statistics Personality 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.913 5 
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4.8. Summary of Chapter 4 
After reviewing the different types of research paradigms, this chapter identified the 
appropriate research design, method, and instrument suitable for this research. The 
research adopted a quantitative research method by using a survey questionnaire as the 
research instrument. The questionnaire design, how the questionnaire was administered, 
and the population of study with the sampling frame of the research were reported in this 
chapter. After the survey questionnaire had been administered, data collected was analysed 
using SPSS. The results of the factor analysis and the Cronbach Alpha’s reliability test of the 
constructs measuring trust and its antecedents were also reported. 
The factor analysis results reported an eight-factor solution for the items measuring 
trust, cognitive conflict, communication efficacy, the perception of board members’ 
competence, and affective conflict. Further analysis was carried out on 5out of the 8factors 
as items were not satisfactorily loaded on the other 3factors. Based on the outcome of the 
factor analysis, trust, board cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ 
competence, and communication efficacy were 3-item construct respectively. Affective 
conflict was a 4-item construct. The factor analysis on board familiarity items suggested that 
the variable is a 3-factor solution. Each of these factors measured board members’ 
knowledge of other board members’ professional life, personal life, and personality. The 
result of the factor analysis revealed board familiarity to be an aggregate of 14 items.  
All the constructs were subjected to a reliability test and were reported to be 
reliable. The Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test for trust was 0.901, cognitive conflict was 
0.783,communication efficacy was 0.754, theperception of board members’ competence was 
0.861, and board affective conflict was 0.839. As for board familiarity, the result of its 
reliability test was 0.888.  
The next chapter will report the results of the regression analysis so as to test the 
formulated hypotheses in Chapter 3: Research Model and Hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS: RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology reported data analysis of the 
measurement model of determinants of trust in the boardroom. This included the results of 
the factor analysis and reliability analysis undertaken on the determinants of trust in the 
boardroom, cognitive conflict, theperception of board members’ competences, 
communication efficacy, affective conflict and familiarity. This chapter reports the results of 
the regression analysis carried out to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 Research 
Model and Hypotheses.  
This chapter is structured as follows; Section 5.2 presents the measurements of the 
dependent (trust), independent (cognitive conflict, the preception of board members’ 
competence, communication efficacy, affective conflict, and familiarity), control (board size, 
CEO duality, the ratio of insider-outside directors, gender diversity, the size of the firm and 
the company turnover), and moderating variables (board meeting frequency and board 
tenure). Section 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics that summarised data obtained on the 
variables considered in this research. Section 5.4 presents the correlation analysis showing 
the relationship between the dependent, independent, control, and moderating 
variables.Sections 5.5 and 5.6 presents and interprets the results of the regression analysis 
regarding the relationship between trust and its determinants, and the moderating effects of 
board meeting frequency and board tenure.5.7 is the Summary Of The Hypotheses Testing 
section which shows the hypotheses that were accepted and rejected based on the result of 
the regression analysis. Section 5.8 summarises the finding presented in this chapter. 
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The dependent variable is trust. This is measured using the mean of the three items 
developed in Table 4.14 in the previous chapter. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables are the 5determinants of trust in the boardroom. These 
determinants are board cognitive conflict, communication efficacy, the perception of board 
members’ competence, board affective conflict, and board members’ familiarity. These 
variables were developed to be a mean of items reported in Chapter 4, section 4.7 of this 
thesis. Cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ competence, and 
communication efficacy were a mean of 3 items. Affective conflict was a mean of 4 items. As 
for familiarity, the variable was considered as a single construct and a mean of 15 items. It 
was also treated as a variable divided into three constructs (i.e. professional life, personal 
life, and personality). The familiarity of board members’ professional lifeand personality were 
both means of 5-item. As for the familiarity of board members’personal life, it was measured 
using  mean of 4 items 
Moderating Variables 
Moderators are variables that alter the direction of the relationship between a 
predictor and an outcome variable in terms ofweakening or strengthening effects (Baron and 
Kenny, 1986). Thus, the moderator effect in the relationship between a dependent and 
independent variable is referred to as an interaction effect whereby the impact of one 
variable depends on the level of another (Fazier, Tix, and Barron, 2004). In this research, the 
variables moderating the relationship between trust and its determinants are board tenure 
and board meeting frequency. Board tenure was measured by the number of months the 
current board of a company has been together, while board meeting frequency was 
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measured by the number of board meetings held in a year.A logarithmic transformation was 
used to control for heteroskedasticity in the measurement of these variables. 
To test the moderator effects of board meeting frequency and board tenure, the 
procedures prescribed by Akien and West (1991), Fazier et al., (2004), and Howells (2007; 
2012) were adopted. The prescribed procedure involves three main steps. The first step is 
the mean centring of the predictors and moderating variables by subtracting the mean of 
each variable from its cases e.g. Cognitive conflict minus ∑Cognitive conflict. The second 
step is the creating of the interaction effect by calculating the product of the mean centred 
predictors, and the mean centred moderating variables e.g. Centred cognitive 
conflict*Centred board meeting frequency. The third step is to subject trust, the determinants 
of trust, and the interaction effects to a hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis. 
Control Variables 
The control variables included in the model are board level and firm level variables. 
The board level control variables are board size, CEO duality, the ratio of insider-outside 
directors, and gender diversity. Information about these variables was obtained by including 
questions about board characteristics in the questionnaires administered. The number of 
directors was used to measure for board size, the ratio of inside-outside directors was 
measured as the percentage of non-executive directors. Gender diversity was measured as 
the percentage of male directors. CEO Duality was measured as a dichotomous variable 
where 0 is the absence of duality and 1 is for the presence of duality. As for firm-level control 
variable, the size of the firm and company turnover is controlled for in the model of the 
relationship between trusts and its determinants. Firm size was measured as the total 
number of employees and company turnover (measured in million pounds) obtained was for 
the last financial year. A logarithmic transformation of firm size and company turnover was 
carried out to control for heteroskedasticity. 
Chapter 5: Data Analysis: Results and Findings 
D E T E R M I N A N T S  O F  T R U S T  I N  T H E  B O A R D R O O M | 154 
 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for trust and its determinants. It reports 
the summary of the characteristics of the boards and firms included of the sample size. The 
size of the firm was determined by the number of employees and the company turnover. 
These measures are in harmony with the factors or features the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skill in the United Kingdom uses to classify small, medium, and large scale 
businesses. In the UK, companies classified into the category of small and medium scale 
must earn less than £25 million pounds and have employees fewer than 250. The number of 
employees of the companies that have responded to the survey ranged from 0 to 135000 
with a mean value of 6505, and their turnover ranged from ranged from 0 to £111695 million 
with an average of £1640.5746 million. Exceeding the benchmark of 250 employees and 
company turnover of £25 million, most of the companies are large-scale enterprises.As 
reported in Table 5.1, the values of firm size and the company turnoverwere not normally 
distributed which suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity. This is depicted in the 
descriptive statistics by the significant difference between the standard deviation, skewness, 
and kurtosis values for firm size and company turnover. Therefore, a logarithmic 
transformation of these variables was carried out, and the results were reported in Table 5.1 
as ’Log of Firm Size’ and ‘Log of Company Turnover’. 
The size of the board governing these firms ranged from 2 to 17 members while the 
appointments to the board ranged from 1 to 122 months. While the average tenure of board 
appointments is 17 months, the average size of the boards is 8 members which consistent 
with Jensen’s (1983) suggested upper limit which a board can grow to remain effective. Also, 
the majority of these corporate boards are dominated by outside directors at an average of 
58.23% and male directors at an average of 85.41%. As for CEO duality in these firms, a low 
percentage (14%) boards had an individual carrying out the roles of the chairperson and 
CEO. 
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An overview of the responses received shows that trust is present among board 
members. This is depicted by the mean average of 6.2818 on trust in the boardroom. Most 
of the boards engaged in cognitive or task related debates (mean of 6.0344)with a low level 
of emotional or affective conflict (mean of 2.1598) in the boardroom. At an average of 
5.4124, most of these boards engaged in a frequent, and task-related communication by 
meeting at an average of 9 times a year. The perception of board members’ competence is 
high at with a mean of 6.2440. Overall, board members familiarity is high to areasonable 
extent as depicted by the mean of 3.2089. However, their familiarity with each other’s 
personal life is to a limited extent as depicted by the mean average of 2.6856. 
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Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Trust 2.67 7.00 6.2818 .83381 -1.651 .245 3.548 .485 
Cognitive Conflict 2.33 7.00 6.0344 .89428 -1.745 .245 4.309 .485 
Perception of Board 
Members' 
Competence 
2.67 7.00 6.2440 .88521 -1.711 .245 3.411 .485 
Communication 
Efficacy 2.33 7.00 5.4124 1.07773 -.709 .245 .048 .485 
Affective Conflict 1.00 5.75 2.1598 1.24121 1.256 .245 .864 .485 
Familiarity: 
Personality 1.00 4.00 3.4948 .58101 -1.547 .245 3.128 .485 
Familiarity: 
Professional Life 2.00 4.00 3.4000 .50827 -.665 .245 -.114 .485 
Familiarity: Personal 
Life 1.00 4.00 2.6856 .63562 -.089 .245 -.285 .485 
Familiarity 1.93 4.00 3.2089 .45802 -.778 .245 .663 .485 
Percentage  of Non-
Executive Directors 0 100 58.23 25.528 -.323 .245 -.183 .485 
Percentage of Male 
Directors 33 100 84.86 16.204 -.998 .245 .513 .485 
Board Size 2 17 7.62 3.121 1.130 .245 1.119 .485 
CEO Duality 0 1 .14 .353 2.056 .245 2.274 .485 
Firm Size 0 135000 6502.56 20148.765 5.436 .245 31.034 .485 
Company Turnover 
(£‘000 000) 0 11695 1640.57 11405.03 9.572 .245 93.069 .485 
Company Sector 1 4 2.97 1.045 -.440 .245 -1.178 .485 
Board Meeting 
Frequency 2 34 9.24 4.195 3.061 .245 16.293 .485 
Board Tenure 1 122 17.46 19.742 2.480 .245 8.508 .485 
Log of Firm Size .60 5.13 3.0250 .94369 -.271 .257 -.077 .508 
Log of Company 
Turnover 5.40 11.05 7.9478 .99745 -.152 .249 .730 .493 
Log of Board 
Meeting Frequency .30 1.53 .9301 .17661 -.270 .245 2.354 .485 
Log of Board 
Tenure .00 2.09 1.0015 .48228 -.128 .245 -.581 .485 
Valid N (listwise)         
5.4 Correlation Analysis 
A correlation analysis was carried out to reveal the relationship between trust (the 
dependent variable), its determinants (Independent variables), control variables, and 
moderating variables. Table 5.2 shows that there is a significant relationship between trust, 
cognitive conflict, theperception of board members’ competence, communication efficacy, 
affective conflict, and familiarity. A significant positive correlation was found between trust, 
cognitive conflict, the perception of board members competence, communication efficacy, 
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and familiarity (see Table 5.2). As for the correlation between trust and affective conflict, a 
significant negative relationship was reported. The results of the correlation analysis show 
that the perception of board members competence with the coefficient value of 0.660 and 
affective conflict with the coefficient value of -0.667 had the strongest relationship to trust. 
The relationship between familiarity and trust was tested in two ways. First, familiarity as a 
construct of 14 items shows a significant positive relationship to trust, and familiarity as a 
subset of 3 constructs (personal life, professional life, and personality familiarities). All three 
sub-construct of familiarity had a significant correlation to trust. The familiarity of board 
members’ personality had a positive coefficient of 0.525. For familiarity of professional life 
and personal life, the correlation coefficients are 0.413 and 0.346 respectively. These values 
imply that familiarity sub-constructs have a positive correlation to trust.As for the relationship 
between trust and the control variables, there was no significant linear relationship reported 
between trust, firm and board control variables except for company sector that had 
asignificant relationship to trust with the coefficient value of 0.225. 
The result of the correlation analysis also showed multiple correlations between the 
independent variables which could potentially imply the issue of multicollinearity. In the 
regression analysis reported in the subsequent section, the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
measure was adopted to test the multicollinearity between the predictor variables. The VIF 
values reported in the regression analysis section ranged from 1.130 to 2.44. As the values 
are less than 5,this indicated a moderate correlation between the predictor variables. 
Therefore, the suggested multicollinearity between the independent or predictor variables 
reported in the correlation analysis in Table 5.2 was ignored. 
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Table 5.2: Correlation Analysis 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Trust 1 1                                           
Cognitive Conflict 2 
.536** 1                                         








** .437** .435** 1                                     
Affective Conflict 5 -.667












.346** .247* .212* .206* -.234* .468** .377** 1                             
Familiarity 9 .535
** .445** .454** .266** -.444** .848** .787** .758** 1                           
Percentage  of Non-
Executive Directors 
10 
.006 .151 .088 .120 -.148 -.063 -.017 -.137 -.067 1                         
Percentage of Male 
Directors 
11 
-.165 -.147 -.131 -.155 .150 -.194 -.124 -.021 -.143 -.167 1                       
Board Size 12 .132 .004 .084 -.075 -.107 .111 .185 .016 .121 .068 -.290
** 1                     
CEO Duality 13 -.045 .006 -.103 .015 .030 .014 -.104 .077 .009 -.248
* .002 -.118 1                   
Firm Size 14 
.069 .069 .031 .117 -.078 -.028 .086 -.022 .015 .160 -.137 .187 -.088 1                 
Company Turnover 15 
.095 -.001 .014 .111 -.107 -.074 .106 -.088 -.038 .037 -.062 .063 -.049 .630** 1               
Company Sector 16 .225
* -.103 .053 -.022 -.123 -.012 .031 -.046 -.027 .030 -.276** .223* -.129 -.046 .102 1             
Log of Firm Size 17 
.164 .067 .198 .123 -.057 .101 .194 -.086 .093 .226* -.157 .419** -.151 .545** .276** -.005 1           
Log of Company 
Turnover 
18 .193 .024 .175 .131 -.111 .217




.190 .205* .173 .103 -.177 .261** .201* .214* .264** -.173 -.199 .002 .082 .070 .044 .044 -.015 .050 1       
Board Tenure 20 
-.010 -.046 .006 -.030 .048 .068 .122 -.135 .028 -.180 .289** -.315** -.007 -.142 -.079 .071 -.223* -.021 -.082 1     
Log of Board 
Meeting Frequency 
21 
.236* .239* .245* .127 -.188 .296** .224* .224* .288** -.241* -.150 .103 -.031 .117 .069 .002 .083 .038 .906** -.079 1   
Log of Board 
Tenure 
22 .006 -.039 -.038 .054 .005 .086 .066 -.041 .049 -.146 .321
** -.410** .034 -.138 -.139 .028 -.254* -.097 -.061 .833** -.048 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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5.5 The Regression Analysis 
To test the relationship in the model and the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3: 
Research Model and Hypotheses, a multiple regression analysis was carried out. The 
regression analysis was carried out in two stages. The first stage tested the primary model of 
therelationship between trust and its determinants (cognitive conflict, the perception of board 
members’ competence, communication efficacy, affective conflict, familiarity). In the second 
stage, familiarity as a subset of three constructs (personality, professional life, and personal 
life), alongside other determinants were regressed against trust.These stageswere repeated 
when testing for the moderation effects of board meeting frequency and board tenure. The 
results of the regression analysis of cognitive conflict, perception of the board members’ 
competence, communication efficacy, affective conflict, and familiarity against trust are 
presentedin Tables 5.3 and 5.4. In Table 5.4, familiarity is treated as a subset of three 
constructs. The regression analysis showing the moderating effects of board meeting 
frequency and board tenure are reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, where Table 5.6 regression 
result depicts the treatment of familiarity as 3 sub-constructs. 
From the regression analysis results, the value that are of interests are the R2 and 
the adjusted R2values, F statistics, P-values,and the β values. The R2 and the adjusted 
R2values range from 0 to 1 and areused to depict the amount variations in the dependent 
variable (trust) that is explained by the independent variables (the determinants of trust). The 
closer the R2 and adjusted R2 values are to 1 the higher the amount of variations explained 
by the independent variable, and the closer the values are to 0, the lesser the variations that 
are explained.The F-value is used to evaluate if the model of relationship is significant or if 
the independent variables included in the model significantly explain the outcome (i.e. the 
dependent variable). The level of significance is decided on using the P-values. A model of 
relationship is significant when the P-value is less than 0.05 or 0.01.After evaluating the 
values of the R2 and F-statistics, the β values or the standardised coefficientare obtained 
after carrying out the regression analysis, and they are used to depict the strength of the 
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impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The values of the β 
coefficient could be positive or negative, and the significance of the measured impact of the 
independent variables are determined when the p-value is less than 0.05 or 0.01. 
The following sections will report the findings of the regression analysis presented 
in the Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. 
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Table 5.3: Multiple Regression Analysis for Trust, Control Variables, and 
Cognitive Conflict, Perception of Board Members’ Competence, 
Communication Efficacy, Affective Conflict, and Familiarity 
Variables Trust 
Model 1 Model 2 VIF 
Percentage of Non-Executive Directors -0.158 -.136 1.384 
Percentage of Male Directors -0.124 -.012 1.377 
Board Size 0.076 .018 1.523 
CEO Duality -0.007 .010 1.130 
Company Sector 0.187 .155 1.387 
Log of Firm Size 0.030 .022 2.110 
Log of Company Turnover 0.172 .049 1.823 
H1: Cognitive Conflict  -0.028 1.130 





H3: Communication Efficacy  0.003 2.447 
H4: Affective conflict  -0.383** 1.385 
H5: Familiarity  0.132 1.942 
R 0.132 0.652  
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.596  
Sig. F Change 1.718 11.557**  
Dependent Variable: Trust 
Model 1: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, 
Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive 
Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm Size 
Model 2: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, 
Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive 
Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm Size, Cognitive Conflict, Communication 
Efficacy, Familiarity, Affective Conflict, Perception of Board Members' 
Competence 
Note: N=97, The table shows the standardised coefficients (β), the value of the 
adjusted R2, and the value of the F change. The levels of significance are *<0.05; 
**<0.01 
5.5.1 Regression Analysis; Trust, Cognitive Conflict, Perception of Board 
Members’ Competence, Communication Efficacy, Affective Conflict, and 
Familiarity 
The results presented in Tables 5.3, and 5.4 show the testing of Hypothesis 1: 
board cognitive conflict impacts positively on trust in the boardroom; Hypothesis 2: the 
perception of board members’ competence positively impacts on trust in the boardroom; 
Hypothesis 3: communication efficacy impacts positively on trust in the boardroom; 
Hypothesis 4: board affective conflict impacts negatively on trust in the boardroom; and 
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Hypothesis 5: familiarity positively impacts on trust in the boardroom.When testing for these 
hypotheses, firm and board variables were controlled, and the results on these are reported 
in Model 1 of Tables 5.3. The results revealed that none of the board (board size, the 
proportion of male directors, CEO duality, and percentage of non-executive directors) and 
firm (firm size, company turnover, and company sector) control variables explained trust.The 
β values of the control variables were all insignificant as reported in Model 1 of Tables 
5.3.Table 5.3 shows the value of the R2 of Model 1 and Model 2 to be 0.055 and 0.596. This 
implies that the regression model explains 5.5% of the variance of the reading test scores in 
Model 1, while it explains 60% of the variance in Model 2. The result implies that Model 2 is 
the most reliable model. The F-testalso showed that Model 2 was highly significant with the 
value of 11.557 (p < 0.01) while the F-value of Model 1 was insignificant at 1.718. Based on 
these values, it can be assumed that there is a significant and a reliable linear relationship 
between the variables regressed in Model 2.  
The multiple linear regression coefficient estimates (i.e. the β values) with their 
significant level are also reported in Table 5.3. In Model 1 and 2, none of the board and firm 
control variables regressed against trust were significant. As for the determinants of trust 
depicted in Model 2, only the perception of board members’ competence, and affective 
conflict had a higher significant impact on trust (p < 0.01). The β value for the perception of 
board members’ competenceis 0.401, and for affective conflict is– 0.383. This implies that 
the perception of board members’ competencies facilitates a higher significant impact on 
trust in the boardroom.The direction of the relationship between the perception of board 
members’ competence and trust as shown by the positive β value of 0.401 and a p-value 
that is less 0.01 implies that hypothesis 2 is supported. As for the direction of the relationship 
between affective conflict and trust, this was reported to be negative as depicted by the β 
value of – 0.383 with a p-value that is less than 0.01. This result also allows us to accept 
hypothesis 4 regarding the negative relationship between affective conflict and trust. 
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Cognitive conflict, communication efficacy, and familiarity had β values of – 0.028, 
0.003, and 0.132 respectively. The relationship between trust and cognitive conflict was 
hypothesised to be positive. The β value for cognitive conflict suggested a negative 
relationship between the two variables. However, the p-value of the coefficient was greater 
than 0.01, implying that cognitive conflict was an insignificant predictor of trust leading to the 
rejection of Hypothesis 1. As for communication efficacy and familiarity, the β values for 
these variables were positive which was consistent with the hypothesised relationship of 
these variables to trust. However, the β values of these variables were both insignificant as 
their p-values were greater than the benchmark of significance levels required i.e. <0.05 or 
<0.01. Based on this results, these variables (i.e. communication efficacy and familiarity) are 
also insignificant predictors of trust. Therefore, Hypotheses 3, and 5 for communication 
efficacy, and familiarity respectively, were not supported. 
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Table 5.4: Multiple Regression Analysis for Trust, Control Variables, and 
Cognitive Conflict, Perception of Board Members’ Competence, 
Communication Efficacy, Affective Conflict, and Familiarity: Personality, 
Professional Life, and Personal Life 
 
Variables Trust 
Model 1 Model 2 VIF 
Percentage of Non-Executive Directors -0.158 -0.133 1.406 
Percentage of Male Directors -0.124 -0.012 1.453 
Board Size 0.076 0.017 1.527 
CEO Duality -0.007 0.005 1.138 
Company Sector 0.187 0.159 1.389 
Log of Firm Size 0.030 0.051 2.269 
Log of Company Turnover 0.172 0.034 1.860 
H1: Cognitive Conflict  -0.045 2.450 





H3: Communication Efficacy  -0.014 1.466 
H4: Affective conflict  -0.387** 2.022 
H5: Familiarity: Personality  0.122 2.031 
H5: Familiarity: Professional Life  -0.063 1.918 
H5: Familiarity: Personal Life  0.107 1.672 
R 0.132 0.662  
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.597  
Sig. F Change 1.718 10.093**  
Dependent Variable: Trust 
Model 1: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, 
Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive 
Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm Size 
Model 2: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, 
Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive 
Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm Size, Cognitive Conflict, Communication 
Efficacy, Familiarity, Affective Conflict, Perception of Board Members' 
Competence 
Note: N=97, The table shows the standardised coefficients (β), the value of the 
adjusted R2, and the value of the F change. The levels of significance are *<0.05; 
**<0.01 
5.5.2 Regression Analysis; Trust, Cognitive Conflict, Perception of Board 
Members’ Competence, Communication Efficacy, Affective Conflict, and 
Familiarity: Personality, Professional Life, and Personal Life 
In Table 5.3 treated familiarity as a single construct, whereas, in Table 5.4 
familiarity is a sub-set of three constructs (personality, professional life, and personal life). 
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Table 5.4, presents the results of the regression analysis. In Model 1 of Table 5.4 shows the 
results of the control variables regressed against trust. The result of the analysis of variance 
shows an insignificantF-value of 1.718. According to the values of the R2 and adjusted R2, 
shows that these control variables explain 5% of the variance in trust. Model 2 of Table 5.4 
was found to be significant with the F-change value of 10.093. The predictors included in the 
model explained 60% of the model as depicted by the adjusted R2  value of 0.597. Despite 
the treatment of familiarity in this model of relationship, the result was not far from that which 
is reported in Table 5.3. None of the sub-levels of familiarity was found to significantly 
explain trust in the boardroom as their significance levels were higher than 0.05. Also, 
neither cognitive conflict nor communication efficacy had a significant impact on trust. 
As it was reported in Table 5.3, Table 5.4 shows that the perception of board 
members’ competence and affective conflict to be the only variables that had a significant 
impact on trust. Both variables had β values that were consistent with the hypothesised 
direction of relationship to trust (i.e. 0.428 and -0.387 respectively).The coefficient values of 
the perception of board members’competence and affective conflict had significance levels 
were less than 0.01. Based on the results in Table 5.4, the outcome is similar to that of Table 
5.3 which is to accept hypothesis 2 that the perception of board members’ competence 
positively impacts on trust in the boardroom and hypothesis4 that affective conflict negatively 
impacts on trust in the boardroom. As for hypothesis 1 that board cognitive conflict 
negatively impacts on trust in the boardroom;hypothesis3 that communication efficacy 
impacts positively on trust in the boardroom; and hypothesis 5 that familiarity positively 
impacts on trust in the boardroom were all rejected. 
5.6 Moderation Analysis 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 presents the results of the regression analysis of the moderator 
effects of board tenure and board meeting frequency in hypothesis 6-15. The moderating 
effect of board tenure are hypotheses 6-10, and the results of the regression analysis are 
reported in Model 3 of Tables 5.5 and 5.6.Hypothesis 6: board tenure negatively moderates 
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the relationship between board members’ cognitive conflict and trust in the boardroom; 
hypothesis 7: board tenure positively moderates the relationship between the perception of 
board members’ competence and trust in the boardroom; hypothesis 8: board tenure 
negatively moderates the relationship between communication efficacy and trust in the 
boardroom; hypothesis 9: board tenure positively moderates the relationship between board 
members’ affective conflict and trust in the boardroom; hypothesis 10: board tenure 
positively moderates the relationship between board members’ familiarity and trust in the 
boardroom. 
The moderator effect of board meeting frequency are hypotheses 11-15, and the 
result of the regression analysis are reported in Model 4 of Tables 5.5 and 5.6.Hypothesis 
11: board meeting frequency negatively moderates the relationship between board 
members’ cognitive conflict and trust in the boardroom; hypothesis 12: board meeting 
frequency positively moderates the relationship between the perception of board members’ 
competence and trust in the boardroom; hypothesis 13: board meeting frequency negatively 
moderates the relationship between communication efficacy and trust in the boardroom; 
hypothesis 14: board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between 
board members’ affective conflict and trust in the boardroom; hypothesis 15: board meeting 
frequency positively moderates the relationship between board members’ familiarity and 
trust in the boardroom 
In Table 5.5, familiarity was a single construct, while in Table 5.6 the variables were 
treated familiarity as a subset of three constructs. 
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Table 5.5: Moderating Analysis: Impact of Board Meeting Frequency (Trust, 
and Cognitive Conflict, Perception of Board Members’ Competence, 
Communication Efficacy, Affective Conflict, and Familiarity) 
Variables Trust VIF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Percentage of Non-Executive Directors -0.158 -.136 -0.138 -0.132 1.462 
Percentage of Male Directors -0.124 -.012 -0.012 -0.008 1.563 
Board Size 0.076 .018 0.032 0.006 1.590 
CEO Duality -0.007 .010 0.007 -0.011 1.354 
Company Sector 0.187 .155 0.129 0.120 1.542 
Log of Firm Size 0.030 .022 0.005 0.041 2.792 
Log of Company Turnover 0.172 .049 0.061 0.050 2.042 
H1: Cognitive Conflict  -0.028 -0.037 -0.042 2.547 
H2: Perception of Board Members’ Competence  0.401** 0.401** 0.377** 3.022 
H3: Communication Efficacy  0.003 0.016 0.038 1.551 
H4: Affective conflict  -0.383** -0.379** -0.385** 2.248 
H5: Familiarity  0.132 0.120 0.108 1.974 
H6: Cognitive Conflict *Board Meeting 
Frequency 
 
 0.113 0.089 2.736 
H7: Perception of Board Members’ 
Competence*Board Meeting Frequency 
 
 -0.044 0.012 2.562 
H8: Communication Efficacy*Board Meeting 
Frequency 
 
 -0.025 0.004 3.087 
H9: Affective Conflict*Board Meeting Frequency   -0.042 -0.035 3.305 
H10: Familiarity*Board Meeting Frequency   -0.065 -0.023 2.308 
H11: Cognitive Conflict*Board Tenure    0.025 1.963 






H13: Communication Efficacy*Board Tenure    0.036 1.727 
H14: Affective Conflict*Board Tenure    -0.172 2.500 
H15: Familiarity*Board Tenure    -0.059 1.697 
R 0.132 0.652 0.658 0.677  
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.596 0.574 0.566  
Sig. F Change 1.718 11.557** 7.815** 6.088**  
Dependent Variable: Trust 
Model 1: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm 
Size 
Model 2: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm 
Size, Cognitive Conflict, Communication Efficacy, Familiarity, Affective Conflict, Perception of Board Members' Competence 
Model 3: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm 
Size, Cognitive Conflict, Communication Efficacy, Familiarity, Affective Conflict, Perception of Board Members' Competence, Cognitive Conflict interaction board meeting frequency, 
Communication Efficacy interaction board meeting frequency, Familiarity interaction board meeting frequency, Affective Conflict interaction board meeting frequency, 
Perception of Board Members' Competence interaction board meeting frequency 
Model 4: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm 
Size, Cognitive Conflict, Communication Efficacy, Familiarity, Affective Conflict, Perception of Board Members' Competence, Cognitive Conflict interaction board meeting frequency, 
Communication Efficacy interaction board meeting frequency, Familiarity interaction board meeting frequency, Affective Conflict interaction board meeting frequency, Perception of Board 
Members' Competence interaction board meeting frequency, Cognitive Conflict interaction board tenure, Communication Efficacy interaction board tenure, Familiarity interaction 
board tenure, Affective Conflict interaction board tenure, Perception of Board Members' Competence interaction board tenure 
Note: N=97, The table shows the standardised coefficients (β), the value of the adjusted R2, and the value of the F change. 
The levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01 
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Table 5.6: Moderating Analysis: Impact of Board Meeting Frequency (Trust and 
Cognitive Conflict, Perception of Board Members’ Competence, 
Communication Efficacy, Affective Conflict, and Familiarity: Personality, 
Professional Life, and Personal Life) 
Variables Trust VIF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Percentage of Non-Executive Directors -0.158 -0.133 -0.139 -0.133 1.519 
Percentage of Male Directors -0.124 -0.012 -0.035 -0.027 1.727 
Board Size 0.076 0.017 0.031 -0.009 1.750 
CEO Duality -0.007 0.005 -0.011 -0.025 1.508 
Company Sector 0.187 0.159 0.123 0.129 1.664 
Log of Firm Size 0.030 0.051 0.034 0.081 2.956 
Log of Company Turnover 0.172 0.034 0.044 0.043 2.166 
H1: Cognitive Conflict  -0.045 -0.063 -0.045 2.875 
H2: Perception of Board Members’ Competence  0.428** .465** 0.393** 4.025 
H3: Communication Efficacy  -0.014 -0.011 0.017 1.821 
H4: Affective conflict  -0.387** -0.367** -0.379** 2.475 
H5: Familiarity: Personality  0.122 0.115 0.127 2.287 
H5: Familiarity: Professional Life  -0.063 -0.084 -0.111 2.333 
H5: Familiarity: Personal Life  0.107 0.110 0.106 1.880 
H6: Cognitive Conflict *Board Meeting Frequency   0.037 0.042 3.637 
H7: Perception of Board Members’ Competence*Board Meeting 
Frequency 
 
 -0.028 0.029 2.875 
H8: Communication Efficacy*Board Meeting Frequency   -0.017 -0.003 3.289 
H9: Affective Conflict*Board Meeting Frequency   -0.088 -0.073 3.623 
H10: Familiarity: Personality*Board Meeting Frequency   0.059 0.017 4.210 
H10: Familiarity: Professional Life*Board Meeting Frequency   -0.117 -0.060 2.907 
H10: Familiarity: Personal Life*Board Meeting Frequency   -0.039 0.015 1.748 
H11: Cognitive Conflict*Board Tenure    0.008 2.265 
H12: Perception of Board Members’ Competence*Board Tenure    -0.178 3.438 
H13: Communication Efficacy*Board Tenure    0.042 2.136 
H14: Affective Conflict*Board Tenure    -0.183 2.641 
H15: Familiarity: Personality*Board Tenure    -0.054 2.771 
H15: Familiarity: Professional Life*Board Tenure    -0.061 2.978 
H15: Familiarity: Personal Life*Board Tenure    0.013 2.167 
R 0.132 0.662 0.673 0.694  
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.597 0.568 0.546  
Sig. F Change 1.718 10.093** 6.376** 4.688**  
Dependent Variable: Trust 
Model 1: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm Size 
Model 2: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm Size, Cognitive Conflict, Communication Efficacy, Familiarity, Affective Conflict, Perception of 
Board Members' Competence 
Model 3: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm Size, Cognitive Conflict, Communication Efficacy, Familiarity, Affective Conflic t, Perception of Board 
Members' Competence, Cognitive Conflict interaction board meeting frequency, Communication Efficacy interaction board meeting frequency, Familiarity interaction board meeting frequency, Affective Conflict interaction board meeting frequency, Perception of Board 
Members' Competence interaction board meeting frequency 
Model 4: Predictors: (Constant), Log of Company Turnover, CEO Duality, Percentage of Male Directors, Company Sector, Percentage of Non-Executive Directors, Board Size, Log of Firm Size, Cognitive Conflict, Communication Efficacy, Familiarity, Affective Conflict, Perception of Board 
Members' Competence, Cognitive Conflict interaction board meeting frequency, Communication Efficacy interaction board meeting frequency, Familiarity interaction board meeting frequency, Affective Conflict interaction board meeting frequency, Perception of Board Members' Competence 
interaction board meeting frequency, Cognitive Conflict interaction board tenure, Communication Efficacy interaction board tenure, Familiarity interaction board tenure, Affective Conflict interaction board tenure, Perception of Board Members' Competence interaction 
board tenure 
Note: N=97, The table shows the standardised coefficients (β), the value of the adjusted R2, and the value of the F change.  
The levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01 
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5.6.1 Regression Analysis: Moderating Impact of Board Meeting Frequency 
The results of the moderating effects of board meeting frequency are reported in 
Model 3 in Tables 5.5and 5.6, where in Table 5.6 familiarity is made up of personality, 
professional life, and personal life constructs. The Models in both tables were significant with 
the F value of 7.815 and 6.376 (p-value <0.01) in Table 5.5 and 5.6 respectively.In Table 
5.5, the adjusted R2 value was 0.574, while in Table 5.6, the Adjusted R2 was 0.568. The 
Adjusted R2 values show that the predictors, including the board meeting frequency as a 
moderator, explained 57% of variations in trust in both Tables. Contrary to the model and 
formulated hypotheses that board meeting frequency moderates the relationship between 
trust and its determinants, board meeting frequency was found not to significantly contribute 
to the model of the relationship. As shown in both tables, the β values of the moderation 
variables were insignificant with p-values that are > 0.05. Based on the outcome of the 
regression analysis of the moderating impact of board meeting frequency, hypotheses 6-10 
regarding the moderator effect in the relationship between trust and cognitive conflict, 
theperception of board members’ competence, communication efficacy, affective conflict, 
and familiarity would be rejected. Therefore,it is concluded that board meeting frequency 
neither strengthens nor weakens the relationship between trust and its determinants. 
The perception of board members’ competence and affective conflict were the only 
determinants that significantly explained trust in the boardroom in Model 3 of Tables 5.5 and 
5.6. This is shown by the significance of the β values of these determinants. In Table 5.5, the 
β value of the perception of board members’ competence and affective conflict were highly 
significant with P-values less than 0.01 at 0.401 and -0.379respectively. In Table  5.6, the β 
values for the perception of board members’ competence were 0.465 and for affective 
conflict was -0.367 with a P-values less than 0.01. These findings imply that hypothesis 2 
regarding the positive impact of the perception of board members’ competence on trust, and 
hypothesis 4 regarding affective conflicts’ negative on trust remain the only hypotheses that 
were accepted. 
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5.6.2 Regression Analysis: Moderating Impact of Board Tenure 
Model 4 in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 tested hypotheses 11-15 regarding the moderator 
effects of board tenure in the relationship between trust and its determinants (cognitive 
conflict, theperception of board members’ competence, communication efficacy, affective 
conflict, and familiarity).The Models of the moderating effect of board tenurein both Tables 
were found to be significant with F-values of 4.688 and 6.088 (p-value <0.01). The Adjusted 
R2 were 0.546 and 0.566. The values of the Adjusted R2 in Table 5.5 show that the 
predictors and the moderating effect of board tenure explain 55% of the variance in trust 
while it explains 57% of the variance in Table 5.6. As it was for board meeting frequency, 
board tenure did not contribute significantly to the model as depicted by the insignificant β 
values with p-values greater than 0.05. Based on these result, hypotheses 11-15 regarding 
the moderating effect of board tenure on the relationship between trust and its determinants 
were not supported. Therefore, board tenure neither strengthensnor weaken the relationship 
between trust and cognitive conflict, the perception of board members’ competence, 
communication efficacy, affective conflict, and familiarity. 
Similar to the findings previous models, Model 4 of Table 5.5 depicted the 
perception of board members’ competence and affective conflict to be the only significant 
determinants of trust. The perception of board members’ competence and affective conflict 
had β values of 0.377 and -0.385respectively. The β values of both variables had P-values 
lesser than 0.01, suggesting their significant impact on trust. Just as it was in previous 
findings, hypotheses 2 and 4 regarding the positive impact of the perception of board 
members’ competence on trust, and the negative impact of affective conflict on trust were 
accepted. Similarly, in Table 5.6 where familiarity was a sub-set of three variables, the 
perception of board members’ competence affective conflict was the only variable that had a 
significant impact on trust. The β value for the perception of board members’ competence 
was 0.393 and for affective conflict was -0.379 and the significant level for both variables 
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were less than 0.01. Therefore in Model 4 of Tables 5.6, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 4 were 
also accepted. 
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5.7 The Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
HYPOTHESES Accept/ 
Reject 
H1 Board members’ cognitive conflict impacts positively on trust in the boardroom Rejected 
H2 Perception of board members’ competence positively impacts on trust in the 
boardroom 
Accepted 
H3 Communication Efficacy impacts positively on trust in the boardroom Rejected 
H4 Board members’ affective conflict impacts negatively on trust in the 
boardroom 
Accepted 
H5 Familiarity between board members positively impacts on trust in the 
boardroom 
Rejected 
H6 Board tenure negatively moderates the relationship between board members’ 
cognitive conflict and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
H7 Board Tenure positively moderates the relationship between the perception of 
board members’ competence and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
H8 Board tenure negatively moderates the relationship between communication 
efficacy and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
H9 Board Tenure positively moderates the relationship between board members’ 
affective conflict and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
H10 Board Tenure positively moderates the relationship between board members’ 
familiarity and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
H11 Board meeting frequency negatively moderates the relationship between 
board members’ cognitive conflict and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
H12 Board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between the 
perception of board members’ competence and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
H13 Board meeting frequency negatively moderates the relationship between 
communication efficacy and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
H14 Board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between board 
members’ affective conflict and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
H15 Board meeting frequency positively moderates the relationship between board 
members’ familiarity and trust in the boardroom 
Rejected 
5.8 Summaryof Chapter 5 
This chapter has presented the results of the hypotheses testing conducted to 
investigate the determinants of trust in the boardroom. The findings suggest that two 
hypotheses are supported, H2: Perception of board members’ competence positively 
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impacts on trust in the boardroom and H4: Board members’ affective conflict impacts 
negatively on trust in the boardroom. The results show that other hypotheses could not be 
accepted. The following chapter will provide a discussion relating these findings to existing 
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Chapter 5 reported the results of the testing of the research model and hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 6, the findings will be discussed, identifying contributions 
to knowledge and outlining implications for board theory and practice. This research 
contributes to enhancing the knowledge of board processes in several ways, and these will 
be outlined in this chapter. There are 2 main implications for theory resulting from the 
findings. First, the study shows that there are 2 principal determinants of trust in the 
boardroom, an important board process that exhibits both affective and cognitive features. 
These determinants are the perception of board members’ competences, a cognitive 
dimension, and board affective conflict, an affective dimension. Second, this study has also 
introduced new or refined existing behavioural concepts in boards such as board 
communication (Farquhar, 2011), board members’ familiarity and perception of board 
members’ competences. These concepts have been under-researched in the context of 
boards. Although this research has not carried out an in-depth investigation of these 
variables, it has provided partial knowledge regarding the impact it has on a board process 
such as trust. This research also adds to board literature regarding these variables.Further, 
the findings have implications for board policy and practice. This chapter will discuss these 
findings and will be structured as follows. In Section 6.2., the implications for theory outlined 
above will be discussed in detail. In Section 6.3., the implications for board policy and 
practice will be outlined. In Section 6.4., a summary of the findings will be provided. 
 
6.2. Implications for Board Theory 
The research findings have 2 principal implications for theories of the board 
directors and our understanding of the determinants of board processes. First, the study 
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shows that one cognitive dimension, theperception of board members’ competences and 
one affective dimension, affective conflict are significant determinants of trust in the 
boardroom, a hitherto under-researched board process. The former is positively related to 
trust in the boardroom whilst the latter is negatively related to trust in the boardroom. 
Second, this study has also introduced new or refined existing behavioural concepts in 
boards such as board communication (Farquhar, 2011), board members’ familiarity and 
perception of board members’ competences. These concepts have been under-researched 
in the context of boards. Although this research has not carried out an in-depth investigation 
of these variables, it has provided partial knowledge regarding the impact it has on a board 
process such a trust. This research also adds to board literature regarding these 
variables.The implications of these findings will be further detailed in this section. In addition, 
this section will explore reasons for those hypotheses that were rejected. 
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Note: ** and * indicate significant levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively 
Figure 6.1: Model of the Relationship between Board Members’ Competence 
and Trust 
 
Figure 6.1 shows that the perception of board members’ competence has a highly 
significant impact on trust as depicted by the β value of 0377. This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that as board members perceive each others’ competences, the trust 
amongst board members increases.When the relationship was moderated by board meeting 
frequency and board tenure, the result showedinsignificant β values of 0.012 and-0.164for 
the moderating variables respectively.This result implies that board meeting frequency and 
board tenure does not strenghten or weaken the realtionship between the perception of 
board members’ competence and trust. The treatment of the perception of board members’ 
competence in this study departs from how previous studies have treated this variable. The 
perception of competence was treated as a separable determinant of intra-group trust in 
terms of being a cognitive calculation of the skills and capabilities of board members and 
was found to be significant. Previous studies have treated the perception of competence as 
an antecedent of trust alongside other variables such as integrity and benevolence when 
investigating interpersonal trust(Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). However, some 
studies have described integrity and benevolence as redundant variables when determining 
trust (Jarvenpaa, Knoll, and Leidner, 1998; Mayer and Gavin, 2005). Also, Colquitt et al. 
Perception of Board 
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Board meeting Frequency 
(β 0.012) 
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(β -0.164) 
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(2007) found in their research that ability or competence is a more significant predictor of 
trust. This research has further supported this claim as the research findings show that 
competence is a significant determinant of trust in the boardroom.This conclusion is 
consistent with studies conducted by Mayer et al. (1995) and Mayer and Davis (1999).Also, 
the positive impact of competence on trust is similar to what is reported in previous research 
whichhas found competence to be a significant predictor of trust (Ayios, 2003; Butler, 19991; 
Colquitt et al., 2007; Connelly, Crook, Combs, Ketchen, and Auginis, 2015; McAllister, 1995; 
Sitkin and Roth, 1993, Simon and Peterson, 2000). Researchers such as McAllister (1999) 
and Parayitam and Dooley (2009) described the form of trust that competence facilitates to 
be cognitive. The findings of these researchers regarding the impact of competence on trust 
are also in congruence with the results reported in this study.According to Parayitam and 
Dooley (2009), trust is a reflection of the perceived competence of team members. The 
explanation for the positive relationship found between the perception of board members’ 
competence and trust. When board members are aware of each other's competencies, they 
are assured that members will use their diverse skills and become more creative in carrying 
out their tasks which increase the level of trust. This makes the perception of board 
members’ competencies a cogent determinant of trust. The more board members are aware 
of other directors’ abilities or competencies, the more likely members will trust each other. 
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Note: ** and * indicate significant levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively 
Figure 6.2: Model of the Relationship between Trust and Affective conflict 
As reported in Figure 6.2, the empirical tests show an inverse relationship between 
trust and affective conflict. Affective conflict was found to impact trust with the β value of –
0.385 negatively which means that the presence of affectiveconflict in the boardroom leads 
to lower levels of trust. When the effects of the moderating variables were examined, the β 
values ofboard meeting frequency and board tenure were found to be insignificant at-0.035 
and -0.035 respectively (see Figure 6.2). This implies that board meeting frequency and 
board tenure neither strengthens nor weakens the relationship between affective conflict and 
trust. The outcome of this study is consistent with the concept of affective conflict, and its 
proposed negative consequences found in prior literature. Affective conflict is described as a 
form of conflict instigated by interpersonal animosity and other homophilic reasons, hence its 
negative impacts (Amason, 1996; De Dreu and Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1995; Langfred, 2007; 
Li and Hambrick, 2005). Similar to the findings of this study, most studies that have 
investigated the impact of affective conflict have found it to negatively impact on board and 
team effectiveness (Brief and Weiss, 2002; Carnevale and Probst, 1998; De Dreu and 
Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1997; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981), decisions (Amason, 
Hochwarter, Thompson, and Harrison, 1995; Parayitam and Dooley, 2008; Simons and 
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Peterson, 2000), and firm performance (Amason, 1996; Elbana, 2009). Based on the trend 
of empirical findings regarding the impact of affective conflict, it is without surprise that its 
impact was adverse on trust. The results of this study is consistent with the growing body of 
literature that suggests affective conflict to be dysfunctional. The reason for this impact is 
that affective conflict or emotional disagreements increases board members’ anxiety and 
could potentially lead to ego threats (Baumeister, 1998; Dijkstra et al., 2005). This often 
leads to escalated hostility among members and is more likely to negatively impact on board 
outcomes, in this case trust in the boardroom (De Dreu and Van Knippenberg, 2005; Jehn, 
Greer, Levine, and Szulanski, 2008; Polzer, Milton, and Swann, 2002; Rispens, Greer, and 
Jehn, 2007). Due to thenegative impact, scholars whohave examined trust have 
recommended that affective conflicts or predictors of trust should be properly managed in a 
way that it supplements cognitive determinants, such as competence or ability, that enhance 
trust (Flores and Solomon, 1998; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; 
McAllister, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin, 1992; Williams, 
2001). In sum, affective conflict was found to be a significant determinant that has a 
dysfunctional effect on trust in the boardroom and, when managed, it leads to enhanced 
trust in the boardroom. 
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Note: ** and * indicate significant levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively 
Figure 6.3: Model of the Relationship between Trust and Cognitive Conflict 
Figure 6.3 shows a contrary result to the proposed positive relationship between 
cognitive conflict and trust. The findings of this study show an insignificant negative impact 
on trust as depicted by the β value of -0.042. When the interaction effects of board meeting 
frequency and board tenure were included in the model of relationship, neither of these 
moderating variables strengthened, weakened nor made the impact cognitive conflict on 
trust significant. This implies that the impact of cognitive conflict on trust is negligible. The 
findings of this research is also divergent from how cognitive conflict is commonly described 
in the literature. Researchers have found cognitive conflict to facilitate positive outcomes in 
teams and boards. For example, cognitive conflict is found to enable higher board and team 
effectiveness (e.g. Baron, 1990; Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Minichilli et al., 2012; Zona, 2016; 
Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Zattoni, 2015) and decision outcomes (Amason, 1996; Dooley and 
Fryxell, 1999; Parayitam and Dooley, 2009).Inconsistent with what is reported in the 
literature, this study has found cognitive conflict to be dysfunctional to trust. Although 
insignificant, the explanation for the negative impact cognitive conflict has on trust could be 
explained using De Dreu and Weingart ’s (2003) study. In their study, they found that higher 
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levels of cognitive conflict can lead to higher affective conflict. This explains why cognitive 
conflict can have a negative impact on specific team or board outcomes (see Jehn, 
Northcraft and Neale, 1999; Mooney et al., 2007; Simons and Peterson, 2000). Studies 
report that when cognitive conflict leads to affective conflict, it inhibits the positive impacts of 
cognitive conflict from materializing (Amason and Sapienza, 1997; Jehn, 1995; Jehn and 
Bendersky, 2003; Mooney et al., 2007; Pelled, 1996; Simons and Peterson, 2000; Yang and 
Mossholder, 2004). Consistent with these findings, Eisenhardt et al. (1997) in their research 
found that top management teams that engaged in cognitive conflict without interpersonal 
hostilities outperformed firms who do not engage in any form of conflict or are characterised 
by higher levels of relationship conflict. Furthermore, in Minichilli et al. (2009) and Zona and 
Zattoni (2007), the impact of cognitive conflict and board performance was tested but found 
to be inconclusive. Based on the studies of these researchers, the reason given for the 
insignificant and negative impact of cognitive conflict on trust in the boardroom could be the 
mitigating impact of board affective conflict. This may imply that there is a relationship 
between cognitive conflict and affective conflict, or that the relationship between cogntive 
conflict and trust is curvilinear. Although, it is beyond the scope of this research to test the 
realtionship between cognitive and affective conflict, the correlation analysis in Table 5.2 in 
Chapter 5 shows that there is a negative relationship between both forms of conflict. This 
result supports the argument of the negative insignificant impact of cognitive conflict on trust. 
As for the potential curvilinear relationship between trust and cognitive conflict, this 
relationship was tested for and was found to be insignificant as it was found when testing the 
linear relationship between both variables. The moderating effects of board meeting 
frequency and board tenure were also tested for in the curvilinear realtionship between 
cognitive conflict and trust and both variables were found neither to strengthen nor weaken 
the curvilinear relationship between cogntive conflict and trust. 
6.6Determinants of Trust: Communication Efficacy 
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Note: ** and * indicate significant levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively 
Figure 6.4: Model of the Relationship between Trust and Communication 
Efficacy 
The impact of communication has commonly been found to positively impact on 
team/relationship commitment and trust (Park, Lee, Lee, and Truex, 2012; Sharma and 
Patterson, 1999). Cullen et al. (2000) and Chu and Fang (2006) found that when 
communication is succinct and directed, it becomes an important factor in building and 
sustaining commitment and trust in teams. In this study, in a similar way, communication 
efficacy was hypothesised to lead to trust based on the premise that it is frequent and task-
related (Iacona and Weisband, 1997; Ishaya and Macaulay, 1999; Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 
1997). The result in this study regarding this hypothesis contrasts with the findings of 
previous studies and the formulated hypothesis. As reported in Figure 6.4 and depicted by 
the β value of 0.038, an insignificant relationship between communication efficacy and 
trustwas established. Apart from the small impact of communication efficacy on trust, the 
moderating impacts of board meeting frequency and tenure was similarly found to be 
insignificant. In the context of boards, researchers have noted certain board characteristics 
that could impact on the relationship between communication and trust. Factors that were 
identified include the balance of power between the CEO and the directors (Holmstrom, 
2005), excessive monitoring or higher proportion of outside directors (Ferreira, 2007; Harris 
and Raviv, 2006),  CEO duality (Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997), and board size 
(Bainbridge, 2002; Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). These factors identified were 
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controlled in the analysis of the relationship of communication efficacy and trust. The impact 
of communication efficacy was still found to be insignificant. Where communication can 
logically be hypothesised to lead to trust, the possible explanation for the reported 
insignificant impact can be found in Vafeas (1999) and Jensen (1999). Where task focused 
communication in the boardroom could lead to trust (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Iacona and 
Weisband, 1997; Ishaya and Macaulay, 1999; Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1997; Song and 
Thakor, 2006), Vafeas (1999) argued that occasions whenboard members have 
tocommunicate are not necessarily productive. This issue is because interactions in the 
boardroom are usually based on previously set agendas (Jensen, 1993). Such routine tasks 
limit the efficacy of communication and make it unnecessary to reflect trust during such 
interaction in the boardroom. This explains the reported insignificant relationship between 
communication efficacy and trust in the boardroom. 
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Note: ** and * indicate significant levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively 











Note: ** and * indicate significant levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively 
Figure 6.6: Model of the Relationship between Trust and Familiarity: 
Personality, Personal life, and Professional Life 
In this research, the presence of familiarity in the boardroom is based on the 
premise that board members engage in a long-term relationship and have acquired 
cumulative knowledge over the years about each other in a way that satisfies their socio-
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2008). Due to the extended period of familiarity, board members are more inclined to 
express homophilic trust in the boardroom (Gualti and Sytch, 2008). It was also 
hypothesised that board tenure and meeting frequency would positively moderate the 
relationship between familiarity and trust as it gives members the opportunity to gather 
affective-based knowledge about eachother. Despite available empirical evidence that 
supports these premise (Bulu and Yildirim, 2008; Crisp and Jarvenpaa, 2000; Kayworth and 
Leidner, 2000), the result of this research shows that familiarity does not explain board trust. 
As reported in Figure 6.5, the insignificant relationship between familiarity and trust is 
represented by the β value of 0.108. When familiarity was treated as a subdivision of 3 
constructs of personality, professional life, and personal life, these too were not found to be 
explaining trust. This was depicted by their insignificant β values. As reported in Figure 6.6, 
personality had a β value of 0.127, professional life had a β of -0.111, and personal life had 
a β of 0.106. Regarding the interaction effects of board tenure and meeting frequency, these 
too had an insignificant impact on the relationship between familiarity and trust as depicted 
by the β values of -0.023 and -0.059 respectively. Table 6.6 similarly reported that when 
board meeting frequency and board meeting tenure moderated the relationship between 
trust and the levels of familiarity, the variables neither strengthened nor weakened the 
relationship. Despite that fact that the presence of board familiarity is desirable for trust 
building in teams such as boards (Gualti and Sytch, 2008), the finding of this research 
contradicts this view by presenting evidence of an insignificant relationship. Other 
researchers have found familiarity to adversely threaten trust. For example, in Hassel's 
(1999: 191) research, the impact of familiarity is described as 'trust threats'. When Hussey 
(1999) considered the impact of familiarity in board relationships in the light of the duration of 
team members’ appointment and the frequency of contact (measured by board tenure and 
meeting frequency in this research), none of these contributed to the impact of familiarity. 
Although it is useful to note that Hussey's research tested the impact on familiarity on auditor 
independence or outside directors, not on trust. This research introduces new knowledge 
and buttresses the research of scholars such as Hussey (1999) that familiarity does not lead 
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to trust in the context of boards. However, further research is required to understand the 
nature of familiarity amongst board members. 
6.8 Contribution to Knowledge: Implications forTheory and Board Practice 
This section summarises the academic and practical contribution of this study to 
what is already known about board behaviour. Thisthesis carries on research on the 
behavioural approach to boards and board processes. As a new way of theorising on 
corporate boards, the behavioural approach to corporate boards has shown that board 
processes are more significant than structural variables in explaining board effectiveness 
(e.g. Minichilli et al., 2012; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Zattoni, Gnan, and Huse, 2015). 
Empirical research within this research domain hasfound that certain board processes 
facilitate the carrying out of certain board tasks effectively while board task performance is 
commonly used to proxy for board effectiveness (e.g. Heemskerk et al., 2014; Simons and 
Peterson, 2000; Mooney et al., 2007; Zattoni et al., 2015). The research on the link between 
board processes and board task performance has dominated research on the behavioural 
approach to boards. While a majority of studies within this stream of research have 
considered the causal relationship between board processes and board task performance, 
fewer studies have considered how board processes are triggered in the boardroom. This 
study mainly aims at igniting further research on the determinants of board processes in the 
boardroom by responding to the call for research by scholars such as Farquhar (2011). 
Following Forbes and Milliken's (1999) model, this study reviewed the commonly 
investigated board processes by identifying their potential determinants (see Chapter 2). The 
determinants of board processes identified in this review were based on previous research 
on teams, top management teams, and boards. By applying team and board constructs to 
this research, more attention was given to trust in the boardroom. Trust is an example of an 
under-researched board process in the behavioural approach to boards. The relevance of 
trust as a board process cannot be over-emphasised when examining other board 
processes (Huse, 2005; Van Ees et al., 2008), social and professional relationships (Brundin 
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and Nordqvist, 2004), board effectiveness and creation of firm value (Camerer, 2003; 
Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Markova, 2004), and healthy interrelational dynamics in the 
boardroom (Migliore and DeClouette, 2011).Previous studies that have investigated trust 
have mostly done so in the context of teams at an interpersonal level (see Colquitt et al., 
2007; Cook and Wall, 1980; Butler, 1991; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995). This study 
examined trust as a team level construct in the context of corporate boards by distinguishing 
its cognitive and affective determinants (see Figure 3.1). Therefore, by choosing to examine 
trust as a team level construct, this study's primary contribution to academic knowledge is 
the identification of the determinants of trust in the boardroom. Theoutcome of this study 
found that the perception of board members' competenceand board affective conflictare the 
main determinants of trust. Where the perception of board members’ competence 
determines the cognitive dimension of trust, affective conflict ignites the affective dimension 
of trust. 
The perception of board members' competence was found toexplain cognitive trust 
significantly. The supported premise of the hypothesised causal relationship is that boards 
require a broad range of skills and competencies to carry out their tasks effectively (Qian, 
2012). When board members are aware of each others' competencies, they are compelled 
to invest in a cognitive form of trust, confident in each others' abilities in the boardroom 
(Colquitt et al., 2007; Gabarro, 1978; Mayer et al., 1995; Qian, 2012; Zand, 1972). This 
conclusion supports Parayitam and Dooley's (2009) findings that trust among executives is 
dependent on the presence and the perception of competencies. The finding of this research 
has implication on the boards’ composition and why members should engage in activities 
that enhance their capabilities. Such activities should include training that improves their 
skills in the boardroom and evaluation of each others’ competencies. 
Regarding board composition, a higher level of professional or competence 
diversity is required in the boardroom. According to Minichilli, Zattoni, and Zona (2009), 
boardroom skills, competence, or knowledge-based diversity produces positive cognitive 
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outputs because it increases the likelihood of creative and innovative solutions to problems. 
As established in this study, an example of such cognitive output is trust. Therefore, when 
appointing board members, their capabilities or competencies should be taken into 
consideration to foster trust in the boardroom. This conclusion is consistent with Biggins 
(1999) who stated that the appointment of board members should be based on the belief 
that these individuals have the expertise to provide a high-level of advice and that they are 
better equipped to understand the challenges and performance evaluation of executives. 
Also, board evaluation, development, and training can alsoincrease awareness in members’ 
competencies in the boardroom, hence their decision to trust. According to Foster-Back 
(2005), competence is vital to reinforcing trust. Although it should be bornein mind that all 
directors should possess a minimum level of core competence, nevertheless, individual 
directors should be matched against a set of desirable competence requirements depending 
on the extent of openness and trust (Coulson-Thomas, 2009). When members observe 
certain deficiencies among themselves due to certain weaknesses in the structure or 
operation of the board, it impedes confidence in the boardroom. Therefore, the training and 
development of the boardroom team should be prioritised. The development of the boardin 
order to build and maintain competent and strong members entails a range of activities 
(Coulson-Thomas, 2009; Lee and Phan, 2000; Metz, 1998; Watson, 2004; Weisman, 2003). 
These activities include careful recruiting and selection, training and preparing, performance 
evaluation, and removing of incompetent board members (Brown, 2007; Coulson-Thomas, 
2009;Daily and Dalton, 2004;Larcker, Miles, Griffin, and Tayan, 2016; Lee and Phan, 2000; 
Watson, 2004).According to Van Den Berghe and Levrau (2004), the training, development, 
and evaluation of the board - such as using the highlighted measures in the previous 
sentence -should be carried out at least annually. When these measures are carefully 
executed to ensure the presence and awareness of competence in the boardroom, this will 
enhance boardroom trust at a cognitive level. 
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As for affective conflict, this determinant is commonly portrayed as a board process 
having an emotional and dysfunctional impact on outcomes in groups, teams, and boards 
(e.g.Brief and Weiss, 2002; Farh, Lee, and Farh, 2010; Farquhar, 2011; De Dreu and 
Weingart, 2003; Gladstein, 1984; Heemskerk et al., 2015; Langfred, 2007; Li and Hambrick, 
2005; Wall and Nolan, 1986).Affective conflict was found to have an adverse impact on trust 
when allowed to permeate the boardroom. As affective conflict was treated as a determinant 
of trust in this research as opposed to a board processes (Ong and Wan, 2005; Farquhar, 
2011; Heemskerk et al., 2015), the results show that processes do not necessarily work ‘side 
by side’, rather that they can influence each other. Based on the results of this study, 
affective conflict, a board process was found to be a determinant that can undermine trust in 
the boardroom. The presence of emotional conflict can affect how board members receive 
and interpret information and in turn impact on the level of trust (De Dreu, 2008; De Wit et 
al., 2012; Parayitam and Dooley, 2009). Also, board members willingly commit to emotional 
investments based on interpersonal relationships resulting fromreciprocated trust (McAllister, 
1995). When the interpersonal relationship between board members is damaged by 
emotional or affective conflict, boardroom trust is extinguished. The empirical evidence in 
this study supports this argument of a negative relationship between affective conflict and 
trust. In line with previous studies that has established the negative impacts ofaffective 
conflict on performance outcomes (Ong and Wan, 2005; Farquhar, 2011; Heemskerk et al., 
2015), this study includes trust in one of those negative outcomes.  
The implication of this finding to board practice is that interaction in the boardroom 
should be in such a way that members' trust isundamaged through interpersonal relationship 
or emotional conflict. This responsibility largely rests on the chairperson of the board. This is 
because chairpersons are commonly appointed based on peer respect, professional 
knowledge, and demonstrated commitment (Bader, 2012).Therefore, reducing affective 
conflict in the boardroom will require less effort from the chairperson. Research also 
suggests that the adverse effects of affective conflict can be lessened under certain 
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conditions (De Wit, Jehn, and Greer, 2012). For example, researchers have found that 
affective conflict is less likely to negatively affect both proximal and distal group outcomes 
when an effective management strategy is put in place (De Dreu and Van Vianen, 2001; 
Jehn, 1997; Murnighan and Conlon, 1991; Tekleab et al., 2009) and when low emotionality 
surrounding affective conflict is discouraged in the boardroom (Jehn et al., 2008).The 
literature agrees that affective conflict within boards has a dysfunctional impact on outcomes 
(Amason, 1996; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Jehn, 1995; Jehn, 1997; Dawes and 
Massey, 2005; Pondy, 1967; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). This research contributes and further 
validates how board affective conflict is perceived in the boardroom regarding its negative 
consequences. However, it is useful to note that avoiding this form of conflict paradoxically 
could hinder good governance (Heemskerk, Heemskerk, and Wats, 2016). 
This research has also contributed to the knowledge regarding the impact of 
communication in the boardroom. Other researchers have treated communication as an 
affective construct at an interpersonal level,and have found it to facilitate emotional trust 
within teams and workgroups (Hofhuis, Van der Rijt and Vlug, 2016). Researchers such as 
Edmondson (1999) and Singh et al. (2013) found that when members feel psychologically 
safe when communicating with their team members, they are more inclined to cultivate 
affective trust. This putsteam members at ease when engaging in a flow of interaction or 
communication with members (Van Oortmerssen et al., 2014). In a different approach, this 
study treated communication as a team construct, a cognitive determinant of trust.As 
opposed to the established link between communication and trust within teams, this 
research shows that this is not the case with corporate boards.Based on this finding, one 
could conclude that irrespective of how often, task focused, and effective board members’ 
communications are, trust in board boardroom cannot be guaranteed on this premise. 
Despite the outcome of communication in this research, this study still acknowledges the 
importance of communication. Studies that have examined the impact communication in the 
context of boards have shown that communication is closely linked to trust. For example, 
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Pearsall, Ellis, and Evans (2008) stated that fractures in communication could inhibit 
essential processes such as trust. After establishing that communication reflects the building 
of trust, Walton (2011) found that when effective and frequent communication between 
board members is absent, this festers distrust in the boardroom. Irrespective of the fact that 
no significant relationship was found between communication efficacy and trust, it is 
imperative for members to engage in communication that abets cognitive outcomes in the 
boardroom (Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999; Iacono and Weisband, 1997; Ishaya and 
Macaulay, 1999; Walton, 2011; Van Oortmerssen et al., 2014). 
As for cognitive conflict, there is an overwhelming amount of literature that has 
found thatthis variable facilitates positive board and team outcomes, especially on board 
task performance (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003; Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Finkelstein and 
Mooney, 2003; Johnson and Grayson, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Zona, 2016).Similarly, 
it was hypothesised in this research that cognitive conflict positively enhances trust as a 
cognitive outcome in the boardroom.Contradictorily, the empirical finding of this research 
shows that this is not the case with the building of trust in the boardroom. Apart from not 
having a significant impact on trust, the negligible impact of cognitive conflict on trust was 
found to be adverse. This study associated the negative consequences of cognitive conflictto 
emotional or affective conflict(Amason, 1996; Amason and Sapienza, 1997; Jehn, 1995; 
Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; Mooney et al., 2007; Pelled, 1996; Simons and Peterson, 2000; 
Yang and Mossholder, 2004). Apart from the fact that extensive engagement incognitive 
conflict does not guarantee trust, cognitive conflict could escalate into emotional conflict and 
negatively affect trust. Coetzer (2015) described this as the limit to cognitive conflict when 
considering board members’ decision quality and decision commitments. In line with this, 
Parayitam and Dooley (2011) described the relationship between cognitive conflict and 
outcomes to be curvilinear. This implies that cognitive conflict will continue to lead to a 
positive outcome until a breakeven point when it spirals out of control into a negative or 
emotional conflict. When board members engage in too much conflict, irrespective of it being 
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cognitive, such conflict may be interpreted by members as a personal attack on their 
capabilities or knowledge. In turn, cognitive conflict triggers an emotional rift amongst board 
members as they argue betweenthemselves whose ideas and methods are superior. 
Similarly, Simons and Peterson (2000) found that teams that experience higher levels of 
cognitive conflict are more susceptible to higher levels affective conflict. As cognitive conflict 
intensifies, board members are victims of misattributions as they use harsh, emotional, 
hurtful, and aggressive tactics to convince other board members about their viewpoints 
(Coetzer, 2015; De Dreu, 2006; Jehn, 1995; Parayitam and Dooley, 2009; Ross and Ross, 
1989). This form of cognitive conflict damages the relationship between board members, 
lowering both affective and cognitive trust. The implication of this to boards is that when 
engaging in interaction or in task focused debates, especially during meetings, members 
should ensure that such debates donot escalate into relationship conflict. However, it is 
useful to note that even when cognitive conflict escalates into a negative emotional conflict, 
its impact on trust is not significant. 
Some researchers have investigated familiarity as a cognitive determinant of team 
outcomes (e.g. Gulati et al., 2003; Komiak and Benbasat, 2006; Littlepage et al., 1997). In 
these studies, familiarity in teams was measured by the knowledge team members have 
acquired about each other over an extended period of interaction. This study has treated 
familiarity differently by adoptingHanft’s (2002) measure of familiarity.Familiarity was treated 
as an affective determinant, suggesting that if board members share similar interests beyond 
their professional interaction, an affective form of trust could emerge in the boardroom. Their 
interestsin each others’ professional life, personalities, and personal life were used to 
capture this form of familiarity.The reason for adopting Hanft’s method was to avoid the 
limitations of previous research on team familiarity. Prior studies regarding team familiarity 
have conducted their research using concocted groups in a laboratory setting, ignoring the 
composition effects of actual organisational teams (Campion et al., 1993; Maynard, 2007). 
Therefore, this study, instead of using the commonly used measure of the history of past 
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interaction to measure familiarity, board members’ interpersonal knowledge of each other 
was adopted. Using a similar method in measuring familiarity,Maynard (2007) found that 
familiarity had no direct effect on teams’ performances. The current study has tested an 
affective form of board familiarity on trust and has similarly been found that it had no 
significance. 
How familiarity has been conceptualised and measured in this research contributes 
significantly to the literature on boards mainly in two ways. First, just as Maynard’s (2007) 
research has responded to the call for distinguishing between an affective and cognitive form 
of familiarity in Rockett and Okhuysen (2002), this study has treated familiarity as an 
affective variable as opposed to prior research. Second, while Maynard (2007) examined 
familiarity using a psychometric measure in the context of teams, this research similarly 
considered familiarity in the context of the board. However, it is useful to call to mind that 
Maynard (2007) investigated its impact on team performance while this study examined its 
impact on trust. Apart from the scanty research on familiarity in the context of boards, this 
study has similarly introduced a more detailed form of how familiarity could be perceived in 
the boardroom. By testing the variables as a determinant of trust, this study’s findings also 
contributes to academic knowledge in that there is no significant relationship between 
familiarity amongst board members and trust in the boardroom. The implication of this 
finding on board practices is that while familiarity is encouraged within teams for the purpose 
of trust building (Gulati and Sytch, 2008; Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1998; Komiak and 
Benbasat, 2006; Wilson, Straus, and McEvily, 2006;Zhang, Ghorbani, and Cohen, 2007), 
this does not apply to the boardroom. Contrary to what was hypothesised in this study, 
Maynard (2007) evidenced that the presence of overfamiliarity within teams could dampen 
the positive impact it could have on team outcome. Since familiarity is not in itself bad in the 
boardroom as shown by the positive insignificant relationship to trust, board members should 
avoid over-familiarity in the boardroom. Since trust has been found to lead to board 
performance, overfamiliarity in the boardroom could weaken board performance which could 
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be interpreted as a weakened trust. Although it is important to flag that the interaction effect 
of trust between familiarity and board performance was not tested in this research. 
6.9 Summary of Chapter 6 
There are a number of new contributions this research makes to knowledge on 
boards of directors. First, there are two key determinants of boardroom trust: perception of 
board members’ competences which has a positive relationship and affective conflict which 
has a negative relationship. Second, this study has also introduced new or refined existing 
behavioural concepts in boards such as board communication (Farquhar, 2011), board 
members’ familiarity, and perception of board members’ competences. These concepts have 
been under-researched in the context of boards. Although this research has extensively 
investigated these variables, it has provided partial understanding on how these concepts 
impact on trust. This research also adds to board literature regarding these variables. Third, 
board processes can influence each other as found with the impact of affective conflict on 
trust. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the research process, the main research findings, the 
contribution to knowledge in the light of the research objectives, and discusses the 
limitations of this study. Aspects not covered in this study that require further research will 
also be presented. The subsequent sections of this chapter are structured as follows: 7.2 is 
theresearch conclusion; 7.3 is the summary of contribution to knowledge; 7.4 discusses the 
limitation of this research; 7.5 is the recommendation for future research, and 7.6 presents 
the final summary. 
7.2 Research Conclusion 
The underlying question this research aimed to answer was ‘What cognitive and 
affective factors influence the presence of trust in boards?’. Other objectives of this research 
related to this question are to:(1) develop a conceptual of the cognitive and affective 
determinants of trust in boards; (2) empirically test the conceptual model of the relationship 
between trust and its determinants; (3)to derive the implication for theory and practice based 
on the outcome of the empirical testing. To achieve the first research objective, a detailed 
review of theliterature on the behavioural perspectives on boards within which this thesis 
contributes knowledge was carried out. In the review, two main strands of literature within 
behavioural perspectiveswere identified. The first is the behavioural theory of boards, which 
was derived from the application of the behavioural theory of the firm to boards as developed 
by van Ees et al. (2009b). The second strand was strongly influenced by Forbes and 
Milliken’s (1999) seminal paper regarding the mediating role of board processes in the 
relationship between board characteristics and board task/firm performance developed from 
the IPO model, derived from theteam and small group literature.In the review of the 
behavioural perspectives on boards, this thesis placed more emphasis on the works of 
scholarsthat have picked up from Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) paper by expanding and 
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testing hypotheses derived from IPO models in a variety of contextual settings (cf. Bettinelli, 
2011; McNulty et al., 2013; Wan and Ong, 2005; Zattoni et al., 2015). The synopsis of the 
findings of these scholars is that board processes are better predictors of board task 
performance than board structural/compositional antecedents alone.Despìte the 
considerable amount of knowledge on board behaviour and processes, there is still a call for 
a thorough understanding of the decision-making culture, interactions, and dynamics in the 
boardroom (Farquhar, 2011; Gabrielson and Huse, 2009; Huse, 2005, 2007; Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2004; Bailey and Peck, 2013; Bankewitz, 2016).Behavioural studies have treated 
processesas a mediator and were insufficiently considering determinants of these processes 
(Ong and Wan, 2005; Zattoni et al., 2015; Zona and Zattoni, 2007), including behavioural 
determinants. The review of the research on board processes led to the primary focus of this 
thesis which was to investigate the determinants of trust in boards. Trust was described as a 
condition that aids the understanding of the decision-making culture and dynamics in the 
boardroom (Bankewitz, 2016; Huse, 2005, 2007).Similarly, a number of scholars have 
placed great emphasis on the importance of trust as an underlying condition that enables 
boards to carry out their tasks more effectively (Huse, 2007; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; van 
Ees et al., 2009).In spite of this stated importance of trust to how boards function, very few 
empirical studies have examined trust in boards (Van Ees et al., 2008; 2009a; Huse and 
Zattoni, 2008; Farquhar, 2011) and its determinants. Based on these reasons among others, 
this thesis investigated trust in the boardroom. 
To investigate trust, a research model was developed, and the hypotheses showing 
the relationship between trust and its determinants were formulated. This model developed 
and tested a team level construct of trust in the boardroom, with cognitive determinants 
(cognitive conflict, theperception of board members’ competence, communication efficacy), 
affective determinants (affective conflict, board members’ familiarity) and moderators (board 
meeting frequency, board tenure).To test the relationship between trust and its determinants, 
a postal survey was administered to 905 boards of UK-listed companies. The items included 
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in the survey to test the model of relationship were developed from the review of board and 
team literature, and subjected to validity and reliability checks.  
To accomplish the second objective of this research, an empirical test of the 
conceptual model of trust and its determinants was carried out, using regression analysis 
(see Chapter 5). The result of the analysis showed that the 2main determinants of trust are 
the perception of board memberscompetence and affective conflict (H2 and H4). 
The third objective of this research was discussedin the previous chapter in Section 
6.8 which is regarding the theoretical and practical implication of the findings of this 
research.A summary of these findings will be presented in 7.3 of this chapter. Also, the 
limitations of this research and recommendation for future research will be discussed in 
subsequent sections. 
7.3 Summary of the Research and Contribution to Knowledge 
The cognitive conflict of board members, how they perceive each other’s 
competencies, their communication efficacy, affective conflict, and their familiarity levels 
were regressed to discover how they explain trust in the boardroom. In this research, the 
main contribution to knowledge is that there are2main determinants of trust in the 
boardroom. The first determinant is the perception of board members’ competence at a 
cognitive level, whereas affective conflict is the second determinant of trust but at an 
affective level. Where affective conflict is negatively related to trust, the perception of board 
members’ competence was found to impact on trust in the boardroom positively. The survey 
found that in responding boards, cognitive conflict and familiarity tended to be high, but that 
communication efficacy had room for improvement. Nevertheless, none of these were found 
to influence trust in the board. 
Apart from focusing on trust in the boardroom, there are other significant 
contributions of this research to board literature. First, this study is a response to the call for 
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research from scholars regarding trigger factors to board processes (e.g. Farquhar, 2011; 
Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005). Thus, by 
investigating trust, this research intended to ignite further research on the determinants of 
board processes in a way that departs from the patternfound in board behaviour and board 
process literature which is dominated by the impact of board processes on board task 
performance. Second, board process literature has atomised board processes when 
examining how they impact on board performance. They have failed to consider the 
possibility of board processes triggering one another. What the result of this research 
showsis that processes do not necessarily work ‘side by side’, rather that they can influence 
each other. For example, the results of this study showed that affective conflict is a 
determinant of trust. Both affective conflict and trust are board processes. Also, it was found 
that affective conflict could undermine trust in the boardroom. Thus, the mixed findings, for 
example on the effects of affective conflict on board task performance (Ong and Wan, 2005; 
Farquhar, 2011; Heemskerk et al., 2015), may be explained by its effects on lowering board 
trust.  Third, this study has also introduced new or refined existing behavioural concepts in 
boards’literature. These concepts are board communication efficacy (Farquhar, 2011), board 
members’ familiarity, and perception of board members’ competencies. The more notable 
one is how familiarity has been measured in this research. Familiarity has been measured as 
a behavioural concept more in the context of teams,and researchers have commonly used 
the number of years working together as a measurement of familiarity. The method of 
measuring familiarity has been refined overtime and is now treated as a multi-dimensional 
construct. At three levels (i.e. professional life, personal life, and personality), familiarity is 
tested using psychometric measures (Hanft, 2002; Maynard, 2007). This relatively new way 
of measuring familiarity was adopted into this research, making the first time familiarity is 
measure in the context of corporateboards either as a behavioural concept or using a 
psychometric measurement. Although this research has not carried out an in-depth 
investigation of these variables (i.e. familiarity, the perception of board members’ 
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competence, and communication efficacy), it has provided partial knowledge regarding the 
impact it has on a board process such a trust.  
7.4 Limitations of this Research 
There are 5 main limitations to this research that should be identified. The first main 
limitation has to do with the relatively low response rate. This is a common limitation in board 
research because gathering data from boards is extraordinarily difficult and for this reason, 
many board researchers opt for archival data gathering techniques (Daily et al., 2003). With 
the low response rate, the sample size on which this research is based is relativelylow, and it 
could stimulate skepticism about the extent of generalisability of the research. However, the 
response rate and sample size is not substantially lower than that in other board studies 
(e.g. Minichilli et al., 2009 = 15%; van Ees et al., 2009a = 10.5%). Furthermore, a check for 
non-response bias showed no significant disparity between the sample and the population. 
The second limitation of this research has to do with the type of board on which the findings 
of this research are based. The United Kingdom adopts a one-tier board system which 
includes both executive and non-executive directors. Whilst this was a helpful empirical 
setting to study trust and its determinants, it is nevertheless difficult to generalise the findings 
of this research to other countries such as Germany that adopt a 2-tier or a multiple tier 
board model. Further research could usefully test the developed model of trust and its 
determinants in other countries or in a cross-country study. The third limitation of this 
research has to do with the nature of this research. This research falls into the category of a 
cross-sectional study. A cross-sectional study is a research carried out based on data 
collated at a specific point in time. Thus, the research could only test for associations, and 
not make claims to causality. Longitudinal studies, or repeat surveys like the one done by 
Huse and colleagues (e.g. Machold et al., 2011), could test how sequences of processes 
evolve. The fourth limitation is related to how trust was conceptualised and modelled. This 
research has considered a team level construct of trust rather than how trust can be 
perceived in the boardroom at an interpersonal level. At an interpersonal level, there are 
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other conditions to trust such as consistency, discretion, loyalty, honesty, and integrity that 
were not included in the model of trust and its determinants (Butler, 1991; Butler, 1999; 
Gabarro, 1978, Ross and LaCroix, 1996). Moreover, trust is a complex construct with multi-
dimensional casual and formal conditions at an interpersonal and intrateam level that 
deserves further investigation (Butler, 1999). The fifth limitation relates to the research 
method adopted in this research. This research has used the orthodox deductive method as 
there is no apriori reason found in board literature to use the alternative inductive method 
when examining trust in the boardroom. Using a quantitative research method, this study 
was able to identify 2 significant determinants of trust which are the perception of board 
members’ competence and affective conflict. Adopting a qualitative method or a mixed 
method could enhance the understanding of how trust is triggered in the boardroom by its 
determinants, especially by those determinants found not to have a significant impact on 
trust. 
7.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
The limitations of this research discussed in the previous section have highlighted 
areas that require further research. First, the determinants of trust examined in this research 
are not exhaustive as trust is multi-dimensional and a complex concept (Butler, 1999). There 
are other determinants identified in a variety of contexts in team literature (e.g. interpersonal 
trust) that could also facilitate trust in the boardroom. This study has primarily focused on 
intra-team trust and has not considered other determinants identified in team literature to see 
if these determinants could vary the outcome of this research. Therefore, further research 
into the determinants of trust, particularly on an interpersonal level is recommended. 
Second, although this research has commenced the research into the determinants of board 
process, this study has not covered other board processes that require research regarding 
what triggers them in the boardroom. An example of such board processes are the use of 
knowledge and skills, effort norms, and cognitive and affective conflicts. Research into these 
other board porcesses in terms of their trigger factors could contribute to the further 
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understanding of what happens in the boardroom, board behaviours, and how board 
processes contribute to board effectiveness. Therefore, research that follows through from 
the findings of this research is recommended.Third, as identified in the previous section, one 
of the limitations of this research is that it has favoured the classical deductive method. 
Perhaps, the use of an alternative method or mixing methods could enhance the 
understanding of the relationship between trust and its determinants. As a recommendation 
for future research, using a qualitative method that brings the researcher even closer to the 
boardroom could help to empirically establish the impact of the proposed determinants of 
trust (i.e. familiarity, cognitive conflict, and communication efficacy) found to be insignificant 
in this study. Fourth, in Chapter 6, Section 6.5 Determinants of Trust: Cognitive Conflict, it 
was discussed that the possible explanation for the insignificant negative relationship 
between cognitive conflict and trust is the mitigating impact of affective conflict. It was also 
identified that it is beyond the scope of this research to examine the relationship between 
affective conflict and cognitive conflict. However, the result of the correlation analysis 
reported in Table 5.2 of Chapter 5 Data Analysis: Result and Findings, it was found that 
there is a significant negative correlation between affective and cognitive conflict. This 
highlights a potential area for future research. Team researchers have tested this 
relationship in teams, top management teams, and workgroups (Amason and Sapienza, 
1997; Jehn et al., 1999; Mooney et al, 2007; Pelled et al., 1999; Simons and Peterson, 
2000), others have examined the pivotal role of trust when considering the relationship 
between these two forms of trust (Simons and Peterson, 2000). There are no studies that 
have considered the relationship between cognitive and affective conflict in the context of 
boards to best of my knowledge. Therefore, examining 'the relationship between board 
cognitive and affective conflict while considering the key role of trust' is recommended as an 
area for future research.Fifth, as identified the introductory section of this thesis, researchers 
that have investigated board processes have often atomised them and not considered the 
inter-relationship between them. The finding of this research regarding the significant 
relationship between affective conflict and trust has established that research on board 
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processes should go beyond an isolative treatment, and should be considered with the 
possibility of cross-interaction between board processes. Therefore, this thesis recommends 
the investigation of the possible inter-relationship between other board processes as a 
potential area for future research. 
7.6 Final Conclusion 
This research has responded to the call for further research into the determinants of 
board processes. By investigating the determinants of trust, this study has made auseful 
contribution to theliterature on board processes and board practices. Previous research has 
suggested that the board process trust is an imperative determinant of board effectiveness. 
As a contribution to behavioural perspectives on boards, this research found 2significant 
determinants of the board process trust. These determinants are the perception of board 
members' competencies which was found to have a positive impact on trust, and the 
adverse impact of affective conflict on trust. By empirically unveiling what conditions in the 
boardroom facilitates of trust, this research enhances understanding of how trust leads to 
board effectiveness. The findings of this research also hassignificant implications for board 
practices. The presence of trust in the boardroom is necessary for board effectiveness and 
for directors to achieve the require level of trust, the finding of this study identifies 
2significant factors that make this possible. First, directors need to engage in activities that 
enable members to perceive their competencies. Activities such as the training and 
development that augment the skills of board members would cognitively increase the level 
of trust board members have in the boardroom. Second, in order to increase trust in the 
boardroom at an affective level, the findings of this research show that affective conflicts 
need to be mitigated. The responsibility of reducing the occurrence of emotional conflict in 
the boardroom largely rests on the chairperson of the board. Board meetings should be 
moderated in a way that encourages a healthy interaction in the boardroom, hence, 
effectively managing affective conflicts. 
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Appendices 





DETERMINANTS OF BOARD PROCESSES: TRUST IN THE BOARDROOM 
Thank you for taking part in this survey. The purpose of this research is to investigate the determinants of trust in 
the boardroom. Previous research has suggested that ‘trust’ is an important determinant of board effectiveness. 
Examining the determinants of trust in the boardroom will enhance the understanding of what makes a board 
more effective. The study should also help in improving corporate governance. 
 
This questionnaire will take no longer than 20 minutes to complete. Any information you provide will be treated in 
strictest confidence and will be used in a thesis leading to an award of doctor of philosophy. Only summaries and 
aggregate data will be included in the final report, and no individuals or organisations will be identified. All data 
will be collected and stored with regard to data protection laws. 
 
If you require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me at the following address: 
Michael A. Ogunseyin 
University of Wolverhampton Business School 
MN Building, Nursery Street 
Wolverhampton, WV1 1AD 
United Kingdom 
Email: M.a.ogunseyin@wlv.ac.uk 
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BOARD PRACTICES 
In this section we are asking you for your perceptions regarding the practices of your board. There are no right or 
wrong answers, all we are interested in is gaining an understanding about the extent to which these practices do 
or do not exist in your organisation. 
Instructions on filling in this section of the questionnaire 
 
Please read each of the following statements carefully and tick (X) the number that corresponds to the extent to 
which your board is involved in the practices: 
 
7 = Strongly Agree (Yes, the statement perfectly describes our board practices.) 
6 = Agree (Yes, the statement describes our board practices.) 
5 = Slightly Agree (Yes, but only to some extent does the statement describes our board practices.) 
4 = Neither Agree nor disagree (I don’t know.) 
3 = Slightly Disagree (No, to some extent the statement does not describe our board practices.) 
2 = Disagree (No, the statement does not describe our board practices.) 
1 = Strongly Disagree (No, the statement does not describe our board practices at all.) 
 
  
Strongly                 Neutral                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                 Agree 
 
 
1 There is considerable trust amongst members of the board ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
2 I know I can strongly depend on other board members ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
3 Other members of the board know they can rely on my full support ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
4 I trust all members on my board ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
5 Board members have complete trust in each other’s level of competence ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
6 Board members operate with absolute integrity ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
7 Board members consider the viewpoints of other members ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
8 Decisions are arrived at amicably ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
9 Discussions are open and candid ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
10 The atmosphere on the board encourages critical thinking ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
11 Discussions at board meetings often result in a clear decision ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
12 It is common for the directors of this board to have differences of 
opinions 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
13 Board members are capable of performing their role ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
14 Board members are knowledgeable about the task that needs to be 
done 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
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Strongly                 Neutral                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                 Agree 
 
 
15 Board members are successful in the things they try to do ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
16 Board members are confident about the skills of other board members ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
17 Board members have specialized capabilities that can help to 
increase board performance 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
18 Board members are well qualified for the task of the board ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
19 Board members communicate frequently about tasks ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
20 Board members spend a lot of time discussing how tasks are to be 
completed 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
21 Board members are clear on how board tasks are to be accomplished ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
22 Board members are provided with a clear explanation of what each 
task involves 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
23 Board members understand how to perform their duties ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
24 There are personality clashes during the process of decision making 
in the boardroom 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
25 Board members do not get along very well ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
26 Board members are not ready to cooperate ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
27 At least one director disagrees with a decision made in the boardroom ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
28 Emotional conflict is often evident on this board ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
29 Anger occurs amongst some members of the board at most meetings ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
30 There is rarely any personal friction between directors at the board 
meeting 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
31 Our board is involved in making proposals on the company’s long 
term strategies and main goals 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
32 Our board is involved in taking decisions on the company’s long term 
strategies and goals 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
33 Our board is involved in putting decisions on the company’s long term 
strategies and main goals into action 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
34 Our board is involved in controlling the follow-up of decisions on the 
company’s long-term strategies 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
35 Board members monitor top management’s decisions and decision-
making 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
36 Board members evaluate the performance of top executives ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
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Strongly                 Neutral                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                 Agree 
 
 
37 The board has an internal mechanism to evaluate firm performance 
yearly 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
38 Board members are formally evaluated by other board members ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
39 Board members analyse budget allocation versus performance ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
40 Board members require information showing progress against targets ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
41 Board members engage in succession planning for the CEO ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
42 Board members contribute with advice on legal and technical 
accounting issues 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
43 Board members contribute with advice on financial issues (internal 
financing and investment) 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
44 Board members contribute with advice on technical issues (i.e. both 
production and information technology) 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
45 Board members contribute with advice on marketing issues ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
46 Our board and its board members act as mentors for the CEO and the 
firm 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
47 Board members contribute to building networks ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
48 Board members contribute to lobbying and building legitimacy ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
49 The company and the board often take advantage of the board 
members’ networks to gather information/intelligence and advice 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ 
50 Our board is involved in making decisions on the company’s long term 
strategies and main goals 
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In this section, we are asking about the extent to which you are familiar with other board members. There are no 
right or wrong answers; all we are interested in is gaining an understanding about the extent to which board 
members are familiar with each other's professional life, personal life, and personalities. 
Instruction on filling in this section of the questionnaire 
Please read each attribute carefully and select the answer that corresponds with the extent to which you are 
familiar with other board members: 
4 = To a Great Extent (Very familiar.) 
3 = To a Reasonable Extent (Moderately familiar.) 
2 = To a Limited Extent (Slightly familiar.) 
1 = Not at all (Not at all familiar.) 
 
                                                                                                                     Not at                                        To a Great 
                                                                                                                      All                                               Extent 
 
1 Strength and Weaknesses ① ② ③ ④ 
2 Competences ① ② ③ ④ 
3 Reputation ① ② ③ ④ 
4 Work Performance ① ② ③ ④ 
5 Abilities ① ② ③ ④ 
6 Values, Attitudes, and Beliefs ① ② ③ ④ 
7 Likes and Dislikes ① ② ③ ④ 
8 Background (i.e. Education, employment history, etc) ① ② ③ ④ 
9 Hobbies ① ② ③ ④ 
10 Family Situation (i.e. married, divorced, kids, etc) ① ② ③ ④ 
11 Trustworthiness ① ② ③ ④ 
12 Honesty ① ② ③ ④ 
13 Conscientiousness ① ② ③ ④ 
14 Dependability ① ② ③ ④ 
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INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR BOARD 




How many members are there on your board? 





How many are non-executive directors? 
Please fill in the numbers of: 




Is the Chairperson the same as the CEO? 
 




How many of your board members are male? 
Please fill in the numbers of: 




When was the latest appointment to the board? 
Please fill in the numbers of months: 




How many board meetings do you have in a year on an 
average? 
Please fill in the numbers of: 
                                               Board Meetings 
 
INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR ORGANISATION 




Which of the following sectors does your company operate 
in? 
 
□ Construction            □ Manufacturing 




What was the total number of your employees in the last 
financial year? 





What was your company’s turnover for the last financial 
year? 
Please fill in the value: 
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INFORMATION ABOUT YOURSELF 




What is your gender?  
 




What is your position on the board? 
Please tick which applies to you: 




How long have you served on the board of your company? 
Please fill in the numbers: 




Would you like to receive an executive summary of the research? If yes, please complete the 
following section: 
 
I would like to receive an executive summary of the research at the following address: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
